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1. Executive	Summary	
Through	 the	 cases	 of	 interoperable	 EU	 databases,	 like	 VIS,	 SIS	 and	 EES,	 and	 space-based,	
networked	 surveillance	 pursued	 under	 the	 EURUSOUR	 project,	 this	 report	
details	 the	 intensification	and	proliferation	of	public	private	 interactions	 concerning	European	
Union	infrastructures	of	border	control.	 It	argues	that	this	has	accelerated	a	drive	towards	the	
securitization	and	militarization	of	European	border	control.	Through	a	methodology	 involving	
the	construction	of	several	databases,	and	multi-sourced	desk	research	into	the	actors,	networks	
and	 instruments	 underpinning	 EU	 border	 control,	 the	 report	 links	 these	 tendenciesto	 the	
conjunction	 between	 EU	 institutions	 and	 private	 actors	 from	 the	 European	 security	
and	defence	sector.	It	examines	the	various	lobbying	strategies	and	forums	effectuated	by	actors	
on	the	market	for	EU	border	control,	and	how	it	connects	to	industrial	ambitions	of	widening	and	
standardized	 of	 future	 markets.	 It	 argues	 thatthe	 blurring	 of	 public	 and	 private	
interests	has	 transformed	many	aspects	of	EU	border	 control	 into	 increasingly	profitable	 sites	
for	 multisectoral	 marketinterventions.	 Much	 of	 this	 development	 has	 been	 engineered	 in	
specialized	and	closed	forums,	such	as	expert	workshops,	task	forces,	technical	studies,	pilots,	or	
advisory	groups	and	technological	platforms	steering	not	just	policies,	but	also	the	formulation	of	
research	and	development	priorities	of	funding	programmes,	like	the	FP7	and	Horizon2020.		
Accordingly,	the	report	identifies	several	R&D	projects	and	framework	contracts	pertaining	to	
interoperable	border	databases	and	the	EUROSUR	project,	which	have	been	awarded	a	number	
of	the	same	big	security	and	defence	companies	in	Europe.	These	actors,	the	report	argues,	are	
involved	 in	 EU	 border	 infrastructures	 on	 the	 levels	 of	 strategy,	 planning,	 advisory	 input	 and	
technical	expertise,	but	also	as	product	suppliers	for	the	“end	users”,	that	is	the	EU	or	national	
agencies	 and	 bodies	 tasked	with	 border	 control.	 By	 comparison,	 voices	 stressing	 the	 need	 to	
safeguard	 the	 rights	of	 those	displaced	are	excluded	 from	anywhere	near	 the	 same	access	 to	
formal	and	informal	policy-making	forums.	The	different	levels	on	which	vested	interests	affect	
policy-making	on	EU	border	control	is	further	illustrated	when	considering	the	financial	dynamics	
underpinning	the	conglomerate	actors	involved	in	border	control,	through	shareholding,	grants,	
loans	and	credits.	It	argues	that	the	strategic	and	operational	influence	on	border-making	yielded	
by	global	finance	is	an	understuded	aspect	of	the	militarization	of	EU	borders,	and	suggests	paths	
to	remedy	this.	From	within	a	framework	of	forward-looking	and	sustainable	policy	based	on	the	
respect	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 democratic	 transparency,	 the	 report	 details	 how	 this	
development	leads	to	technological	and	political	lock-in	effects.	These	make	it	diffulcult	for	policy-
makers	to	question	or	reverse	the	functionality	of	the	EU	borders	as	well	as	the	norms	embedded	
within	infrastructures	such	as	the	VIS,	SIS,	EES	or	EUROSUR	systems.	These	dynamics	pose	serious	
challenges	 not	 just	 to	 the	 democratic	 legitimacy	 and	 transparency	 of	 the	 EU’s	 multileved	
governance	of	borders,	but	also	to	the	balance	struck	between	short-sighted,	vested	interests,	
and	the	respect	for	fundamental	rights,	including	to	privacy	and	protection.	
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2. Introduction	
This	 report	 concerns	 the	 implications	 of	 public-private	 relations	 for	 EU	 border	 control	
infrastructures.	 In	 recent	 decades,	 European	 border	 control	 has	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 a	 growing	
number	of	public,	private	and	technological	discussions	and	initiatives	at	the	EU-level	connected	
to	practices	of	enforcement	and	infrastructures	of	border	control.	Some	are	physical,	like	border	
guards,	others,	 such	as	biometric	databases	 and	maritime	 surveillance	 systems	are	digital	 and	
technological.	 Dominant	 discourses	 typically	 depict	 border	 technologies,	 new	 security	 systems	
and	the	private	actors	developing	them	as	a	panacea	to	deal	with	irregular.	These		systems	are	
intimately	 linked	to	political	and	economic	 interests,	both	at	the	national	 levels	of	EU	Member	
States	 and	 within	 EU	 agencies	 and	 institutions.	 Taking	 this	 nexus	 of	 interests	 into	 account	 is	
emerging	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 complex,	 important	 and	 underexamined	 areas	 in	 European	
immigration	politics,	these	years.	Given	the	laudable	focus	of	the	United	Nations	Human	Rights	
Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	(OHCHR)	on	the	role	of	private	military	and	security	companies	
in	 immigration	 and	 border	management	 and	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 all	
migrants,	 this	 report	 attempts	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 larger	 developments	 and	 problems	 facing	 this	
policy	development.	It	is	based	on	the	premise	that	any	careful	analysis	of	EU	border	control	must	
take	into	account	the	political	economy	underpinning	border	control	technologies,	and	how	these	
and	 the	political	decisions	accompanying	 them	can	be	 shaped	by	other	actors	 than	 the	public	
bodies	and	institutions	of	the		EU	or	its	Member	States.		
A	sustainable	policy	on	migration	that	takes	into	account	the	safeguarding	of	fundamental	
rights	 must	 therefore	 acknowledge	 this	 supply-chain	 of	 border	 technologies,	 functions	 and	
infrastructures.	It	needs	to	consider	how	the	development	of	EU	border	control	also	happens	as	a	
result	 of	 how	 commercial	 actors	 position	 themselves,	 and	 are	positioned	by	policy-makers,	 as	
central	 nodes	 on	markets	 for	 EU	border	 control	worth	 billions	 of	 euro.	 Such	 a	 perspective	 on	
border	control	challenges	standard	assumptions	privileging	the	territorial	unit	of	the	nation-state,	
or	the	stated	self-image	of	the	EU	as	a	supranational	Area	of	Freedom,	Security	and	Justice	(AFSJ).	
It	 amounts	 to	 an	 important	 decentring	 of	 the	 focal	 points	 determing	 how	 border	 control	 is	
analyzed,	as	it	does	not	limit	critical	scrutiny	to	the	dictates	of	national	or	EU	politicians,	but	also	
observes	how	commercial	actors	not	bound	by	the	same	rules	of	accountability,	are	increasingly	
crucial	 for	 the	 development,	 adoption	 and	 implementation	 of	 EU	 measures	 related	 to	
immigration.		
The	aim	of	this	report	is	therefore	to	assist	the	OHCHR	in	identifying	and	discussing	some	
of	the	key	actors,	processes	and	networks	in	the	political	economy	of	EU	border	control	pertaining	
to	two	central	policy	drives,	namely:	 Interoperability	of	biometric	databases,	and	transnational	
surveillance	systems	at	the	union´s	external	borders.	While	a	focus	on	these	two	themes	is	not	
exhaustive,	it	is	argued	to	be	able	to	demonstrate	dynamics,	silences,	controversies	and	criticism,	
which	needs	to	be	addressed	in	EU	border	control.	Its	findings	and	methods	build	on	the	report	
“The	political	 economy	of	 EU	entry	 governance”	 (Lemberg-Pedersen,	 Rübner	Hansen	 and	 Joel	
Halpern	2020).	Not	a	legal	analysis	of	rights	violations,	its	focus	is	on	how	path	dependencies,	lock-
in	effect	and	opaque	relations	behind	the	construction	of	EU	border	control	infrastructures	have	
implications	for	the	lack	of	protection	of	migrants	rights	to	protection.	
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3. Methodology	
This	report	identifies	important	public-private	interactions	in	the	political	economy	of	EU	border	
control	 by	 collecting	 and	 tracing	 contracts	 from	 the	 EU	 agencies	 and	 funding	 programme	 of,	
respectively,	 Frontex,	 EU-Lisa	 and	 Horizon	 2020,	 Research	 Framework	 Programmes	 and	 the	
Copernicus	Programme.	All	of	these	contracts	were	collected	in	an	Excel	database,	the	starting	
point	of	which	was	set	at	2007.		
A	 second	 database	 was	 also	 built	 in	 Excel	 concerning	 information	 about	 meetings	
between	European	Commission	representatives	and	the	dominant	companies	on	the	market	for	
EU	border	control	in	order	to	examine	the	engagement	of	border	industrial	actors	with	EU	policy-
makers.	The	information	was	collected	from	the	EU	Transparency	Register.	and	included	data	on	
who	the	companies	met	with,	when	they	met,	where	and	what	the	subject	of	the	meeting	was.	
Information	was	also	stored	on	the	portfolios	of	the	Commission	representatives.	This	allows	for	
the	 construction	 of	 several	 timelines	 visualizing	 the	 number	 of	 registered	 meetings	 between	
companies,	sectors	and	Commission	representatives	and	portfolios.	
	 Complementing	the	databases,	this	report	also	relies	on	open	source	data	from	publicly	
available	policy	documents,	policy	 reports,	 technical	 studies	and	cost	assessments.	These	have	
been	identified	in	particular	through	the	EU-portal	Cordis,	which	has	been	used	to	generate	all	
objective	 and	 project	 descriptions	 quoted	 about	 consortiums	 under	 FP7	 and	 Horizon	 2020.	
Moreover,	webpages	of	relevant	agencies	and	programmes,	such	as	Frontex,	EU-Lisa,	Copernicus,	
EUROSUR,	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	have	also	been	used.	Other	 sources	of	data	on,	 respectively,	
private	 interests	 in	EU	border	control	and	on	lobbyism	in	EU	institutions	 included	reports	from	
Statewatch,	 Stop	 Wapenhandel,	 and	 the	 Transnational	 Institute,	 as	 well	 as	 lobbyfacts.eu,	
Corporate	Europe	Observatory	and	Transparency	 International’s	 Integrity	Watch.	 Together,	 this	
allows	 for	 analyses	 in	 some	detail	 how	companies’	 impact	 the	 	policy-making	processes	of	 EU	
border	governance	and	how	this	connects	to	the	infrastructural	and	technological	development	
of	border	control.	
	 The	report	has	a	set	of	delimitations.	First,	 its	 focus	on	European	actors,	networks	and	
policies	means	that	it	does	not	inquire	into	the	role	of	private	actors	in	other	important	border	
control	in	other	contexts	around	the	world.	Moreover,	the	focus	also	means	that	the	report	does	
not	engage	with	a	series	of	other	funding	 instruments,	 like	the	EU	Trust	Fund	for	Africa,	Home	
Affairs	Fund,	including	the	External	Borders	Fund,	the	SOLID	programme,	the	DCI	Programme,	the	
Aeneas	Programme	and	the	B7-667	budget	line.	Others	also	excluded	are	the	Instrument	for	Pre-
Accession	(IPA),	the	European	Neighbourhood	Instrument	(ENI)	and	the	European	Development	
Fund	(EDF).	This	means	that	it	does	not	engage	with	general,	and	vital,	concerns	about	the	political	
economy	of	EU	externalization	of	border	control	to	territories	or	actors	beyond	Union	territory	
(see	f.i.	Lemberg-Pedersen,	2013;	Moreno-Lax	and	Lemberg-Pedersen,	2019).	Nor,	does	it,	despite	
interesting	perspectives,	map	out	the	flows	of	money	from	EU	instruments	and	back	into	national	
economies.	 Such	 a	 task,	 however,	 also	 faces	 the	 challenge	 of	 states´	 lacking	 will	 to	 disclose	
contracts	for	bilateral	arms	and	control	equipment	sales.	
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It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 data	 from	 the	 Transparency	 Register	 is	 incomplete.	
Although	the	Juncker	Commissioners	in	2014	announced	plans	to	improve	the	Register,	which	was	
set	up	in	2008,	in	order	to	“seek	to	ensure	an	appropriate	balance	and	representativeness	in	the	
stakeholders	they	meet”	(IntegrityWatch,	2019),	it	still	suffers	from	several	flaws:	It	is	voluntary	
for	companies	and	lobbying	groups	to	register	their	activities.	This	means	that	many	do	not,	whilst	
others	underreport	them	and	the	associated	lobbyism	expenses	(Alter-EU,	2013).	Moreover,	no	
equivalent	transparency	tool	exists	for	examining	the	interaction	of	the	Council	or	Parliament	with	
private	companies,	interest	organizations	or	communication	and	consultancy	firms,	which	makes	
quantifiable,	 cross-institutional	 comparisons	 impossible.	 As	 of	 2019,	 the	 Commission,	 the	
European	Parliament	and	Council	were	still	negotiating	the	adoption	of	a	mandatory	transparency	
register	for	all	three	institutions	(Integrity	Watch,	2019).	Consequently,	while	the	report	does	not	
represent	 an	 exhaustive	 mapping	 of	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 global	 or	 even	 EU	 border	
governance,	it	does	offer	an	illustrative	and	case-based	analysis	that	brings	crucial	questions	and	
criticisms	into	light,	contributing	new	knowledge	and	facilitates	attempts	by	civil	society	and	non-
state	 actors	 to	 understand	 the	 actors,	 networks	 and	 processes	 influencing	 the	 current	
development	of	border	control.	
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4. The	market	for	EU	border	control		
This	report	focuses	on	for-profit	commercial	actors	and	interest	organizations	from	the	European	
sectors	 of	 biometrics,	 security,	 defence	 and	 aerospace,	 and	 their	 involvement	 in	 making	 a	
multifaceted	 and	 expanding	market	 for	 EU	 border	 control.	 Either	 directly,	 or	 through	 interest	
organizations,	consultancy	firms	and	communications	bureaus,	these	actors	seek	to	gain	access	to	
EU	policy-makers	 in	order	to	ensure	profit,	growth	and	the	strengthening	of	 their	markets	and	
market	positionality	(cf.	Lemberg-Pedersen,	2013;	Kumar,	2017;	Baird,	2018).	That	the	potential	
profit	is	huge,	is	illustrated	by	estimates	that	the	global	market	for	biometric	systems	will	be	worth	
€65,3	billion	by	2024	(Market	and	Markets,	2019).	
In	general,	these	commercial	non-state	actors	can	influence	EU	policy	through	strategies	
of	public-private	partnerships,	lobbyism,	private	rule-	and	standard-setting	and	of	framing	their	
input	 as	 expert	 knowledge	 (Ibid.;	 Baird	 2018).	 These	 strategies	 are	 pursued	 in	 different	ways.	
Lobbyists	 may	 target	 the	 European	 Commission,	 responsible	 for	 the	 formulation	 of	 new	
legislation,	 via	 consultative	 processes	 and	 expert	 groups	 officially	 formed	 by	 the	 Commission,	
often	relating	to	specific	issues	or	challenges	(cf.	Coen	and	Richardson,	2009;	Bouwen,	2004).	
	
4.1	Public	funds	to	a	multisectoral	market	for	EU	border	control	
Conventionally,	within	the	realm	of	migration	politics,	the	concept	of	a	market	for	border	control	
has	been	used	to	describe	both	markets	for	enforcement	and	markets	for	border	infrastructures.	
The	current	report	focuses	especially	on	the	latter	market,	but	it	is	worth	noting	that	even	within	
this	perspective,	it	is	in	fact	extremely	multifaceted,	and	operates	across	a	wide	range	of	sectors.	
While	the	current	report	follows	existing	work	in	focusing	on	the	sectors	of	aerospace,	defence,	
biometrics	and	security,	the	information	collected	on	our	database	illustrate	a	plethora	of	small	
and	medium-sized	 businesses	 (SMEs)	 who	 also	 reap	 smaller	 contracts	 concerning	 IT,	 housing,	
interpretation,	health,	cleaning,	layout/design,	software,	conference	and	meetings,	consultancies,	
maritime	or	aviation	services,	office	supplies	or	transportation.		
In	 what	 follows,	 Tables	 1-4	 are	 used	 to	 generate	 a	 snapshot	 of	 current	 procurement	
practices	among	the	key	agencies	in	EU	border	control	between	2012-2018.	They	also	illustrate	
that	even	if	a	certain	diversity	is	observable	among	the	largest	contracts	granted	by	agencies	like	
Frontex,	EU-Lisa,	Copernicus,	and	under	Horizon	2020,	it	is	nervetheless	a	small	number	of	capital-
intensive	sectors	like	ICT,	biometrics,	aerospace	and	defence,	with	aviation	services	as	a	possible	
exception,	which	are	consistently	awarded	the	biggest	contractors	by	EU	agencies.			
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Table	1	-	Top	recipients	of	contracts	for	border	control	awarded	by	Frontex,	2012-2018.	
Frontex	was	founded	in	2004	through	Regulation	2007/2004	which	stated	that	“Community	policy	
in	the	field	of	the	EU	external	borders	aims	at	an	integrated	management	ensuring	a	uniform	and	
high	 level	 of	 control	 and	 surveillance,	which	 is	 a	necessary	 corollary	 to	 the	 free	movement	of	
persons	within	the	European	Union	and	a	fundamental	component	of	an	area	of	freedom,	security	
and	justice	(European	Council,	2004,	p.1).	Its	first	major	operation	was	the	Hera	operations,	which	
took	place	in	the	territorial	waters	of	Senegal,	Mauritania	and	Cap	Verde	in	2006-7.		
	 The	Frontex	R&D	Unit	was	set	up	to	facilitate	information	exchange	on	the	surveillance	of	
the	EU’s	external	borders	between	Member	States’	border	guard	authorities,	research	institutes,	
universities	 and	 industry.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 Unit	 participates	 in	 numerous	 fairs,	 conferences,	
workshops	 and	 luncheons.	 Notably,	 it	 has	 participated	 in	 several	 EU	 expert	 forums	 alongside	
industry	 representatives.	On	 behalf	 of	 the	 Agency,	 the	Unit	 has	 also	 organized	 several	 border	
technology	 workshops,	 such	 as	 drones	 or	 biometrics,	 providing	 “industry	 with	 the	 chance	 to	
demonstrate	the	capabilities”	of	their	products,	as	one	such	workshop	in	Bulgaria	was	presented	
(Frontex,	2010).	Illustrating	the	challenges	with	such	close	relations	to	industry,	Frontex	was	found	
to	give	payments	varying	from	€10.000	to	€198.000,	to	European	security	and	defence	companies	
exhibiting	their	wares	during	such	events	(Fotiadis	and	Ciobanu,	2013).	
In	July	2011,	the	mandate	of	Frontex	was	amended,	blurring	the	boundaries	between	the	
Agency	and	industrial	interests	interests	further.	While	Frontex’s	previous	mandate	described	the	
Agency’s	 function	as	one	of	 “following	up”	on	 research	 into	border	 control,	 the	new	mandate	
stated	that	it	should	“proactively	monitor	and	contribute	to	the	developments	in	research	relevant	
for	 the	 control	 and	 surveillance	 of	 the	 external	 borders”	 (EU	 Parliament,	 2011a).	 Moreover,	
Frontex	was	also	allowed	to	build	a	permanent	pool	of	equipment	itself	through	purchase	or	lease,	
Agency Year Contract	title Contractor Sector Value	of	contract	(€)
Frontex 2018 Aerial	Surveillance Diamond-Executive	Aviation Surveillance 4.793.875,00
Frontex 2017 Aerial	Surveillance Diamond-Executive	Aviation Surveillance 3.929.247,00
Frontex 2017 Organization	of	Frontex	events	outside	
Poland
Adria	Congrex	srl Events 3.102.242,00
Frontex 2017 Provision	of	travel	desk	services	
(transportation	and	accommodation	
bookings)	for	Frontex
eTravel	SA Events 2.755.265,59
Frontex 2016 Provision	of	services	and	delivery	of	goods	
for	the	maintainance	and	development	of	
the	EUROSUR	network
GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence	S.A.U. Surveillance 2.597.863,24
Frontex 2017 Aerial	Surveillance EASP	Air	BV Surveillance 2.145.525,00
Frontex 2016 Software	development	services Asseco	Poland ICT 2.082.275,50
Frontex 2015 Maintenance	and	development	of	the	
Eurosur	Network
GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence	S.A.U Surveillance 2.042.403,81
Frontex 2016 Provision	of	travel	desk	services	
(transportation	and	accommodation	
bookings)	for	Frontex
eTravel	SA Events 2.034.831,27
Frontex 2013 Information	Systems Asseco	Poland	S.A ICT 1.903.303,99
Frontex 2018 Provision	of	ICT	products	and	services	for	
Eurosur
GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence	S.A.U. ICT 1.887.738,07
Frontex 2018 Software	development	services	-	FWC	with	
reopening	of	competition
Asseco	Poland ICT 1.819.391,50
Frontex 2013 Maintenance	and	development	of	the	
Eurosur	Network
GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence	S.A.U Surveillance 1.756.895,98
Frontex 2017 Aerial	Surveillance CAE	Aviation	s.a.r.l. Surveillance 1.746.000,00
Frontex 2017 Provision	of	services	and	delivery	of	goods	
for	the	maintainance	and	development	of	
the	EUROSUR	network
GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence	S.A.U Surveillance 1.744.950,37
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rather	than	loaning	equipment	from	Member	States	as	before.	This	positioned	the	agency	in	the	
double	role	of	not	only	monitoring	and	fostering	industry,	but	also	becoming	its	direct	end-user.	
This	 legislative	 drive	 was	 continued	 with	 Regulation	 2016/1624	 stating	 that	 Frontex	 should	
“participate	in	the	development	and	management	of	research	and	innovation	activities	relevant	
for	the	control	and	surveillance	of	the	external	borders,	including	the	use	of	advanced	surveillance	
technology,	and	develop	pilot	projects”	to	this	effect	(EU	Parliament,	2016a).	Frontex	also	plays	a	
role	 in	 developing	 and	 deciding	 on	 EU	 research	 programmes,	 funding	 streams	 for	 them,	 and	
strategic	priorities	for	EU	border	control.		
An	overview	of	the	15	largest	Frontex	contracts	between	2012-2018	(Table	1)	illustrates	
how	the	air	surveillance,	events	and	ICT	sectors	dominate	procurement.	The	sectoral	 links,	size	
and	time	of	these	contracts	is	a	useful	tool	for	deciphering	the	Agency’s	core	activities,	namely	
land	and	sea	surveillance	and	conferences	and	events.	More	specifically,	it	is	noticeable	that	the	
surveillance	activities	have	been	upscaled	in	2017	and	2018	via	the	companies	Diamon-Executive	
Aviation	EASP	Air	BV	and	CAE	Aviation.	More	specifically,	this	corresponds	to	the	operational	shift	
in	 EU	border	management	 since	2016	where	maritime	 rescue	operations	have	 gradually	 been	
replaced	 by	 aereal	 surveillance	 flights	 in	 the	 Mediterranean,	 and	 intelligence-sharing	 and	
collaboration	with	f.i.	Libyan	authorities	on	pulling	back	migrant	boats	to	Libyan	territory..		
As	mentioned,	 another	 big	 contractual	 thematic	 has	 been	 the	 organization	 of	 Frontex	
events,	workshops	and	conferences	outside	Poland	during	2017	(awarded	to	Adria	Congrex)	and	
the	maintenance	 and	 development	 of	 the	 EUROSUR	 network	 in	 2013-2017	 (awarded	 to	GMV	
Aerospace	and	Defence).	While	Diamond-Executive	Aviation	have	won	the	two	largest	contracts,	
worth	€8.723.122,	GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence	have	won	contracts	worth	around	€10	million.	
	
	
Table	2	-	Top	recipients	of	contracts	awarded	by	EU-Lisa,	2013-2018.	
EU-Lisa	(the	European	Union	Agency	for	the	Operational	Management	of	Large-Scale	IT	Systems	
in	 the	Area	of	Freedom,	Security	and	 Justice)	was	established	 in	2011	 in	Tallinn	via	Regulation	
1077/2011	and	has	datacentres	in	Strasbourg.	It	officially	opened	operations	in	December	2012.	
The	Agency’s	relations	to	industrial	actors	was	placed	with	the	EU-Lisa	Procurement	Team,	which	
frames	its	task	as	an	“important	part	of	the	single	market”,	and	as	removing	barriers	and	opening	
Agency Year Contract	title Contractor Sector Value	of	contract	(€)
eu-LISA 2018 Framework	Contract	for	the	Maintenance	
in	Working	Order	Visa	Information	System	
and	BMS
Bridge³	Consortium:	Accenture,	Atos	og	Safran Biometrics 54.783.467,78
eu-LISA 2017 Framework	Contract	for	the	Maintenance	
in	Working	Order	Visa	Information	System	
and	BMS
Bridge³	Consortium:	Accenture,	Atos	og	Safran Biometrics 51.912.634,95
eu-LISA 2014 Framework	Contract	for	the	Maintenance	
in	Working	Order	of	the	Visa	Information	
System
Bridge³	Consortium:	Accenture	NV/SA	(leader),	
Morpho	Limited	Company	(member)	and	Hewlett-
Packard	Belgium	BVBA/SPRL	(member)
Biometrics 27.568.971,18
eu-LISA 2014 The	new	second	generation	Schengen	
Information	System	(SIS	II)	MWO
Consortium:	ATOS	Belgium	SA/NV	(leader),	
Accenture	NV/SA	(member),	and	Hewlett	Packard	
Belgium	BVBA/SPRL	(member)
Biometrics 24.999.750,76
eu-LISA 2015 Framework	Contract	for	the	Maintenance	
in	Working	Order	of	the	Visa	Information	
System
Bridge³	Consortium:	Accenture	NV/SA	(leader),	
Morpho	Limited	Company	(member)	and	Hewlett-
Packard	Belgium	BVBA/SPRL	(member)
Biometrics 23.627.826,23
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up	markets	(EULisa,	2019a).	EU-Lisa	manages	databases	like	the	Eurodac,	the	second	generation	
Schengen	Information	System	(SIS	II),	the	Visa	Information	System	(VIS)	(EU-Lisa,	2019b)	and	the	
European	Criminal	Records	Information	System	–	Third	Country	Nationals	(ECRIS-TCN).	It	has	also	
been	 scheduling	 the	 roll-out	 of	 the	 Entry-Exit	 System	 (EES)	 in	 2020.	 EU-Lisa	 cooperates	 in	
particular	with	agencies	from	the	sphere	of	 justice	and	home	affairs	 (JHA);	CEPOL,	EASO,	EIGE,	
EMCDA;	Eurojust,	Europol,	FRA	and	Frontex.	Based	in	Tallinn,	Estonia,	EU-Lisa	cooperates	with	the	
Estonian	Academy	of	Security	Sciences	following	an	agreement	signed	in	2015	(EU-Lisa,	2019c).	It	
receives	funding	through	a	mixture	of	EU	grants	and	direct	contributions	from	member	states.	In	
2019,	it	had	a	total	revenue	of	€204m	(EU-Lisa,	2019d)	compared	to	just	€34m	in	2013	(EU-Lisa	
2019e).	
Observing	the	five	largest	contracts	awarded	by	EU-Lisa	after	2012	(Table	2),	the	fact	that	
all	 of	 them	 have	 been	 awarded	 to	 the	 same	 five	 companies,	 namely	 Atos,	 Safran,	 Accenture,	
Morpho	(subsidiary	to	Safran)	and	HP,	stands	out.	All	are	companies	operating	on	the	markets	of	
ICT	 and	 biometrics.	 It	 is	 furthermore	 interesting	 to	 notice,	 that	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Bridge3	
consortium	responsible	for	the	VIS	database	changed	after	2015,	from	consisting	of	Accenture,	
Morpho	and	HP	Belgium	to	consisting	of	Accenture,	Atos	and	Safran.	In	reality,	since	Morpho	is	a	
subsidiary	of	Safran,	the	big	difference	is	the	replacement	of	HP	Belgium	with	Atos	Belgium.	
	
	
Table	3	-	Top	recipients	of	border	control	projects	awarded	by	H2020,	2015-2018	
Horizon	2020	 is	 the	biggest	EU	R&D	 Innovation	programme	ever	with	nearly	€80bn	of	 funding	
available	between	2014-2020	(European	Commission,	2020a).	It	was	conceived	in	2011	in	line	with	
a	commitment	to	increase	EU	spending	on	R&D	to	3%	by	2020	(European	Commission,	2011e).	
The	 project	 has	 been	 overseen	 by	 Carlos	Moedas,	 EUC	 for	 Research,	 Science	 and	 Innovation	
(European	Commission,	2018a).	It	received	over	115.000	proposals	in	the	first	3	years,	of	which	
about	1	in	8	were	successful	(Ibid.).	60%	of	the	successful	proposals	came	from	the	EU	heartland	
of	the	UK,	Germany,	France,	Spain	and	Italy.	Of	the	grants	awarded	beyond	Europe’s	borders,	by	
far	the	most	went	to	the	USA	–	almost	10%	of	the	total,	with	the	next	largest	numbers	going	to	
Agency Year Contract	title	 Contractor Sector Value	of	contract	(€)
H2020 2015-
2018
C-BORD	-	effective	Container	inspection	at	
BORDer	control	points
COMMISSARIAT	A	L	ENERGIE	ATOMIQUE	ET	
AUX	ENERGIES	ALTERNATIVES
Research	Organisations 3.610.930,00
H2020 2016-
2019
RANGER:	RAdars	for	loNG	distance	maritime	
surveillancE	and	SaR	opeRations
DIGINEXT ICT 1.973.208,75
H2020 2018-
2022
Foldout	-	Through-foliage	detection,	including	in	
the	outermost	regions	of	the	EU
AIT	AUSTRIAN	INSTITUTE	OF	TECHNOLOGY	
GMBH
Research	Organisations 1.698.580,00
H2020 2015-
2018
C-BORD	-	effective	Container	inspection	at	
BORDer	control	points
SMITHS	HEIMANN	SAS Security 1.419.638,75
H2020 2016-
2019
RANGER:	RAdars	for	loNG	distance	maritime	
surveillancE	and	SaR	opeRations
LEONARDO	-	SOCIETA	PER	AZIONI Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
1.346.750,00
H2020 2019-
2022
D4FLY	-	Detecting	Document	frauD	and	iDentity	
on	the	fly
VERIDOS	GMBH Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
1.330.950,00
H2020 2016-
2018
SafeShore	-	System	for	detection	of	Threat	
Agents	in	Maritime	Border	Environment
DR	FRUCHT	SYSTEMS	LTD Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
1.129.773,58
H2020 2016-
2019
PROTECT	-	Pervasive	and	UseR	Focused	
BiomeTrics	BordEr	ProjeCT
THE	UNIVERSITY	OF	READING Higher	or	Secondary	
Education	
Establishments
1.082.707,50
H2020 2015-
2018
C-BORD	-	effective	Container	inspection	at	
BORDer	control	points
UNIVERSITA	DEGLI	STUDI	DI	PADOVA Higher	or	Secondary	
Education	
Establishments
1.035.225,00
H2020 2017-
2020
MARISA	-	Maritime	Integrated	Surveillance	
Awareness
LEONARDO	-	SOCIETA	PER	AZIONI Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
1.031.843,75
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China,	 Canada,	 Australia,	 South	 Africa,	 Brasil	 and	 Japan	 (Ibid.).	 Applications	 from	 entities	 in	
Belgium,	France,	the	Netherlands,	Luxembourg	and	Austria	were	the	most	successful,	with	more	
than	 one	 out	 of	 six	 applications	 being	 successful,	while	 applications	 from	 entities	 in	 Bulgaria,	
Slovenia,	Hungary,	Croatia	and	Latvia	were	 less	successful;	Bulgarian	proposals	were	successful	
less	 than	one	 time	 in	 ten	 (Ibid.).	 It	 transpires	 then,	 that	 the	 funding	has	 clustered	 in	 locations	
traditionally	associated	with	economic	power	in	Europe.	The	new	instrument	Horizon	Europe	is	
projected	to	start	in	2021	(European	Parliament	2019a)..	
Table	3	 visualizes	 the	10	 largest	 contracts	 awarded	by	 the	 EU-funded	Horizon	2020	 to	
private	 companies.	 These	 companies	 represent	 the	 ICT,	 security	 and	 defence,	 aerospace	 and	
biometrics	sectors.	Leonardo	and	Veridos	GMBH	are	the	two	companies	that	have	received	the	
largest	contracts,	with	the	total	value	of	respectively	€2.378.593,75	and	€2.327.825,00.	They	both	
represent	the	sector	of	defence,	aerospace	and	biometrics.	
	
Table	4	-	Top	recipients	of	contracts	awarded	by	Copernicus,	between	2014-2018	
Table	4	visualizes	 the	10	 largest	contracts	awarded	by	Copernicus	between	2014-2018,	 though	
apart	 from	one	 in	2016,	all	 those	shown	here	are	 from	2015.	All	 the	contracts	are	awarded	to	
companies	in	the	defence,	aerospace	and	biometrics	sector.	Thales	won	the	two	largest	contracts	
worth	over	€370m	combined,	though	the	four	next	largest	–	all	going	to	Astrium	–	have	a	similar	
combined	 value.	 Astrium	 and	 Ariane	 are	 both	 companies	 within	 the	 Airbus	 umbrella;	 taken	
together,	Airbus’	total	revenue	from	Copernicus	contracts	approached	€700m.	
	 The	 processes	 through	which	 this	multifaceted	market	 has	 evolved	 have	 included	 the	
blurring	of	boundaries	between	public	interests	and	institutions,	and	the	profit-driven	activities	of	
the	commercial	actors	 listed	above.	Of	particular	 interest	 in	this	regard	 is	 the	way	 in	which	EU	
research	funding	has	been	used	to	underpin,	diversify	and	grow	the	border	control	market	that	is	
restructuring	the	material	conditions	for	EU	border	control.	
4.2	 Industrial	 interests,	 research	 frameworks	 and	 horizons	 for	 border	
control		
Agency Year Contract	title Contractor Sector Value	of	contract	(€)
Copernicus 2015 Sentinel	3	Satellites	C/D	Unit	Construction Thales	Alenia	Space	France
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
206.494.364,00
Copernicus 2015 Sentinel	1	Satellites	C/D	Unit	Construction Thales	Alenia	Space	Italia
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
166.834.268,00
Copernicus 2015 Sentinel	2	Satellites	C/D	Unit	Construction Astrium	GMBH	-	Satellites
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
101.702.188,00
Copernicus 2015 Sentinel	5	Satellites	-	Recurrent	models	B	+	C Astrium	GMBH	-	Satellites
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
81.261.548,00
Copernicus 2015 Sentinel	1	Satellites	C/D	Unit	Construction Astrium	GMBH	-	Satellites
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
76.393.104,00
Copernicus 2015 Data	Relay	Services	for	Copernicus	Sentinels	(EDRS) Astrium	GMBH	-	Satellites
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
70.492.472,00
Copernicus 2015 Launch	Service	Sentinel	1B Ariane	Space
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
70.356.152,05
Copernicus 2015 Sentinel	2	Satellites	C/D	Unit	Construction Airbus	Space	and	Defence
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
66.442.394,00
Copernicus 2016 Sentinel	6B	Satellite	Instrument	Construction Airbus	Space	and	Defence
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
63.597.986,00
Copernicus 2015
Sentinel	1	Payload	Ground	Data	Segment	(PGDS),	
system	operations,	maintenance	and	evolutions Airbus	Space	and	Defence
Defence,	aerospace	and	
biometrics
49.250.234,00
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According	 to	 a	 2015-study	 contracted	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 conducted	 by	 Dutch	
consultancy	 company	 ECORYS,	 an	 “EU	 security	 industry”	 combined	 to	 generate	 an	 annual	
turnover	of	close	to	€200	billion	and	employing	nearly	4.7	million	people	(ECORYS,	2015).	Of	the	
seven	Member	States	surveyed	by	ECORYS,	the	midpoint	estimates	for	turnover	and	employment	
were:	 The	United	 Kingdom:	 €37,2	 billion/435.000	 people;	 France:	 €32	 billion/300.000	 people;	
Italy:	 €18,6	 billion/159.000	 people;	 Spain:	 €9,9	 billion/86.000	 people	 for	 Spain;	 Poland:	 €1,6	
billion/67.000	 people;	 Estonia:	 €1,3	 billion/14.000	 people.	 A	 strong	 correlation	 was	 observed	
between	 the	 estimated	 industry	 size	 and	 that	 of	 the	 national	 economies	 (Ibid.).	 ECORYS	 also	
estimated	 that	 the	 percentage	 of	 EU	 security	 industry	 turnover	 could	 be	 further	 divided	 into	
different	activities,	some	of	which	included	distribution	(20,5%),	installation	(18,8%),	maintenance	
and	servicing	(11,6%)	research	and	development	(9,9%),	design	and	engineering	(9,7%)	or	system	
integration	(5,5%).	
A	reoccurring	uncertainty	with	such	estimates	is,	however,	the	difficulty	of	distinguishing	
border	control	as	a	subset	of	the	market	for	security.	This	is	because	many	of	the	products	and	
technologies	 have	 dual,	 or	multiple,	 uses.	 Technologies	 purchased	 for	 one	 purpose	 (migration	
control)	may	also	be	repurposed	over	time	(population	control)	as	the	definitions	of	security	and	
border	 practices	 overlap.	 Accordingly,	 depending	 on	 political	 and	 economic	 expedience,	 the	
export	of	security	and	defence	technology	during	externalization	projects,	can	be	framed	as	either	
the	export	of	civil	security	or	of	defence	capabilities.	In	the	post-9/11	political	and	marketized	EU	
landscape,	border	control	technologies	and	practices	supervene	the	distinction	between	internal	
policing,	traditionally	seen	as	falling	within	the	civilian	sphere,	and	external	security,	traditionally	
seen	as	falling	within	the	military	sphere	(Bigo,	2006).	Border	control	technologies	therefore	elude	
clear-cut	dichotomies	like	security/defence	or	civil/military,	and	it	has	been	suggested	that	they	
should	be	defined	as	security	technologies	spanning	capacities	for	fighting	both	war	and	crime	
(Bigo,	Bonditti,	Jeandesboz	and	Ragazzi,	2008).	
Crucially,	the	overlap	between	security	and	border	control	is	not	only	determined	by	the	
materiality	of	the	technologies.	The	development	of	these	is	very	much	also	the	creation	of	politics	
and	economy.	Research	conducted	on	behalf	of	the	European	Parliament	has	questioned	whether	
the	“EU	Brand”	of	a	single	security	market,	 including	border	control	 technology,	was	 in	 fact	an	
economic	reality,	or	rather	a	policy	objective	developed	by	the	Commission	in	close	conjunction	
with	industrial	interests	which	profit	from	such	a	market	(European	Parliament,	2014).	Thus,	the	
European	Commission	also	responded	to	the	post-9/11	environment	by	expanding	the	sphere	of	
traditional	security	concerns	to	a	global	scale	and	a	range	of	new	issues,	facilitated	both	by	political	
discourses	 linking	 together	 crime	 prevention,	 maritime	 or	 aviation	 security	 with	 the	 combat	
against	 irregular	migration.	And	 they	are	also	 facilitated	by	 the	aim	of	 technology	 suppliers	 to	
expand	market	shares	or	develop	new,	emerging	markets,	through	discourses	of	“dual	purposes”,	
“civilian	spill-over	effects”	and	the	need	to	resist	the	“fragmentation”	of	the	European	security	
market	 faced	 with	 competition	 from	 Asian	 countries	 (Bigo,	 and	 Jeandesboz,	 2010;	 European	
Commission,	2012b).	
This	trend	then	goes	beyond	the	issue	of	border	control,	and	so	the	interest	in	contracts	
pertaining	to	EU	border	governance	can	be	seen	as	a	general	implication	of	the	widening	of	the	
security	market	 (Ibid.).	 For	 some	years	now,	 traditional	defence	 industrial	 conglomerates	have	
been	 relabelling	 themselves	 as	 “security	 industrial	 actors”	 concerned	with	 the	 border	 control	
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needs	of	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	(Jeandesboz,	2016).	And	while	the	market	for	EU	border	
control	is	also	characterized	by	many	SMEs,	the	political	and	economic	gravity	of	the	large	actors	
of	the	defence	industry	also	has	a	significant	effect	on	the	dynamics	of	the	market	for	EU	border	
control	 (Jones,	 2016).	 Indeed,	 as	 Ben	 Hayes	 noted	 already	 in	 2006;	 “the	 security-industrial	
complex	 has	 developed	 as	 the	 traditional	 boundaries	 between	external	 security	 (military)	 and	
internal	security	(security	services)	and	law	enforcement	(policing)	have	eroded”	(Hayes,	2006).	
The	European	Commission	has	 invested	much	 in	 trying	to	create	a	common-European	security	
and	border	 industry.	 In	February	2004,	the	Commission	granted	€65	million	to	the	Preparatory	
Action	 for	 Security	 Research	 subsidizing	 39	 projects	 between	 2004	 and	 2006.	 In	 2007,	 the	
European	 Commission	 launched	 its	 first	 European	 Security	 Research	 Programme	 under	 the	
heading	of	“Secure	Societies:	protecting	freedom	and	security	of	Europe	and	its	citizens	(European	
Commission,	2020b).	The	ESRP	followed	a	four-year	period	where	the	strategic	priorities	guiding	
the	 Research	 Programme	 had	 been	 developed	 through	 several	 Commission-initiated	 expert	
forums.	 These	 included	 the	 2003	 Group	 of	 Personalities	 (GoP),	 the	 2005	 European	 Security	
Research	Advisory	Board	(ESRAB),	and,	alongside	the	 launch	of	the	Research	Programme	itself,	
the	2007	European	Security	Research	 Innovation	Forum	(ESRIF).	Unlike	civil	 society	actors,	 like	
humanitarian	 NGOs,	 high-level	 representatives	 from	 the	 major	 actors	 of	 the	 European	 arms	
industry	were	granted	seats	on	all	of	the	forums.	Thus,	on	the	GoP	advising	on	the	future	priorities	
of	 the	 European	 Security	 Research	 Programme,	 the	 Commission	 had	 invited	 on	 board	
representatives	 from	 Airbus,	 Thales,	 BAE	 Systems	 and	 Finmeccanica,	 on	 the	 ESRAB	 sat	
representatives	from	Airbus,	Thales,	BAE	Systems,	Finmeccanica	and	Safran,	and	on	ESRIF	were	
representatives	from	Finmeccanica,	Airbus,	Safran	and	Thales.	Similarly,	for	the	development	of	
the	 EU’s	 Security	 Industrial	 Policy,	 announced	 in	 2012,	 were	 invited	 representatives	 from	
Finmeccanica,	Airbus	and	Thales.		
Besides	 the	 composition	 of	 each	 of	 these	 forums,	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 commercial	
interests	into	EU	policies	was	also	facilitated	by	the	fact	that	each	of	the	forums	recognized	and	
built	upon	the	recommendations	of	the	earlier	ones.	For	instance,	the	GoP	warned	that	"time	is	
of	 the	 essence.	 Europe	 needs	 to	 act	 quickly	 if	 it	 is	 to	 remain	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 technology	
research,	and	if	industry	is	to	be	able	to	exploit	the	results	competitively	in	response	to	the	rapidly	
emerging	 needs	 for	 sophisticated	 security-related	 products"	 (GoP,	 2003).	 Mirroring	 the	 GoP-
report,	ESRIF	also	emphasized	the	need	“to	bring	together	at	a	European	level	the	'demand'	and	
'supply'	sides	 in	order	to	 jointly	define	commonly	agreed	strategic	 lines	of	action	for	European	
security	research”,	and	to	 increase	support	for	technologies	that	the	actors	from	the	European	
security	and	defence	sector	was	itself	producing	and	selling,	such	as	surveillance	and	navigation	
satellites,	 drones,	 authentication	 technologies,	 biometrics	 and	motion	 sensor	 systems	 (ESRAB,	
2006).	
Similarly,	ESRIF’s	third	working	group	on	border	security	recommended	increased	funding	
to	research	and	development	to	border	control	technologies,	since	“authorities	involved	in	border	
surveillance	 activities”	 needed	 a	 technical	 framework	 capable	 of	 “considerably	 improve	 their	
situational	 awareness”.	 This	 awareness,	 the	 Forum	 continued,	 could	 require	 deployment	 of	
drones,	 biometrics,	 new	 technology	 radars	 and	 satellites	 (ESRIF,	 2009).	 In	 2007,	 following	 the	
ESRIF-recommendations,	a	common-European	ESRP	was	established	with	a	€1,4	billion	budget	
from	 2007-13	 through	 the	 FP7	 program,	 entitled	 “Secure	 Societies:	 protecting	 freedom	 and	
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security	of	Europe	and	its	citizens”	(European	Commission,	2020b).	It	included	the	subsidizing	of	
35	projects	in	2008	and	78	projects	in	2009.	(Lemberg-Pedersen,	2013).	In	a	2010	Communication	
and	through	thematic	headlines	like	“Europe	needs	industry”,	“Strengthening	the	single	market”	
and	“Capitalising	on	globalization”,	the	Commission	had	formulated	ambitions	for	integrating	and	
harmonizing	industrial	policy	in	order	to	boost	competitiveness,	singling	out	the	sectors	of	security	
and	space	were	singled	out	as	growth	potential	and	in	need	of	subsidising	(EC,	2010a).		
Aligned	 with	 the	 views	 of	 commercial	 security	 companies,	 this	 Communication	 also	
announced	a	dedicated	Security	Industrial	Policy,	which	was	duly	launched	in	a	Commission	Staff	
Working	Paper	in	2012	and	stated	that	“A	competitive	EU	security	industry	is	the	conditio	sine	qua	
non	 of	 any	 viable	 European	 security	 policy	 and	 for	 economic	 growth	 in	 general”	 (European	
Commission,	 2012b).	Within	 these	 ambitions,	 the	 European	 border	 security	 market	 is	 clearly	
framed	as	an	emerging	market	with	potential	for	growth.	Thus,	the	document	notes	the	potential	
of	aviation,	maritime	and	border	security,	and	estimates	the	European	border	security	market	at	
between	€4,5	–	€5,5	billion,	and	the	global	market	to	be	worth	€9,9	billion	(Ibid.).	This	included	
technologies	like	border-perimeter	interoperable	communication	systems,	virtual	border	systems,	
checkpoints,	 fence	 and	 barrier	 hardware,	 border-perimeter	 people	 screening	 systems,	 border-
perimeter	 people	 and	 workforce	 biometric	 identification	 systems,	 and	 border-perimeter	
construction	projects	(Ibid.).	Although	later	disappointed	by	the	Commission’s	rejection	of	further	
increasing	the	subsidies	for	the	industry	(Jones,	2016),	at	the	time,	the	lobby	groups	of	the	border	
security	 companies,	 the	 European	 Organization	 for	 Security	 (EOS)	 and	 the	 Association	 of	
AeroSpace	and	Defence	Associations	of	Europe	(ASD)	welcomed	the	long	awaited	policy,	The	ASD	
described	the	policy	as	a	“giant	step	forward	towards	unlocking	the	potential	of	Europe’s	Security	
Industry”	and	expressed	expectations	of	“working	closely	with	the	European	Commission	on	the	
details	of	the	proposals	and	to	contributing	to	their	implementation”	(ASD,	2012).	
The	EU	Framework	Programme	7	continued	the	trend	of	subsidizing	security	and	defence	
projects	on	surveillance,	biometrics	and	maritime	and	land	border	technology	initiated	under	the	
PASR.	 Of	 the	 European	 companies,	 Thales	 was	 the	 biggest	 beneficiary	 of	 FP7	 project	 funds,	
participating	 in	 97	 projects	 totalling	 €253,8	 million,	 Airbus	 and	 several	 of	 its	 subsidiaries	
participated	in	74	projects	worth	€37,6	million,	while	Telespazio,	the	joint	venture	between	Thales	
and	Finmeccanica,	harvested	€6,1	million	through	8	projects	(Kumar,	2017;	European	Commission,	
2011g).	After	2013,	 this	 trend	was	 continued	and	 indeed	expanded	when	 the	 seven-year	€1,7	
billion	 financing	 of	 the	 ESRP	 was	 continued	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	 Horizon	 2020	 framework	
research	programme.		
Both	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	subsidized	a	variety	of	projects	concerned	with	the	research	
and	 development	 of	 EU	 border	 infrastructure.	 Figures	 1-3	 visualize	 the	 consortiums	 PERSEUS	
(FP7),	and	ARESIBO	and	PROTECT	(Horizon	2020),	illustrating	how	the	research	and	development	
of	 European	border	 control	 technologies	happens	 in	 close	 collaboration	between	 security	 and	
defence	companies,	universities	and	research	organizations	and	consultancy	firms.	The	Norwegian	
Institutt	 for	 Fredsforskning	 (Institute	 for	 Peace	 Research),	 for	 instance,	 is	 heavily	 involved	 in	
numerous	 collaborations	with	 the	military	 industry.	 And	 sometimes,	 academic	 institutions	 are	
coordinating	 such	 border	 security	 projects,	 like	 the	 University	 of	 Reading	 under	 the	 PROTECT	
consortium	 (Figure	 3).	 Other	 times,	 they	 are	 being	 coordinated	 by	 security	 and	 defence	
companies,	like	Airbus,	such	as	under	the	ARESIBO	consortium	(Figure	2).	
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Figure	1	-	The	PERSEUS	consortium	under	FP7,	divided	into	Member	States,	sectors,	companies	
and	contracts	
	
	
Figure	2	-	The	ARESIBO	consortium	under	Horizon	2020,	divided	into	Member	States,	sectors,	
companies	and	contracts	
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Figure	3	–	The	PROTECT	consortium	under	Horizon	2020,	divided	into	Member	States,	sectors,	
companies	and	contracts	
	
By	way	of	visual	exemplification,	Figures	1-3	confirm	 the	multisectorality	of	 the	market	 for	EU	
border	control,	and	how	the	funding	of	European	research	consortiums	cannot	be	distinguished	
from	national	economic	 interests	of	Member	States.	 In	other	words:	This	allow	us	to	recognize	
that	the	development	of	border	control	technologies	unfolds	within	the	larger	and	pre-existing	
financial	asymmetries	of	EU	financial	 instruments,	such	that	north-western	Member	States	are	
more	 likely	 to	 feature	 in	 consortiums	 developing	 border	 control	 technologies	 than	 Eastern	
European	Member	States.	When	it	comes	to	this	specific	area,	the	role	of	Poland	stands	out	a	bit,	
however,	since	the	Frontex	headquarters	are	based	in	Warsaw.	
Moreover,	the	role	of	academia	in	the	development	of	EU	border	control	technology	is	an	
understudied	phenomenon,	but	the	conjunction	of	universities	and	the	military	industry	in	border	
control	research	and	development	stands	out	both	in	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	consortiums.	Indeed,	
just	 in	 Horizon	 2020,	 a	 total	 of	 42	 consortiums	working	 on	 border	 control	 projects,	 narrowly	
defined,	 involved	 academic	 institutions.	 These	 collaborations	 have	 several	 implications;	 large	
corporations	may	use	collaborative	projects	to	engineer	and	frame	academic	research	or	course	
content,	where	the	latter	can	be	used	as	PR	for	the	company.	They	often	also	use	such	projects	to	
recruit	younger	researchers.	University	participation	in	collaborative	projects	may	lead,	or	indeed	
have	as	their	stated	deliverable,	the	“up-take”	of	technology	by	end-users	such	as	state	agencies,	
or	the	creation	of	patents	for	technologies	or	the	establishment	of	small	business	ventures.	Both	
of	 these	 practices	 are	 increasingly	 encouraged	 by	 university	 managements,	 in	 effect	 creating	
economic	 incentives	 to	 participate	 in	 such	 consortiums.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 risk	 creating	
counterincentives	for	support	of	critical	research	into	the	same	cross-sectoral	political	economy.	
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Border	control	is	increasingly	being	militarized	as	actors	traditionally	associated	with	the	defence	
sectors	have	entered	and	facilitated	the	creation	of	an	emering	market	for	their	products	in	EU	
border	governance.	The	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	consortiums	illustrate	that	with	this	transformation	
the	historical	association	between	academia	and	defence,	is	also	increasingly	observable	in	border	
politics.		
Academic	institutions	must	therefore	be	recognized	as	actors	involved	in	the	markets	and	
political	economy	of	EU	border	control.	Their	participation,	as	that	of	other	actors	like	research	
organizations,	consultancy	and	communication	firms,	means	that	they	enter	into	the	constitution	
of	 certain	 epistemic	 communities	 ripe	 with	 norms	 and	 knowledges.	 This	 kind	 of	 knowledge	
production	thereby	seeks	to	transform	the	wider	understanding	of	societal	issues	and	norms,	that	
is,	expectations,	 rules	and	standards,	deemed	appropriate	to	address	 them	(cf.	Finnemore	and	
Sikkink,	2001;	Baird,	2018).	The	expectations,	rules	and	standards	around	which	FP7	and	Horizon	
2020	consortiums	on	border	control	have	convened,	have	been	dominated	by	actors	 from	the	
security	industry	framing	social	context	in	alignment	with	commercial	interests.	
In	2018,	the	Commission	tabled	its	proposal	for	the	successor	of	Horizon	2020,	namely	
the	€100	billion	 research	and	 innovation	programme	entitled	Horizon	Europe,	 to	 run	between	
2021-2027	 (European	 Commission,	 2018d).	 The	 programme’s	 general	 objectives	 include	
delivering	“scientific,	economic	and	societal	impact	from	the	Union’s	investments	in	research	and	
innovation	so	as	to	strengthen	the	scientific	and	technological	bases	of	the	Union	and	foster	its	
competitiveness,	including	in	its	industry”.	Among	its	more	specific	objectives	are	“to	strengthen	
the	impact	of	research	and	innovation	in	developing,	supporting	and	implementing	Union	policies,	
and	 support	 the	 uptake	 of	 innovative	 solutions	 in	 industry	 and	 society	 to	 address	 global	
challenges”	(Ibid.,	p.	28)	A	programme	entitled	“inclusive	and	secure	societies”	is	to	realize	those	
ambitions	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 security	 industry,	 and,	by	 implication,	 also	 the	border	 control	
component	of	EU	border	control.	
4.2.1	Work	Programmes,	Advisory	Groups	and	Technology	Platforms		
Companies	 and	 interest	 organizations	 target	 various	 policy	 venues	 as	 vehicles	 of	 proactive	
influencing	in	order	to	generate	new	procurement	opportunities.	Here,	influencing	Member	State	
representatives	on	the	Programme	Committees	which	decide	the	priorities	of	Work	Programme	
topics	and	calls,	represents	one	more	such	strategy.	
	 With	the	beginning	of	FP7,	the	Commission	revised	its	funding	mechanism	by	setting	up	
blurred	public-private	forums	such	as	Advisory	Groups	(AGs)	and	European	Technology	Platforms	
(ETPs),	Joint	Technology	Initiatives	(JTIs)	and	Joint	Undertakings	(JU).	These		forums	can	be	seen	
as	procurement	at	a	pre-commercial	stage,	since	the	suppliers	of	border	control	technology	win	
contracts	for	research	and	development	of	the	technologies	before	these	reach	the	market.	Since	
such	AGs	and	research	and	development	platforms	are	typically	undertaken	in	collaboration	with	
potential	“end-users”,	like	the	Commission,	EU	agencies,	border	authorities,	national	coastguards	
or	customs	administrations,	the	effect	of	this	public-private	interaction	is	often	to	undermine	the	
market	 competitiveness	 otherwise	 invoked	 as	 justification	 for	 increased	 subsidies	 as	 it	 is	 pre-
empted	by	already-agreed	procurement	demands.	As	such,	while	heralded	as	innovation	by	the	
Commission,	these	 initiatives	certainly	also	mirror	the	 interests	of	a	narrow	elite	of	the	 largest	
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European	security	and	defence	companies	in	establishing	complete	end-to-end	supply	chains	for	
their	soft-	and	hardware	(cf.	Jones,	2016).	
The	 members	 are	 allegedly	 sitting	 on	 AGs	 in	 their	 personal	 capacities,	 and	 not	 as	
representing	 organizations	 or	 countries.	 However,	 interested	 industry	 stakeholders	 are	 closely	
engaging	 with	 the	 groups	 either	 by	 approaching	 their	 members,	 or	 when	 representatives	 or	
former	employees	are	nominated	as	AG	members.	For	instance,	looking	at	the	members	of	two	
AG	 under	 FP7s,	 respectively	 for	 Space	 (SAG)	 and	 Security	 (SecAG),	 the	 distinction	 between	
members’	personal	and	professional	capacity	becomes	blurred	as	does	the	information	about	it.	
Thus,	one	section	the	Commission	website	(European	Commission,	2011f)	lists	members	like	Paul	
Kamoun	and	 Jean-Jacques	Tortora	as	 coming	 from,	 respectively,	 the	University	of	Nice-Sophia-
Antipolis	 and	 Eurospace.	 However,	 in	 the	 SAG’s	 own	 report	 (European	 Commission,	 2011a)	
Kamoun	is	listed	as	the	Chairman	of	the	ASD	working	group	on	GMES.	And	both	lists	fail	to	mention	
that	 Kamoun	was	 also	 Vice	 President	 for	 Thales	 Alenia	 Space	 at	 the	 time.	 Similarly,	 although	
Tortora	was	the	Secretary-General	of	Eurospace,	Eurospace	is	also	the	Space	group	of	the	ASD.	In	
2010,	 the	Security	AG	also	 listed	members	allegedly	sitting	 in	 their	personal	capacity,	but	who	
were	 nonetheless	 also	 representatives	 for	 companies	 like	 Cassidian	 (Jacqueline	 Argence),	
Finmeccanica	(now	Leonardo)	(Giovanni	Barontini),	Siemens	(Angelika	Staimer),	SAGEM/Morpho	
(Jean-Marc	 Suchier),	 the	 EOS	 (Luigi	 Rebuffi),	 alongside	 Frontex,	 the	 Spanish	 Ministry	 of	 the	
Interior,	Europol,	and	the	British	Home	Office.		
The	same	pattern	was	observable	in	the	Horizon	2020	Advisory	Groups.	Thus	in	the	group	
for	Space	(SAG),	while	members	like	Tortora	continued,	new	ones	were	former	or	current	CEOs	of	
aerospace	companies	(Luca	Rossettini	for	D-Orbit),	while	another	member,	Barbara	Ghinelli,	had	
worked	for	Astrium	(now	Airbus),	including	a	decade	as	the	head	of	its	unit	for	Copernicus	Business	
Development.	 In	the	Protection	and	Security	Advisory	Group	(PASAG),	the	appointed	chair	was	
the	former	CEO	of	Finmeccanica,	Alberto	de	Benedictis.	
ETPs	were	created	after	Commission	proposals	in	2000	and	2002,	Council	support	in	2003,	
and	Commission	Action	Plans	and	Guidelines	in	2003	and	2004.	They	are	extensions	of	industry	
associations	 intended	 to	provide	advice	 for	 research	 funding	 from	 the	perspective	of	business	
needs	and	capabilities,	and	thus	to	promote	competitiveness	through	public-private	partnership	
and	agenda-setting	(Briani	et	al.,	2010).	Concern	has	been	expressed	that	European	Technology	
Platforms	(ETPs)	effectively	come	to	function	as	lobby	forums,	since	industry	representatives	here	
sit	side	by	side	with	EU	agencies,	and	Commission	representatives.	Such	fears	were	not	dissuaded	
when	in	2007,	the	then-Commissioner	for	Research,	Janez	Potocnik,	defended	ETPs	by	saying	that	
they	“can	play	a	key	role	 in	better	 incorporating	 industry's	needs	 into	EU	research	priorities	by	
bringing	 together	 stakeholders,	 led	 by	 industry,	 to	 define	 a	 Strategic	 Research	 Agenda	 and	 to	
suggest	possible	directions	for	its	implementation”	(CEO,	2011b,	p.5).	
In	negotiating	the	FP7	Work	Programmes,	the	Commission	received	inputs	from	the	AGs	
and	ETPs.	While	the	Commission	was	responsible	for	drawing	up	the	annual	Work	Programmes,	it	
did	so	through	advice	from	the	AGs	in	particular.	This	advice	was	delivered	via	a	yearly	document,	
which	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 preparing	 the	 annual	 calls	 if	 endorsed	 by	 Programme	 Committees.	
Crucially,	 the	 selection	 process	 determining	 particular	 topics	 is	 undertaken	 by	 the	 AGs,	which	
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guide	the	Commission,	resulting	in	a	draft	Work	Programme	to	be	approved	by	the	Programme	
Committees.		
In	2010,	there	were	enthusiastic	descriptions	of	the	ETPs	as	“unique	in	the	history	of	the	
FPs”	since	“there	is	real	evidence	that	the	stakeholders	can	play	an	active	part	in	the	preparation	
of	the	WPs”,	making	the	ETPs	“probably	the	single	most	important	source	for	the	Commission	with	
regard	to	defining	the	topics	in	the	WPs”	(Andrée,	2008,	p.	35).	This	responded	to	calls	from	the	
industry	through	the	00’s,	and	expressed	through	blurred	forums	like	the	GoP	and	ESRAB,	to	be	
inserted	into	the	strategizing	processes	on	research	and	development.	The	focus	on	markets	of	
border	 control	 had	 also	 featured	 explicitly	 as	 part	 of	 this	 argumentation,	 including	 some	
suggestions	 to	 raise	 the	 Commission-funding	 of	 the	 ETPs	 themselves	 from	 a	 50/50	 deal	 with	
industry,	to	75%	Commission	funds;	that	ETPs	should	be	“mission-oriented”	particularly	when	it	
came	 to	 border	 control	 and	 that	 the	 central	 coordination	 role	 held	 by	 Frontex	 should	 be	
transformed	so	that	the	Agency	could	enable	the	security	industry	to	overcome	the	“demand	side	
market	failure”	in	European	border	politics	(by	which	was	meant	a	lacking	political	demand	for	
the	level	of	procurement	of	border	security	products	desired	by	industry)	(Briani	et	al.,	2010)		
The	Commission	responded	to	the	push	for	increased	standardization	of	technologies	in	
order	 to	 facilitate	 a	 “single	 EU	 border	 market”	 through	 Frontex	 coordination,	 by	 revising	 the	
Agency’s	mandate.	It	went	from	“following	up	on”	industry	developments	to	“proactively	monitor	
and	contribute	to	the	developments	in	research	relevant	for	the	control	and	surveillance	of	the	
external	borders”	(European	Parliament,	2011a).	Moreover,	it	was	placed	on	the	SecAG,	and	also	
allowed	 to	build	a	permanent	pool	of	equipment	 itself	 through	purchase	or	 lease,	 rather	 than	
loaning	equipment	from	Member	States	as	before.	This	effectively	placed	the	agency	in	multiple	
roles:	It	was	no	longer	only	monitoring	and	fostering	industry,	coordinating	Member	States’	border	
politics,	but	also	becoming	an	end-user	of	industrial	actors	eager	to	expand	the	Union’s	border	
control.	 Alongside	 its	 placement	 on	 the	 SecAG,	 the	 Agency	 would	 also	 play	 a	 larger	 role	 in	
developing	and	deciding	the	funding	streams	for	EU	research	programmes.	This	legislative	drive	
was	 continued	 with	 Regulation	 2016/1624	 stating	 that	 Frontex	 should	 “participate	 in	 the	
development	and	management	of	research	and	innovation	activities	relevant	for	the	control	and	
surveillance	of	the	external	borders,	including	the	use	of	advanced	surveillance	technology,	and	
develop	pilot	projects”	to	this	effect	(European	Parliament,	2016a).			
In	 2015,	 the	 ETPs	 were	 fused	 with	 European	 Industrial	 Initiatives	 and	 turned	 into	
European	Technology	and	Innovation	Platforms	(ETIPs)	(European	Parliament,	2017a).	Thirty-six	
ETPs	were	effective	under	Horizon	2020	 themes	decision	making,	 including	 Integrated	Mission	
Group	 for	 Security	 (IMG-S),	 the	 ASD,	 Big	 Data	 Value	 (BDV)	 and	 the	 European	 Cyber	 Security	
Organization	(ECS).	Among	these,	IMG-S	frames	itself	as	a	European	network	of	experts	in	security	
with	 230	members	 from	 119	 organizations	 across	 24	 countries.	 It	 has	 formed	 the	 Aerospace	
Security	 and	 Defence	 –	 Strategic	 Research	 and	 Technology	 (ASD-SRT),	 a	 Synthesis	 and	
Coordination	Group	(SCG)	and	seven	working	groups,	including	on	surveillance	and	identification,	
communication	systems	and	cyber	security.	Its	mission	is	to	“provide	input	to	the	Horizon	2020	
Secure	Societies	Work	Programmes	via	its	thematic	groups.”	Among	the	members	of	the	ASD-SRT	
are	Thales,	BAE	Systems,	Leonardo,	Dassault	and	Airbus.	Other	members	include	Cassidian,	Indra,	
Cea,	SAAB,	and	Fraunhofer	(IMG-S,	2020).		
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Also	at	the	level	of	pre-determining	the	research	priorities	of	the	EU,	the	examples	of	ETPs	and	
AGs	 illustrate	 the	multileveled	 commercial	 influence	 on	 the	 formulation	 of	 EU	 border	 control	
priorities.	
4.2.2	Companies	on	the	multisectoral	market	for	EU	border	control	
When	it	comes	to	the	largest	EU	contracts,	the	sectors	of	biometrics	and	ICT,	security	and	defence,	
and	space	dominate	the	multisectoral	market.	The	market	for	border	control	is	characterized	by	
dynamics	of	supply,	demand,	loans,	credit	and	competition.	Both	national	governments	and	EU	
institutions	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	many	 tenders	 that	 companies	 pursue,	 and	 the	market	 for	
border	 control	 is	 therefore	 intimately	 connected	 to	 both	 economic	 venues.	 Due	 to	 the	
multisectoral	character	of	this	market,	the	contracts	vary	greatly	in	character	and	complexity	when	
it	comes	to	services	supplied,	the	companies	involved	and	the	complexity	of	the	political	economic	
interests	involved.	
All	 of	 these	 sectors	 are	 characterized	 by	 complex	 forms	 of	 ownership,	 including	
conglomerates,	 joint	 ventures	 and	 SMEs.	 Several	 of	 the	 biggest	 corporate	 actors	 on	 this	
multisectoral	market	(see	Figure	6)	pursue	conglomerate	strategies	 involving	parent	companies	
and	multiple	 subsidiaries	 spread	 across	 several	 industries	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 their	 potential	
markets	 and	 contract	 portfolios.	 This	 makes	 for	 complex,	 volatile	 and	 sometimes	 ownership	
structures	lacking	transparency.	For	instance,	Thales	completed	the	acquisition	of	Gemalto	in	2019	
thereby	strengthening	its	position	on	the	global	market	of	identity	and	security	(Thales,	2019a).	
Only	two	years	earlier,	Gemalto,	in	turn,	had	acquired	the	company	3M’s	Identity	management	
business	 and	 its	 speciality	 of	 biometric	 technology	 for	 governmental	 and	 commercial	 actors	
(Gemalto,	 2017).	 Likewise,	 Morpho	 was	 acquisitioned	 by	 Safran,	 but	 in	 2017	 Safran	 sold	 off	
Morpho,	which	then	merged	with	Oberthur	Technologies	and	created	OT	Morpho.	OT	Morpho	
was	then	shortly	after	renamed	Idemia.	The	multisectoral	market	for	border	control	thus	spans	
across	 several	 highly	 competitive,	 capital-intensive	 and	 volatile	 markets	 characterized	 by	
processes	of	buying,	branching	off,	merging	through	joint	ventures,	or	sub-contracting	to	other	
market	actors.		
As	for	subsidiaries,	Airbus,	for	example,	divides	its	products	into	markets	of	commercial	
aircraft,	 helicopters,	 defence,	 space	 and	 innovation.	 These	 are	 then	 targeted	 by	 subsidiary	
companies,	 such	 as	 Airbus	 Helicopters,	 Airbus	 Defence	 &	 Space,	 ATR,	 Stelia	 Aerospace,	 Elbe	
Fluzeugwerke,	Airbus	 Corporate	 Jets,	 Airbus	Military,	 Panavia	Aircraft,	Helibras	 and	Airbus	UK.	
Similarly,	 Italian	 Leonardo	 also	divides	 its	 products	 into	 four	 divisions:	 Electronics,	 helicopters,	
aircrafts,	 aerostructures	 and	 cyber	 security.	 These	 are	 then	 targeted	 by	 subsidiary	 companies,	
including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 AugustaWestland,	 MBDA,	 ATR,	 Telespazio,	 Thales	 Alenia	 Space,	
Leonardo	US	Holding.,	SELEX	Galileo,	SOGEPA,	AugustaWestland	Holdings,	Selex	ES	International,	
Alenia	 Aermacchi,	 Sistemi	 Software	 Integrati,	 Finmeccanica	 UK,	 Finmeccanica	 Group	 Services,	
Finmeccanica	 Finance	Telespazio	Holding,	Dataspazio,	Datamat	 (Suisse),	 Leonardo	UK,	Ansaldo	
Argentina	S.A.,	Alenia	Hellas,	Selex	Sensors	and	Airborne	Systems,	to	name	but	a	few.	
Although	 public	 institutions	 are	 integral	 for	 the	 processes	 whereby	 the	 construction,	
maintenance	 or	 operation	 of	 border	 control	 infrastructure	 is	 researched,	 developed	 and	
outsourced,	 the	 companies	 themselves	 can	 also	 be	 very	 pro-active.	 Some	 of	 their	 attempted	
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influence	on	policy-making	can	be	observed	via	the	Transparency	Register,	where	the	companies	
voluntarily	register	activities	and	information.	IntegrityWatch	has	compiled	this	information,	and	
through	it,	it	is	possible	to	cast	an	incomplete	gaze	into	how	commercial	interests	in	border	control	
technology	seek	to	place	themselves	in	the	machine	room	of	EU	multileveled	governance.	
	
Figure	4	–	Large	contractors	on	the	market	for	EU	border	control	
Observing	the	largest	contracts	among	the	sampled	data	ranging	from	2012-2018,	it	is	clear	that	
a	 small	 handful	 of	 European	 companies	 stand	 for	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 these	 large-scale	
infrastructural	projects.	These	companies	have	featured	on	multiple	levels	when	it	comes	to	EU	
border	 governance	 realized	 through	 the	 development,	 maintenance	 and	 evolution	 of	
interoperable	information	systems	and	the	EUROSUR	system.	Accordingly,	these	actors	are	briefly	
introduced	below.		
Airbus	is	a	pan-European	aerospace	and	defence	company,	mostly	based	in	Germany	and	
France.	 In	2018,	 it	had	revenues	of	€64bn	(Airbus,	2019a)	and	currently	employs	over	130,000	
people	(Forbes,	2019).	Founded	in	1998,	in	2004	Airbus	took	their	first	major	bordering	contract	
creating	an	integrated	border	system	for	Romania,	in	line	with	EU	membership	requirements,	at	a	
cost	 of	 €734m	 (Akkerman,	 2016).	 Today,	 integrated	 border	 systems	 are	 just	 one	 area	 of	
specialization	 (Airbus,	2019b),	alongside	a	comprehensive	space	programme	with	a	number	of	
subsidiary	 companies	 including	 Ariane	 Space	 and	 Astrium	 GMBH.	 In	 2015	 alone,	 this	 set	 of	
companies	 won	 contracts	 worth	 over	 €700m	 for	 satellite	 construction	 under	 the	 Copernicus	
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project	(ESA,	2019a).	Airbus	reported	having	13	lobbyists	placed	in	Brussels,	estimating	their	costs	
to	between	€1.500.000	and	€1.749.000	(Airbus,	2020).	The	person	with	the	main	responsibility	
for	 EU	 relations	 is	 the	 Senior	 Vice	 Preseident	 and	Head	 of	 Europe	 and	NATO	Affairs,	 Nathalie	
Errard.	 Figure	 7	 visualizes	 the	 meetings	 Airbus	 have	 had	 with	 Commission	 representatives	
between	2015-2019.	
	
Figure	5	-	Timeline	over	Airbus	meetings	with	Commission	representatives,	2015-2019	
Accenture,	originally	Arthur	Andersen,	is	a	digital,	technology	and	consultancy	services	company	
founded	in	Denmark	in	1989,	but	based	in	Dublin	since	2009.	With	a	2018	revenue	of	$39.6bn	
(Accenture,	 2019),	 the	 company	 has	 over	 450.000	 employees	 (Forbes,	 2019b).	 Accenture	 has	
partnered	 extensively	 with	 Morpho	 as	 part	 of	 The	 Bridge3	 consortium	 through	 which	 it	 was	
awarded	a	three-year	framework	contract,	worth	a	total	of	€	27.568.971,	for	the	maintenance	of	
the	EU’s	VIS-system.	In	2015,	Accenture	was	also	contracted	to	construct	both	the	EU’s	second	
generation	Schengen	Information	System	(SIS	II),	worth	€2,2m,	as	well	as	the	contract	for	system	
maintenance	and	user	training	for	the	Biometric	Identity	Management	System	(BIMS)	set	up	by	
the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees	(UNHCR).	
The	company	also	led	the	VIS	project,	alongside	many	others	in	the	border	industry	(Accenture,	
2013).	Accenture	has	reported	14	meetings	with	Commission	representatives	(Figure	8)	and	has	a	
lobby	budget	estimated	between	€600.000	and	€699.999.	They	only	report	one	lobbyist,	Babara	
Wynne,	who	is	Director	for	the	EU	Government	Relations.	
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Figure	6	-	Accenture	meetings	with	Commission	representatives,	2015-2017	
	
Atos	is	a	French	ICT	and	biometrics	technology	company,	founded	in	1982.	In	2018,	the	company	
boasted	 revenues	 of	 $11,3bn	 and	 had	 122.000	 employees	 (Forbes,	 2019c).	 Atos	 entered	 the	
market	for	border	infrastructures	very	early,	as	it	was	responsible	for	the	development	of	the	first-
generation	 Schengen	 information	 System	 (SIS	 I).	 Since	 2014	 it	 has	 also	 been	 involved	 in	
consortiums	for	the	SIS	II	system	as	well	as	the	upcoming	Entry/Exit	System	(EES).	Its	technology	
supply	includes	integrated	maritime	surveillance	systems	which,	they	claim,	are	responsible	for	
saving	migrant’s	lives	through	their	use	by	the	Spanish	coastal	patrols	and	border	guards	in	the	
Mediterranean	(Atos,	2017).	Its	former	CEO	Thierry	Breton	has	controversially	gone	on	to	become	
France’s	representative	at	the	EU	Commission,	as	commissioner	for	Internal	Markets	(European	
Commission	2019b).	 Since	2014,	ATOS	have	 reported	20	meetings	with	 European	Commission	
representatives	 (Figure	 9).	 Their	 budget	 for	 these	 meetings	 has	 been	 between	 €25.000	 and	
€49.999.	They	report	having	approximately	10	in-house	lobbyists	based	in	Brussels.	The	person	
with	the	main	responsibility	is	Alexandre	Menais,	who	is	General	Secretary	of	the	Group.	
	
Figure	7	-	Atos	meetings	with	Commission	representtives,	2015-2019	
Leonardo	 (formally	 Finmeccanica)	 is	 an	 Italian	 arms	 and	 defence	 company	 specializing	 in	 the	
supply	 of	 helicopters	 to	 border	 agencies	 (Akkerman,	 2019).	 In	 2018,	 it	 reported	 revenues	 of	
€12,2bn	and	46.000	employees	(Leonardo,	2019).	Finmeccanica	identified	border	markets	as	an	
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important	emerging	strategy	back	in	2009	(Finmeccanica,	2009)	and	especially	took	advantage	of	
the	 Italy-Libya	 ‘Friendship	 Pact’	 in	 which	 €5bn	 was	 earmarked	 for	 providing	 surveillance	
equipment	 to	be	used	 in	 combatting	 irregular	migration	 to	Europe	 (Lemberg-Pedersen,	 2013).	
Leonardo	has	a	subsidiary	joint	venture	company	called	Telespazio,	owning	67%	and	where	French	
Thales	 owns	 the	 remaining	 33%.	 Through	 this	 the	 company	 has	 been	 able	 to	 land	 significant	
contracts	 within	 the	 space	 industry	 (Telespazio,	 2019).	 Leonardo	 has	 registered	 3	 lobbyists	 in	
Brussels	and	a	budget	of	around	€300.000-400.000	per	year.	Reponsible	for	EU	relations	 is	the	
Vice	 President	 for	 International	 Relations,	 Massimo	 Baldinato.	 Its	 registered	 meetings	 with	
Commission	representatives	are	visualised	in	Figure	10.	
	
Figure	8	-	Timeline	over	Leonardo	meetings	with	Commission	representatives,	2015-2019	
Thales	is	a	French	security	and	defence	company	founded	in	2000,	that	specializes	in	biometrics,	
radar	 systems	 and	 space	 technology.	 In	 2018,	 it	 had	 a	 revenue	 of	 €15,8bn	 and	 over	 80.000	
employees	(Thales,	2019b).	Since	2012,	Thales	has	been	developing	drone	technology	for	use	by	
Frontex	 (Akkerman,	 2019).	 With	 Thales’	 acquisition	 of	 Gemalto	 –	 a	 company	 specializing	 in	
biometrics	which	had	itself	already	incorporated	3M’s	Identity	Management	business	–	they	have	
shown	 a	 clear	 interest	 in	 developing	 their	 company	 down	 this	 line	 (Ibid.).	 Through	 their	 joint	
venture	company	Thales	Alenia	(33%	owned	by	Leonardo),	they	have	also	been	awarded	multiple	
large	contracts	in	the	space	sector	over	the	last	half	decade,	securing	over	€600m	in	Copernicus	
contracts	 between	 2015-18	 (ESA,	 2019).	 Thales	 have	 registered	 6	 lobbyists	 in	 Brussels,	with	 a	
budget	of	 around	€300.000,	 and	answering	 to	 the	Senior	Vice	President	 for	 EU,	NATO	and	EU	
relations,	Marc	Cathelineau.		
Alongside	 these,	both	3M	and	Gemalto	also	 registered	 lobbyists.	Thus,	 from	2014	and	
until	its	take-over	by	Gemalto,	3M	registered	five	lobbyists,	of	which	Maxime	Bureau,	Director	of	
Government	 Affairs	 and	 EMEA	 was	 the	 main	 responsible.	 Its	 lobbying	 budget	 was	 between	
€600.000	and	699.000.		Gemalto	registered	only	one	lobbyist,	who	from	2014	had	three	meetings	
with	representatives	from	the	European	Commission.	The	person	with	main	responsibility	for	the	
relation	 with	 the	 EU	 was	 Marie	 Figarella,	 VP	 Institutional	 Relations,	 with	 a	 budget	 between	
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€50.000	 and	€	 99.999	 at	 her	 disposal.	 Combined,	 the	 lobbying	 efforts	 of	 3M	and	Gemalto	 on	
identity	management	has	been	instrumental	in	building	Thales	market	position	within	this	area.	
Figure	11	shows	3Ms	registered	meetings	with	Comimission	Representatives	between	2014-2017.	
	
	
Figure	9	-	3M	meetings	with	Commission	representatives,	2014-2017	
Indra	 is	 a	 Spanish	 ICT	 and	 consultancy	 aiming	 at	 becoming	 specialists	 in	 border	 security,	
particularly	regarding	biometrics	for	integrated	border	systems.	In	2018,	they	achieved	revenues	
of	 €3,1bn	 and	 employed	 43.000	 people	 (Indra,	 2019).	 Founded	 in	 1993,	 the	 company	 was	
reporting	a	 significant	 interest	 in	border	markets	by	2008	 (Indra,	2008).	By	2015,	 security	 and	
defence	accounted	for	19%	of	company	revenue	(Akkerman,	2016).	 Indra	have	been	especially	
active	in	forming	and	leading	consortiums	in	the	border	control	arena;	PERSEUS	and	Operation	
Seahorse	 being	 two	 examples	 (Indra,	 2011).	 Indra	 registered	 six	 lobbysists	 in	 Brussels,	 with	 a	
budget	 between	 €900.000	 and	 €1.000.000.	 The	 main	 responsible	 for	 lobby	 operations	 was	
Director	David	Luengo	Riesco.	
GMV	was	 established	 in	 1984	 and	 specializes	 in	 the	 space	 and	 defence	 sector	 (GMV,	
2020a).	In	2018,	the	company	had	revenues	of	€196m,	and	employed	1800	people	(GMV,	2020b).	
During	the	1990’s	GMV	began	to	develop	systems	for	military	use	of	satellite	navigation	(GMV,	
2020a),	and	since	2010,	the	company	has	won	pilots	and	several	subsequent	Frontex	contracts	for	
the	development,	and	evolution	of	the	EUROSUR	project	(GMV,	2020c).	GMV	has	not	registered	
its	activities	in	the	Transparency	Register.	
Safran	is	a	French	aerospace	and	defence	company	which	created	revenues	of	€21.5bn	in	
2018,	and	reported	employing	91.000	people	(Safran,	2019a).	It	was	created	in	2005	by	merging	
two	previous	companies,	Snecma	and	Sagem	SA;	via	this	heritage	it	claims	to	be	the	oldest	aircraft	
manufacturing	company	in	the	world	(Safran	2019b).	Through	its	subsidiary	company,	Morpho,	
Safran	has	won	a	number	of	important	border	contracts	in	the	ICT	and	biometrics	sector,	such	as	
the	VIS	system	(Accenture,	2013),	and	through	the	Ariane	Group,	a	joint	venture	with	Airbus,	it	is	
a	 lead	 contractor	 for	 the	 EU’s	Ariane	5	 and	6	 launch	 facilities,	 connected	with	 the	Copernicus	
programme.	The	company	Safran	has	held	nine	meetings	with	representatives	from	the	European	
Commission	since	2014	(see	Figure	12).	They	have	seven	lobbyists	for	these	tasks,	of	which	Marie	
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de	 Saint-Cheron,	 senior	 VP	 in	 European	 and	Multilateral	 Affairs,	 is	 the	 person	 with	 the	main	
responsibility.	Their	lobby	budget	is	estimated	to	be	around	€495.000.	
	
Figure	10	-	Timeline	over	Safran	meetings	with	Commission	representatives,	2016-2019	
Hewlett-Packard	(HP)	is	an	American	ITC	company	founded	in	1939.	In	2018,	it	had	revenues	of	
$58	billion	and	employed	55.000	people	(Forbes,	2019d).	As	a	member	of	The	Bridge3	Consortium,	
it	 collaborates	with	Accenture	 and	Morpho	and	has	 received	multiple	 framework	 contracts	 to	
create	 the	 VIS	 database.	 HP	 has	 registered	 two	 in-house	 lobbyists,	 of	whom	 Irena	 Bednarich,	
Director	 of	 Corporate	 Affairs	 in	 Europe,	 Middle	 East	 and	 Africa,	 is	 the	 person	 with	 the	 main	
responsibility.	Since	2014	HP	has	reported	11	meetings	with	Commission	representatives	and	a	
lobby	budget	between	€400.000	and	€499.999.		
	 IBM	 is	an	American	ICT	company	founded	in	1919.	In	2018,	it	had	revenues	of	$79,6bn	
(IBM,	 2019a)	 and	 employs	 380.000	 people	 (Forbes,	 2019e).	 IBM	 has	 a	 dedicated	 border	
management	division,	providing	technology	solutions	 including	real-time	risk	assessment	(IBM,	
2019b).	In	2018,	in	collaboration	with	the	Danish	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Danish	Refugee	
Council,	 it	 co-developed	 a	 Predictive	Modeling	 of	Mixed	Migration	 Flows-tool,	 the	MM4Sight,	
designed	 to	 forecast	 the	 creation	 and	 direction	 of	 forced	 displacement,	 based	 on	 machine	
learning.	It	is	one	of	the	most	prolifically	lobbying	companies	when	it	comes	to	setting	up	meetings	
with	 representatives	 for	 the	 European	 Commission.	 IBM	 has	 registered	 nine	 lobbyists	 to	
strengthen	their	relationship	with	the	EU,	of	whom	Liam	Benham,	Vice	President	of	Government	
and	Regulatory	Affairs	in	Europe,	is	main	responsible.	Since	2014,	they	have	reported	90	meetings	
with	representatives	from	the	European	Commission	and	have	an	annual	lobby	budget	between	
€1.750.000	and	€1.999.999.		
	 Observing	the	relative	size,	lobbying	systems	and	interactions	with	representatives	from	
the	European	Commission,	the	most	active	companies	on	the	market	for	EU	border	control	differ	
in	size,	geographic	origin,	products	and	services.	While	some	only	seek	out	the	Commission	on	an	
irregular	 basis,	 others	 organize	 strings	 of	 meetings	 throughout	 the	 year,	 and	 along	 different	
Commission	portfolios.	This	point	is	crucial	when	trying	to	assess	the	relative	influence	yielded	by	
these	companies.	For	while	they	may	primarily	supply	services	for	security,	military,	aerospace,	
ICT	 and	 biometrics	 purposes,	 they	 situate	 themselves	 on	many	more	 levels	 of	 influence	with	
respect	 to	EU	policies,	 such	as	 industry,	 jobs	and	growth,	digital	economy,	 financialization,	 the	
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internal	market,	mobility,	energy,	space	and	trade,	 to	mention	a	 few.	The	security	and	military	
industrial	actors	active	on	the	market	for	EU	border	control	are,	in	other	words,	intimately	woven	
into	the	fiscal	fabric	of	contemporary	Europe.	
4.3	Lobbyism	and	strategy	on	the	market	for	border	control	
The	kinds	of	interaction	between	the	companies	and	the	EU	Commission	described	in	the	previous	
section	 are	 not	 the	 only	way	 through	which	 commercial	 interests	 are	 pursued.	 There	 is	 great	
opaqueness	on	these	issues,	for	instance,	when	it	comes	to	how	such	actors	lobby	the	Commission	
on	the	phrasing	and	wording	of	communications	and	legislative	drafts	and	acts.	This	is	at	least	in	
part	 because	 of	 the	 daunting	 number	 of	 Directorate	 Generals,	 agencies,	 departments	 and	
associated	 funding	 instruments.	 The	 Committees	 and	 Sub-Committees	 of	 the	 European	
Parliament	have	also	grown	as	a	site	of	lobbyism	efforts	as	its	influence	on	Union	law-making	has	
been	 increasing	over	 the	 last	decade.	But	 in	general,	 the	greater	 the	 lack	of	 transparency,	 the	
higher	 likelihood	 of	 informal	 interventions	 in	 the	 drafting	 of	 policies,	 funding	 priorities	 and	
legislations	(cf.	Baird,	2018).	
	 The	lobbying	efforts	may	take	several	forms.	A	widespread	strategy	is	described	by	the	
interest	 organization	 ASD:	 Companies	 wishing	 to	 be	 “proactive	 and	 strive	 to	 generate	 new	
procurement	opportunities”	should	engage	with	representatives	from	their	Member	State	who	
are	placed	 in	 the	Programme	Committee	of	 the	 funding	 instruments	desired	by	 the	 company.	
Since	these	Programme	Committees	are	responsible	for	deciding	on	the	content	of	future	Work	
Programmes,	says	the	ASD,	“companies	can	advocate	vis-à-vis	“their”	national	representative	to	
increase	 the	 number	 of	 tenders	 open	 to	 industry	 and	 to	 include	 more	 projects	 on	 physical	
[security]	capabilities	rather	than	on	institution	building”	(ASD,	2016,	p.10).	
The	ASD	underscores	that	particularly	in	the	run-up	to	the	mid-term	reviews	of	funding	
instruments	 is	 there	 room	 to	 insert	 business	 priorities,	 as	 this	 “offers	 the	 opportunity	 to	 shift	
priorities	and	change	the	content	of	programmes	for	the	remaining	period	of	the	budget	cycle”	
(ASD,	2016,	p.10).	And	from	2017,	both	organizations	like	the	ASD	and	the	EOS	have	been	engaging	
in	an	intensifying	proactive	lobbying	effort,	in	order	to	influence	the	setting	of	priorities	for	the	
next	budget	cycle	between	2021-2028,	where	“more	profound	structural	changes	can	be	made	to	
reform	existing	funding	instruments	or	establish	new	ones”	(Ibid.,	p.11).	
	 To	this	end,	companies	employ	both	in-house	lobbyists	as	described	above,	or	external	
lobbyists,	 who	 can	 arrange	 meetings	 with	 the	 relevant	 Directorate	 Generals	 or	 higher-level	
Commission	representatives,	or	approach	MEPs.	External	lobbyists,	like	communications	bureaus,	
may	also	orchestrate	larger	media	campaigns	in	targeted	European	cities	and	financial	centres	on	
behalf	of	 their	 client	companies.	Both	kinds	of	 lobbyists	also	collaborate	or	 facilitate	networks	
through	 intergroups	 or	 more	 informal	 extra-parliamentary	 groups,	 or	 approach	 national	
representatives	on	the	Work	Programmes.	In	the	following,	these	practices	are	considered	in	some	
detail,	in	order	to	determine	the	vehicles	and	degree	of	influences	they	yield	on	the	formulation	
of	EU	border	control	policies.		
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4.3.1	External	lobby	companies		
In	the	European	Parliament,	interest	groups,	broadly	defined,	working	for	companies	producing	
border	control	technology	will	typically	assist	their	clients	or	members	by	identifying	which	MEPs	
to	approach	and	which	Committees	or	Sub-Committees,	like	those	on	Security	and	Defence,	LIBE,	
Foreign	Affairs	and	 Industry,	Research	and	Energy,	are	of	highest	 relevance.	When	 it	 comes	 to	
funding,	which	instruments	are	conducting	mid-term	reviews,	will	be	deciding	on	future	funding	
cycles,	or	preparing	feasibility	studies	that	might	impact	the	demand,	or	market	positionality,	of	
the	companies.	Often,	larger	companies	have	both	in-house	lobby	offices	in	Brussels,	sometimes	
registered	through	the	Transparency	Register,	but	also	hire	external	bureaus	alongside	these,	such	
as	 law	firms,	communications	bureaus	and	public	 relations	 firms.	The	 largest	of	 these	external	
bureaus	 include	 Fleishman-Hillard,	 Alber	 &	 Geiger,	 Hill-Knowlton,	 Burson	 Marsteller,	 Europe	
Analytica,	Gellis	Communications,	LOGOS	Public	Affairs,	PA	Europe	or	Havas	Public	Affairs	(Public	
Affairs	Networking,	2020).	
	 For	instance,	FleishmanHillard	Brussels	works	with	several	large	companies	active	on	the	
market	for	border	control,	including	Atos	and	Airbus.	It	claims	to	help	companies	by	using	long-
standing	relationships	with	“industry	influencers,	policymakers	and	targeted	trade	media”	thereby	
developing	key	alliances	that	facilitate	programme	development	in	Europe.	Alongside	this,	they	
also	promise	“C-level	engagement”	with	“Brussels	audiences	directly”,	that	is,	the	facilitation	of	
direct	interactions	with	EU	policy-makers	(FleishmanHillard,	2020).	Similarly,	Alber	&	Geiger	has	
offices	in	Brussels,	Berlin	and	London,	and	boasts	that	they	enlist	“former	European	Commission	
officials,	the	Vice-President	of	the	European	Parliament,	an	EU	ambassador	and	a	former	judge	at	
the	EU	Court	of	Justice	who	know	how	to	move	client	agendas”	(Alber	&	Geiger,	2020).	
Next	to	these,	both	informal	extra-parliamentary	groups	and	parliamentarily	recognized	
cross-party	groups	are	utilized	by	such	actors.	These	kinds	of	informal	groups	typically	consist	of	
MEPs,	 representatives	 from	 interest	 groups,	 as	well	 as	 actors	 from	 the	 industrial	 sector.	Often	
business	 interests	 have	 been	 integral	 to	 their	 foundation,	whereas	 the	 intergroups	 have	 been	
organized	according	to	parliamentary	rules	(European	Parliament,	2019;	see	also,	1999).		
4.3.2	Intergroups	
These	 are	 forums	 of	MEPs	 assembled	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 specific	 topics	 or	 themes	 through	
informal	exchanges	and	facilitated	contact	with	extra-parliamentary	actors.	More	than	70	groups	
were	proposed	 for	 the	2014-2019	period;	only	28	were	 formed	 for	 the	period.	This	process	 is	
repeated	every	fifth	year.	While	some	intergroups	are	massively	targeted	by	interest	groups	and	
commercial	actors,	others	receive	much	less	attention	(Nedergaard,	and	Dagnis	Jensen,	2014).		
Of	these	intergroups,	the	Sky	and	Space	Intergroup	(SSI)	is	particularly	relevant	as	a	hub	
for	security	and	defence	lobbyism.	It	brings	together	MEPs,	with	institutional	actors	like	the	ESA,	
but	also	large	military	contractors	like	Airbus	and	Leonardo.	From	2009-2014	the	SSI	Secretariat	
of	2-3	persons	was	even	provided	by	the	ASD,	one	of	the	biggest	European	lobby	organization	for	
the	 security	 and	 military	 industry.	 The	 ASD’s	 President	 at	 the	 time	 was	 Leonardo’s	 (then	
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Finmeccanica)	CEO,	Mauro	Moretti,	which	further	underscores	the	collusion	of	 interests	 in	this	
intergroup	(Corporate	Europe	Observatory,	2011).		
Each	year	the	SSI	organises	the	EU	Aeronautics	Conference	with	the	support	of	ASD.	Here	
they	manage	to	gather	over	300	participants,	including	Commissioners,	Members	of	the	European	
Parliament,	CEOs,	national	experts	and	industry	stakeholders.	The	conference,	says	SSI,	“provides	
a	 platform	 for	 an	 interdisciplinary	 debate,	 by	 engaging	 policymakers,	 the	 industry	 and	 the	
scientific	community,	and	aims	at	leading	to	tangible	conclusions	that	will	inspire	future	political	
initiatives”(EU	 Aeronautics	 Conference,	 2018). Prominent	 speakers	 at	 the	 2018	 conference	
included;	the	President	of	the	SSI,	Monika	Hohlmeier;	the	president	of	the	European	Parliament;	
the	Vice	President	of	the	European	Commission;	the	Commissioners	for	Industry	and	Transport,	
the	Director-General	of	DG	MOVE;		and	from	the	market	for	border	control;	the	ASD	and	high	level	
representatives	from	Dassault,	Airbus,	Indra,	Thales	and	Leonardo.	
The	SSI’s	close	ties	to	the	military	 industry	differs	 from	another	 intergroup	relevant	for	
European	border	control,	namely	that	on	Digital	Agenda.	By	comparison,	it	did	not	report	receiving	
any	administrative	or	financial	support	from	industry	(EU	Parliament,	2015).	Intergroups	represent	
one	 medium	 through	 which	 commercial	 actors	 in	 the	 market	 for	 border	 control	 can	 pursue	
strategies	of	both	indirect	but	also	direct	communication	with	EU	policy	makers.	
4.3.3	Extra-parliamentary	groups	–		the	Kangaroo	Group	
When	it	comes	to	the	more	informal	and	extra-parliamentary	groups,	one	relevant	case	in	point	
is	 the	 Kangaroo	Group.	 It	 presents	 itself	 as	 focused	 on	 “free	movement	 and	 security”,	 and	 as	
working	towards	abolishing	internal	borders	and	facilitating	a	Single	Market,	whilst	strengthening	
the	Union’s	 external	 border	 control.	 The	Group	was	 formed	 in	 1979	 as	 “an	 informal	 group	 of	
friends	 in	 the	 European	 Parliament,”	 it	 is	 now	 registered	 as	 a	 Belgian	 NGO.	 A	 look	 at	 its	
membership	is	illustrative	of	the	ways	in	which	such	lobby	groups	exercise	influence	in	and	beyond	
the	public	bodies.	In	2019	its	members	included	honorary	members	in	the	form	of	a	former	French	
President;	 a	 former	 Italian	 Prime	Minister;	 a	 former	 Spanish	minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs;	 and	 a	
former	president	of	the	European	Patent	Office.		
Among	its	18	regular	members	were	listed	the	Vice-President	of	the	European	Parliament;	
the	vice-chair	of	the	Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs	as	well	as	four	MEPs	sitting	on	the	Committees	
on	Economic	and	Monetary	Affairs;	three	from	the	Committee	on	Civil	Liberties,	Justice	and	Home	
Affairs;	two	from	the	Committee	on	the	Internal	Market	and	Consumer	Protection;	two	from	the	
Committee	on	Industry,	Research	and	Energy	and	two	from	the	Sub-Committee	on	Security	and	
Defence	 (Kangaroo	Group,	 2020a).	 The	Group	 also	 listed	 37	members	 from	other	 institutions,	
academia	and	experts,	including	professors,	former	MEPs	and	38	members	from	industry,	services	
and	 trade.	These	 include	representatives	 from	Nokia,	aerospace	and	defence	companies	Volvo	
and	 Saab,	 Safran	Group,	Airbus,	 the	 European	Organisation	of	Military	Associations	 and	Trade	
Unions	 (EUROMIL),	 the	 German	 steel	 industry	 (Wirthchaftsvereinigung	 Stahl),	 and	 the	 British	
satellite	 and	 telecommnuications	 company	 Inmarsat	 (Kangaroo	 Group,	 2020b).	 The	 Kangaroo	
Group’s	Brussels	office	 is	 located	down	the	road	from	the	European	Parliament,	 three	minutes	
away	on	foot.	
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The	Kangaroo	Group	seeks	to	develop	“a	truly	borderless	single	market	that	is	a	win-win	
for	business	and	consumers”.	But	it	also	notes,	that	the	open	borders	between	Member	States	
“will	only	be	maintained	if	the	external	borders	of	the	Union	are	adequately	protected.”	To	this	
end,	 the	Group	 focuses	on	 the	 “future	of	 Frontex,	 Eurosur	 and	 the	humanitarian	and	 security	
aspects	of	the	protection	of	our	external	borders.”	More	concretely,	it	lobbies	for	the	creation	of	
common	technical	 standards	 for	an	EU	security	and	defence	market	eager	 to	use	 technologies	
such	 as	 “Remotely	 Piloted	 Aircraft	 Systems	 and	 their	 admission	 to	 the	 European	 Airspace,	
intelligence,	 space	 situational	 awareness,	 the	 security	 of	 space	 based	 assets,	 and	 the	 next	
generation	of	satellite	communications”	for	border		control	purposes	(Ibid.)	
		
Figure	11	–	Selected	Kangaroo	Group	events,	2013-2018		
	
The	 Kangaroo	Group	 has	 also	 hosted	 a	 series	 of	 events,	workshops	 and	 luncheons	 convening	
policy-makers	 and	 industrial	 representatives.	 Some	 of	 these	 have	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 been	
related	to	EU	border	control.	These	include	a	December	3,	2013	meeting	on	“EU’s	future	space	
surveillance	and	tracking	support	programme”,	a	March	18,	2014	meeting	on	“Surveillance	of	the	
External	Sea	Borders”,	a	October	11,	2016	meeting	on	“European	Foreign-,	Security-	and	Defence	
Policy	in	the	21st	Century	–	External	Borders,	Situation	of	the	Refugees	and	the	so-called	Islamic	
State”;	a	December	6,	2017	meeting	on	“Space	and	Security	Strategy	for	Europe”	and	a	June	19,	
2018	meeting	on	“Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy	–	current	state	of	play”	(Figure	13).	During	
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these,	Kangaroo	Group	members	meet	under	more	informal,	and	non-mediatized	settings	with	
EU	and	national	policy-makers,	other	industry	representatives	and	interest	organizations.	
The	 various	 groups	 often	 seek	 to	 influence	 political	 discussions	 and	 policy-making	 by	
getting	 together	 immediately	 ahead	of	more	 official	 parliamentary	 committee	 or	 commission-
appointed	high	level	expert-meetings.	This	allows	for	discussions	in	those	formalized	meetings	to	
be	“pre-cooked”	by	those	experts	who	are	also	members	of	the	informal	groups	(Parkin,	2011).	
However,	the	relations	between	EU	policy-makers	and	the	border	industry	are	not	a	one-
way	street	for	several	reasons.	Even	if	EU	policy	forums	are	massively	targeted	by	interest-based	
organizations	and	actors,	they	are	not	empty	containers	void	of	their	own	priorities,	to	be	dictated	
by	external	and	corporate	forces.	Similarly,	even	if	public	policies	and	institutions	form	a	crucial	
foundation	 for	 industrial	 sectors,	 commercial	 actors	 are	 far	 from	 passive	 socialisees	 of	 policy	
dictates.	While	many	commentators,	 journalists	and	civil	organizations	 rightly	worry	about	 the	
increasing	influence	of	such	commercial	priorities	on	EU	border	policy-making,	the	possibility	for	
maneuverability	still	exists,	depending	on	the	actors	in	question.	In	such	cases,	it	is	more	accurate	
to	 say	 that	 both	 sides	 are	 engaged	 in	 norm	 diffusion	 through	 a	 constant	 re-appropriation,	
reversion	and	counter-narration.	From	this	view,	while	the	balance	of	power	to	shape	discourses	
and	policy-outcomes	may	be	shifting,	there	is	no	stable	point	from	which	to	observe	cooperative	
systems	and	analyse	norm	diffusion,	for	the	actors	involved	play	interchangeable	roles,	depending	
on	priorities	and	specific	contexts	(cf.	Cassarino,	2018).	
Such	 processes	 illustrate	 how	 new	 political	 priorities	 may	 also	 seep	 back	 into	 the	
discourses	and	priorities	of	commercial	actors.	For	instance,	the	increased	political	awareness	of	
environmental	 issues	has	come	to	 feature	more	prominently	 in	security	 industry	discourses	on	
maritime	 security.	 One	 example	 is	 Airbus	 discourses	 on	 the	 Sentinel-2	 satellites,	 which	 were	
launched	in	June	2015,	and	used	by	the	Frontex	Agency	through	the	Copernicus	Programme.	Thus,	
shifting	the	focus	from	its	border	control	and	migration	management	capabilities,	the	company	
increasingly	highlights	its	use	for	detecting	maritime	pollution	and	describes	how	companies	and	
organizations	 increasingly	rely	on	satellite	 imagery	 in	this	regard.	 In	one	new	item,	Airbus	thus	
commemorated	 the	World	 Cleanup	Day	 2019,	 by	 describing	 its	 collaboration	with	Waste	 Free	
Oceans	and	Ocean	Cleanup,	and	how	it	uses	machine	learning	to	better	detect	plastic	and	other	
ocean	waste	(Airbus,	2019c).	As	with	intergroups,	the	extra-parliamentary	groups	are	often	ideal	
for	direct	and	secretive	interaction	with	policy-makers.	
4.3.4	Border	security	lobby	organizations		
Recent	research	indicates	the	view	among	Commission	staff	members	that	it	is	preferred	not	to	
deal	 directly	with	 individual	 companies,	 but	 instead	 to	 go	 through	 self-described	 “brokers”	 or	
”interlocutors”,	 like	the	EOS	and	ASD	(Kumar,	2017).	These	function	both	as	 lobbying	hubs	and	
forums	for	 industry	collaborations.	And	when	invited	 into	public-private	forums	or	EU	research	
projects	like	the	FP6	project	Archimedes	by	public	actors	like	the	Commission,	they	also	function	
as	 actors	 involved	 in	multileveled	 policy-making	 on	 EU	 borders.	 They	 organize	meetings	 with	
Commission	 representatives,	 conferences,	 workshops,	 High	 level	 Roundtables,	 and	 produce	
reports	and	white	papers,	in	order	to	facilitate	their	members’	interests.		
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4.3.4.1	Aerospace	and	Defence	Industries	Association	of	Europe	(ASD)	
The	ASD	is	the	one	of	the	most	comprehensive	lobby	groups	for	the	security	and	defence	industry	
in	Europe.	Its	Chairman	is	Eric	Trappier,	the	CEO	of	Dassault	Aviation,	and	the	Vice	Chair	is	Håkan	
Buskhe,	CEO	of	SAAB.	Member	of	its	board	include	CEOs	from	the	companies	Indra,	MBDA,	Thales,	
Rolls	 Royce,	 Airbus,	Naval	Group,	 Kongsberg	Defence	&	Aerospace,	 Safran,	 Leonardo	 and	 BAE	
Systems.	ASD’s	head	office	is	based	in	Brussels,	thus	closely	located	to	the	corridors	of	power	in	
the	 EU.	 Its	 lobby	budget	 for	 2015	was	 €298.000	 (Jones,	 2016),	 however,	 questions	 have	been	
raised	 whether	 the	 actual	 lobbying	 budget	 is	 in	 fact	 significantly	 larger	 (Lobbyfacts,	 2020b).	
According	to	the	Transparency	Register,	ASD	has	registered	33	meetings	with	representatives	from	
the	European	Commission	since	2014.	
ASD	represents	the	interests	of	over	3,000	companies	within	the	European	Aeronautics,	
Space,	 Defense	 and	 Security	 Industries.	 It	 was	 formed	 in	 2004	 when	 the	 older	 industry	
associations	 EDIG,	 AECMA	 and	 EUROSPACE	were	 combined.	 According	 to	 its	 own	website,	 its	
members	combine	to	employ	864.000	people,	and	generated	a	turnover	of	€228,5	million	in	2017	
(ASD,	2018).	ASD	is	promoting	the	interests	of	its	members	by	being	in	constant	dialogue	with	EU	
institutions,	 like	 the	European	Commission	and	 stakeholders,	 organizing	public-private	 forums,	
and,	 through	 these,	 engaging	 in	 the	multileveled	 governance	 of	 European	 security	 policy	 and	
legislation.	Figure	13	visualizes	all	ASD	meetings	with	representatives	of	the	Commission	between	
2014-2018.		
	
	
Figure	12-	Timeline	2014-2018	over	registered	ASD	meetings	with	the	European	Commission	
Additionally,	 the	 ASD	 also	 positions	 itself	 as	 an	 expert	 on	 policy	matters,	 framing	 itself	 as	 an	
“intelligence	 hub	 for	 expert	 knowledge	 on	 industry-related	 issues”	 (Heinrich,	 2015).	 	 Border	
security	 is	 a	 specific	 focus	 point	 for	 the	 lobbying	 organizations,	 who	 are	 keenly	 aware	 of	 the	
importance	of	 the	European	Commission,	EU-Lisa	and	Frontex	when	 it	comes	to	procurement,	
research	&	development,	and	the	standardisation	of	border	control	technologies.		
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Concentrating	its	lobbying	efforts	on	supporting	investments	in	research	and	innovation	
and	 border	 management	 infrastructures,	 it	 encourages	 further	 harmonization	 of	 border	
equipment	needs	at	European	level,	and	seeks	to	stimulate	the	procurement	of	such	equipment	
at	the	national	level	(ASD,	2020).	ASD	has	also	functioned	as	the	secretariat	for	the	SSI,	which	the	
Secretary	General,	 Jan	Pie,	described	 in	2016	as	“an	extremely	effective	 forum	to	engage	with	
MEPs”	(ASD,	2016,	p.1)	
4.3.4.2	European	Organization	for	Security	(EOS)	
EOS	was	developed	 in	2007,	 from	the	already	existing	ASD,	by	 the	 former	CEO	of	Thales,	Luigi	
Rebuffi,	and	operates	in	15	different	countries.	Its	chairman	is	Giorgio	Mosca	from	Leonardo,	and	
the	 Vice-chairman	 is	 David	 Luengo	 from	 Indra.	Members	 of	 its	 Board	 include	 CEOs	 from	 the	
companies	Airbus,	Atos,	Conceptivity,	Gemalto,	 Indra,	Leonardo,	Laurea,	Secunet,	Naval	Group,	
Smiths	Detection	and	Thales	to	name	a	few	(EOS,	2020a).	
Most	of	its	members	are	also	members	of	the	ASD.	The	EOS	has	stated	its	main	objective	
as	 “the	 development	 of	 a	 consistent	 European	 Security	Market	 sustaining	 the	 interests	 of	 its	
Members”	 (EOS,	 2009,	 p.15)	 It	 claims	 to	 work	 closely	 with	 the	 Commission	 and	 Directorate	
Generals	 (DGs),	 and	 is	 regularly	 participating	 in	 EU	 Task	 Forces,	 expert	 groups	 and	 research	
projects	funded	by	Commission	instruments.		
	The	 EOS	has	 argued	 that	 the	most	 effective	 counter-measures	 to	 immigration	 require	
more	 common	 European,	 as	 opposed	 to	 national,	 border	 initiatives	 (Ibid.).	 This	 has	 led	 it	 to	
recommend	the	implementation	of	innovative	surveillance	technologies	and	the	creation	of	EU-
funded	 programs	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	 an	 integrated	management	 system	 for	 regulated	
borders.	To	this	end,	it	recommended	the	formation	of	a	public-private	“EU	Border	Checks	Task	
Force,”(Ibid.,	pp.	9-10)	and	stressed	that	Frontex	should	“be	a	relevant	interlocutor	for	the	supply	
industry”	by	coordinating	the	definition,	test	and	validation	of	elements	of	common	architectures,	
such	as	EUROSUR	(Ibid.,	p.11).		
That	border	control	technology	is	of	key	interest	to	the	EOS	members,	is	illustrated	by	the	
groups’	prolonged	focus	on	the	field.	In	a	relatively	short	span	of	time,	the	organization	has	had	a	
Working	Group	on	Border	Surveillance,	chaired	by	SELEX	ES,	a	subsidiary	of	Finmeccanica	(now	
Leonardo)	and	a	Working	Group	on	Smart	Borders,	co-chaired	by	Morpho	and	Thales.	Recently	it	
has	been	pursuing	the	business	of	border	control	through	its	Integrated	Border	Security	Working	
Group,	 co-chaired	 by	Giorgio	Gulienetti	 of	 (Leonardo)	 and	 Peter	 Smallridge	 (Gemalto),	 among	
others	(EOS,	2020b).		
The	 EOS	 claims	 to	 be	 engaging	 directly	with	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 European	
Parliament,	the	European	Council	and	EU	agencies	like	Frontex	and	EU-Lisa.	Among	other	things,	
the	Integrated	Group’s	objectives	consist	of;	endorsing	an	 integrated	approach	to	procurement	
policy,	 in	parallel	to	a	comprehensive	strategy	for	future	ISF	funding;	building	the	reputation	of	
security	equipment	manufacturers	and	fostering	lasting	relationships	with	European	regulators;	
promoting	cross-cutting	applications	of	the	technologies	in	the	field	of	civil	protection,	land	and	
maritime	 security;	 supporting	 the	 harmonization	 of	 EU	 Regulations	 and	 standards	 to	 ensure	
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interoperability;	and	to	encourage	further	funding	and	development	of	border	security	research	
(Ibid.).	
The	 interest	 groups	 active	 on	 the	 market	 for	 border	 security	 often	 try	 to	 mirror	 the	
discourse	 and	 structure	 of	 policy	 venues	 in	 order	 to	 maximize	 the	 potential	 uptake	 of	 their	
strategic	communication	into	the	official	policy-making	processes.	One	example	of	this	was	when	
the	EOS	in	2009	established	seven	working	groups	covering	more	or	less	the	same	topics	as	the	
Commission-launched	ESRIF	forum,	namely	Green	&	Blue	Borders,	Surveillance,	Security	&	Safety;	
Civil	 Protection	 (including	 crisis	 management);	 Energy	 Infrastructures	 Security	 and	 Resilience;	
Supply	 Chain	 Security;	 Air	 Passenger	 transport	 security;	 ICT	 networks,	 data	 protection,	
Information	Society	Security;	Surface	Transport	Security	(Hayes,	2009).	By	mirroring	the	discourses	
of	central	EU	institutions,	the	company	members	of	EOS	try	to	steer	and	appropriate	EU	policy	
agendas	according	to	their	interests.	Strategically	mirroring	framings	of	social	contexts	is	thus	used	
to	 facilitate	 the	co-constitution	of	norms	 through	collaboration	on	events	or	projects,	but	also	
decisions	 on	 contracts	 or	 subsidies	 channelled	 from	 institutions	 to	 the	 corporate	members	 of	
organizations	like	the	EOS.	Figure	14	visualizes	in	a	timeline,	the	EOS’	meetings	with	Commission	
representatives	distributed	over	portfolios,	as	registered	in	the	Transparency	Register.	
	
	
Figure	13	-	Timeline	over	registered	EOS	meetings	with	the	European	Commission,	2014-2018	
	
Another	example	has	been	pointed	out	by	Chris	Jones,	namely	how	the	FP7	programme	was	used	
to	fund	the	EOS-coordinated	project	Archimedes,	which	ran	from	January	1,	2012	to	December	
31,	2014.	The	EU	contribution	amounted	to	€1.353.848	out	of	the	overall	€1.534.245.	Its	stated	
objective	was	to	increase	the	market	uptake	of	research	and	development	in	security	technology,	
by	 promoting	 a	 “common	 innovation	 culture”	 and	 aligning	 research	 agendas	 between	 EU	 and	
Member	States	security	policies.		
This	was	 to	be	achieved	by	bringing	 together	 so-called	end-users	and	operators	 into	a	
“permanent	public-private	dialogue”	in	order	to	reinforce	cooperation	with	the	supply	side,	that	
is,	the	industrial	actors	(Ibid.,	see	also	Jones,	2017,	p	34).	In	its	final	report,	the	EOS	claimed	that	
it	would	be	optimal	if	discussions	involved	the	widest	array	of	actors.	However,	in	the	same	report	
it	also	explained	that	such	an	approach	was	not	possible,	as	the	dialogue	had	to	be	taken	“in	a	
closed	and	trusted	environment	that	allows	(when	needed)	sharing	of	confidential	information”	
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(EOS,	2015,	see	also	Jones,	2017,	p.35).	Such	“trusted”	environments	had	of	course	already	been	
established	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Archimedes	 project,	 through	 a	 number	 of	 industry	 stakeholder	
roundtables,	organised	by	EOS.		
Archimedes	can	thus	be	seen	as	one	node	in	the	multi-leveled	public-private	governance	
of	 the	EUs	policies	on	 security	 industry	and	border	control.	However,	 that	 this	 can	also	create	
inconsistency	between	the	different	goals	of	Union	policy-making	is	starkly	illustrated	in	the	final	
Archimedes	report,	where	the	EOS	states	that,	seen	in	the	light	of	boosting	the	European	security	
and	defence	industry,	fundamental	rights	are	“politically	correct	but	not	necessarily	a	competitive	
advantage	at	MS	and	international	level”	(Archimedes,	2019).	
4.4	Interests	and	networks	for	an	EU	border	security	policy	
The	run-up	to	the	EU	Security	Industrial	Policy	in	2012	is	an	apt	example	of	the	kinds	of	blurred,	
public-private	networking	events	and	processes,	which	co-shape	EU	policies.	In	October	2010,	the	
think-tank	Security	&	Defence	Agenda	(SDA)	organized	a	conference	concerning	“Fine-tuning	EU	
border	security.”	It	brought	together	participants	from	heavy-weight	communication	bureaus	like	
Fleishman-Hillard;	 representatives	 from	Member	State	ministries	of	 interior	and	defence,	 from	
European	organizations	like	the	Directorate	General	for	Home	Affairs,	and	Fisheries	and	Maritime	
Affairs,	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	NATO,	as	well	as	representatives	from	companies	like	
Thales,	 Safran,	 Cassidian,	 Symantec,	 SAAB;	 non-state	 actors	 like	 the	 International	 Centre	 for	
Migration	 Policy	 Development	 (ICMPD)	 and	 the	 IOM	 as	 well	 as	 ten	 representatives	 from	 the	
consultancy	firm	PriceWaterhouseCoopers.	But	not	all	reflected	interests	in	security;	some	press	
officers,	 as	 well	 as	 representatives	 from,	 respectively,	 feminist	 socialists	 and	 the	 Bolivian	
government	also	participated	(SDA,	2010).	
Both	in	February	2011	and	March	2012,	the	EOS	and	the	Commissioner	for	Home	Affairs,	
Cecilie	Malmström,	 organized	 High	 Level	 Public-Private	 Security	 Roundtables.	 In	 the	 first	 one,	
European	 industrial	 actors,	 the	 Hungarian	 EU	 presidency,	 executive	 management	 of	 EU	
institutions	 and	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Interior	 of	 Member	 States	 were	 brought	 together.	 The	
Roundtable	was	to	“explore	ways	of	how	the	public	and	private	side	can	together	contribute	to	
the	implementation	of	EU	security	policies.”	Before	the	meeting,	Malmström	stated	“I	am	looking	
forward	 to	 discussing	 with	 representatives	 of	 the	 European	 security	 industry	 how	 they	 can	
contribute	to	make	our	citizens	safer”	(European	Commission,	2011b).	
Notably,	one	day	after	the	2011	Roundtable	followed	another	Brussels-based	conference	
organized	by	SDA,	now	alongside	the	EOS.	It	was	on	“A	New	Partnership	for	European	Security”	
and	sponsored	by	companies	 like	BAE	Systems,	EADS	(now	Airbus),	G4S,	Raytheon,	Safran,	 the	
Finmeccanica	(now	Leonardo)	subsidiary	Selex	Sistemi	Integrati,	Smiths	Detection	and	Thales,	to	
name	a	few.	The	conference	focused	on	using	EU	policy	to	further	the	competitive	advantage	of	
European	 companies,	 and	 in	 a	 session	 entitled	 “Securing	 Europe’s	 borders,”	 the	 Director	 for	
Migration	and	Borders,	from	the	Commission’s	Directorate	General	for	Home	Affaairs,	Jean-Louis	
de	Brouwer	(also	invoted	to	speak	during	the	first	SDA	conference),	and	MEP	and	member	of	the	
LIBE	Committee,	Simon	Busuttil,	were	paired	with	Massimo	Piva	from	Sistema	Integrati	and	Jean-
Marc	Suchier,	from	Safran	Morpho.	Moderated	by	the	EOS	and	SDA,	participants	were	tasked	with	
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discussing	whether	a	more	integrated	border	management	system	should	become	a	cornerstone	
of	a	“comprehensive”	European	security	policy	(SDA,	2011;	also,	Jeandesboz,	2016).		
Already	 in	 May	 2011,	 the	 Commission	 held	 another	 High	 level	 summit,	 namely	 a	
Conference	 on	 Defence	 and	 Security	 Industries	 and	 Markets.	 Its	 focus	 was	 the	 transfer	 and	
procurement	of	defence	technology,	how	to	build	up	the	demand	side	of	the	security	market,	and	
discussions	of	the	risk	of	cuts	to	defence	and	security	budgets	after	the	2008	financial	crisis.	It	was	
hosted	 by	 Antonio	 Tajani,	 the	 Vice-President	 of	 the	 European	 Commission,	 responsible	 for	
Industry	and	Entrepreneurship,	and	Michel	Barnier,	the	EU	Commissioner	for	Internal	Market	and	
Services.	 Invited	 speakers	 included	 the	 Chief	 Executive	 of	 the	 European	 Defence	 Agency,	
representatives	from	Swedish,	Italian	and	Polish	Ministries	of	Defence,	and	the	CEOs	of	MBDA	and	
Thales,	the	Chairman	of	Finmeccanica	(now	Leonardo),	as	well	as	the	President	of	the	ASD.	During	
the	 conference,	 it	 was	 emphasized	 that	 Europe	 needed	 to	 set	 higher	 ambitions	 for	 Common	
Defence	and	Security	Policy,	something	Vice-President	Tajani	underscored	required	a	strong	and	
competitive	defence	industry	(EC,	2011c).	
Then,	 on	 October	 18,	 2011,	 as	 preparation	 for	 the	 Commission	 Communication,	 the	
European	Commission	organized	a	workshop	on	Security	Industrial	Policy,	with	the	aim		of	bringing	
together	stakeholders	from	the	public	and	private	sectors	to	discuss	measures	for	strengthening	
the	European	security	industry.	Themes	focused	on	were	standardization,	civil-military	synergies	
and	limited	liability	of	third	parties.	Participants	included	the	French	and	Italian	representatives	
to	 FP7	 Programme	 Committee	 –	 security	 theme,	 representatives	 from	ministries	 of	 research,	
defence	and	interior	from	several	Member	States,	EU	institutions,	like	the	Directorate	General	for	
Enterprise’s	Head	of	Security	Research	&	Development,	and	the	European	Defence	Agency,	as	well	
as	research	organizations	like	ECORYS,	and	companies	like	Finmeccanica	and	Smith	Detection.	At	
the	 level	of	 interest-based	organization,	the	workshop	also	 included	participants	from	the	EOS,	
ASD,	 the	 German	 European	 Security	 Association	 (GESA)	 and	 the	 Confederation	 of	 European	
Security	Services	(CoESS)(EC,	2011d).	
	 When	the	Security	Industrial	Policy	was	published,	it	was,	in	other	words,	also	the	result	
of	much	 hard	work	 from	 the	 security	 and	military	 industry,	 eager	 to	 reinvent	 itself	 as	 an	 “EU	
Brand”	of	security	that	included	border	control.	The	various	actors	had	worked	for	a	policy	with	
close	relations	between	technology	providers	and	end	users,	with	US-level	subsidies	to	research	
and	 development	 to	 boost	 competitiveness.	 Moreover,	 it	 was	 hoped	 that	 it	 would	 be	
characterized	by	bridging	the	civil-military	gap	through	dial	functions,	which,	incidentally,	would	
be	equivalent	with	the	militarization	of	European	border	control.	Only	rarely	did	the	many	blurred	
public-private	forums	initiated	by	the	Commission,	or	the	numerous	conferences	and	workshop,	
from	the	GoP,	over	ESRAB	and	ESRIF	and	the	formulation	of	the	ESRP,	to	the	public	and	private	
workshops	and	High	Level	Roundtables,	 include	non-governmental	or	civil	society	voices	which	
could	be	expected	to	be	critical	to	this	industry	wish	list.	
4.5	The	Multiannual	Financial	Framework	for	2021-2027	
May	2,	2018,	the	European	Commission	launched	a	proposal	for	an	“EU	Budget	for	the	Future”	
which	envisioned	significant	increases	in	the	funding	allocated	to	external	borders,	migration	and	
asylum	policies,	almost	tripling	the	expenses	to	more	thsn	€34,9	billion	compared	to	€13	billion	in	
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the	previous	period	from	2014-2020.	Controversially,	it	also	proposed	a	standing	corps	of	10.000	
border	 guards	of	 the	European	Border	 and	Coast	Guard	 (Frontex).	 This	 represented	a	massive	
change	 from	a	 2020-situation	where	Member	 States	 could	 be	 activated	 to	 loan	 1500	national	
border	guards	for	rapid	border	intervention,	or	the	similar	pool	of	300	officers	on	loan	in	2015s.	
In	the	Commission¢s	proposal,	the	pool	of	1500	would	even	be	added	as	complementary	to	the	
standing	corps.	
The	financial	increase	was	due	to	substantially	more	funds	to	be	allocated	especially	to	
Frontex,	 to	 border	 control,	 including	 customs	 equipment	 through	 a	 new	 Integrated	 Border	
Management	Fund	to	guarantee	“a	high	level	of	security”	through	“strong	and	effective	border	
management”.	It	was	to	support	“the	roll-out	of	the	European	Border	and	Coast	Guard,	systematic	
checks	at	the	borders,	new		large-scape	and	interoperable	IT	systems,	including	a	future	Entry/Exit	
System.”	 (Commission	 2018g).	 The	 Commission	 proposed	 to	 devote	 €4.8	 billion	 to	 Member	
States¢s	border	management	measures	by	allocating	a	fixed	sum	of	€5	mllion	to	each,	distributing	
the	rest	based	on	“pressure	and	threat	level”	at	external	land	borders	(30%),	external	sea	borders	
(35%),	airports	(20%)	and	consular	offices	(15%),	€1.3	billion	to	better	customs	control	equipment	
on	external	borders,	€12	billion	to	reinforcing	EU	border	management	agencies,	like	Frontex	and	
EU-Lisa,	and	€10.4	billion	 to	a	 renewed	Asylum	and	Migration	Fund,	which	was	also	 to	ensure	
faster	and	more	frequent	deportations.	Also	a	new	EU	Agency	for	Asylum	would	get	€900	million	
(European	Commission	2018h).		
According	to	the	Commission,	the	“challenge”	of	irregular		arrivals	“can	be	better	managed	
by	Member	States	with	 the	 financial	and	 technical	 support	of	 the	EU.”	 (European	Commission	
2018g).	Also,	the	Commission	noted	that	partnerships	and	cooperation	with	third	countries	will	
be	 an	 essential	 component	 of	 EU	migration	 policy.	 The	 Frontex	 spokeswoman,	 Ewa	Moncure	
framed	this	potentially	massive	funding	boost	for	the	Agency,	by	asking	"The	question	is	are	we	
going	to	be	doing	things	the	old	way	or	we	are	already	moving	into	doing	things	in	the	new	way?"	
(Nielsen	May	2,	2018).	Also,	the	ASD	has	long	lobbied	in	order	to	turn	the	Multiannual	Financial	
Framework	priorities	on	research	funding	towards	its	member	companies´	interests	and	products.	
Since	2017,	this	includes	promoting	the	message	that	the	European	Space	Agency,	the	Copernicus	
Programme	 and	 Frontex	 should	 research,	 develop	 and	 ensure	 procurement	 of	 High	 Altitude	
Pseudo	Satellites	(HAPS)	for	border	security	and	search	and	rescue	missions	(cf.	Akkerman	2019).		
ESA	has	been	aligning	itself	with	this	agenda,	as	the	Agency	on	its	webpage	described	the	
unmanned	HAPS	as	“the	missing	link”	between	drones	flying	close	to	Earth´s	surface	and	satellites	
orbiting	 in	 space	 (ESA	 2018).	 This	 agenda	 was	 pursued	 through	 several	 workshops,	 like	 the	
international	workshop	HAPS4ESA	held	in	Leiden,	the	Netherlands	between	February	12-14	2017.	
Here	 actors	 like	 ESA,	 EMSA,	 EU	 Satellite	 Center,	 the	 European	Commission	 gave	presentations	
alongside	 companies	 including	 German	 Frank	 Fuchs	 Consulting,	 Spanish	 satellites	 company	
Hispasat,	 Thales	Alenia	 Space,	Airobotics,	 Airbus,	 Skytec,	 Skytec,	 as	well	 as	 the	Universities	 of	
León,	 California	 and	 York.	More	 generally,	 the	ASD	has	 stressed	 the	need	 to	 continue	 existing	
Horizon	 2020	 funding	 streams	 towards	 research	 in	 border	 security	 in	 general	 under	 the	
Multiannual	 Financial	 Framework	 2021-2027,	 and	 to	 foster	 the	 growth	 of	 “breakthrough	
technologies”	in	particular	(ASD	2019).	This	would	include	continuing	projects	such	as	TELEO	and	
HAPPIEST,	 through	 ESA´s	 Discovery	 and	 Prepartion	 Programme,	 where	 companies	 like,	
respectively,	Hispasat	and	Airbus,	and	Thales	Alenia	Space	and	Airobotics,	research	and	develop	
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HAPS	 functionalities,	 including	 measures	 for	 maritime	 and	 vessel	 surveillance	 through	 Earth	
Observation	(Quiros	et	al.	2018).	
After	the	Commission	proposal,	the	Member	States	entered	into	negotiations	in	order	to	
arrive	at	a	common	Council	perspective	before	the	Trilogue	negotiations	witht	eh	Commission	and	
the	European	Parliament.	To	this	end,	the	Council	set	up	two	Working	Parties,	namely	the	general	
Ad	hoc	Working	Party	on	 the	Multiannual	 Financial	 Framework,	 and	 the	more	 specific	Ad	hoc	
Working	 Party	 on	 JHA	 (Justice	 and	 Home	 Affairs)	 Financial	 Instruments.	 However,	 the	 Council	
refused	to	keep	any	records	from	the	Parties¢	meetings,	thereby	preventing	public	scrutiny	into	
the	multi-billion	euro	priorities	of	the	Member	State	governments	(Statewatch	2018a).	Moreover,	
leaked	versions	of	 the	Commission	proposal	was	criticized	by	several	 research	and	civil	 society	
actors.	One	point	concerned	how	the	Horizon	2020	pillars	of	“industrial	leadership”	and	“societal	
challenges”	seemed	to	be	merged	under	one	overall	goal	of	boosting	the	Union¢s	in	order	to	gain	
“higher	visibility	for	industry’s	role	in	solving	global	challenges”	thereby	subsuming	social	impact	
under	the	objective	of	“industrial	competitiveness”	(GHA	2018).	
On	 December	 2019,	 the	 Finnish	 Presidency	 published	 the	 MFF	 Negotiating	 Box	 with	
figures	and	options	up	for	negotiation.	Then,	on	December	12,	the	European	Council	discussed	
the	Framework´s	main	features.	From	February	12	to	21	the	President	of	the	European	Council,	
Charles	 Michel	 then	 entered	 into	 individual	 talks	 with	 all	 27	 Member	 State	 leaders	 on	 the	
proposed	budget.	A	summit	 followed	on	February	20-21	with	 intense	negotiations	on	the	MFF	
(European	Council	2020).	
4.6	Controversies	and	criticism	
This	section	has	detailed	how	the	market	for	EU	border	control	is	multisectoral,	but	dominated	by	
the	security	and	defence	industry.	Union	policy-making	may	seem	to	take	the	form	of	constructing	
“wish	 lists”	based	on	prevailing	political	 knowledge	 regimes	and	priorities,	 according	 to	which	
companies	 then	 develop	 technologies.	 These	 wish	 lists	 then	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 tenders	 and	
procurement	processes	through	which	corporate	actors	try	to	research	and	develop	technology	
capable	 of	 meeting,	 or	 negotiating,	 the	 goals	 set	 by	 policy-makers.	 But	 the	 construction	 of	
knowledge	that	underpins	the	relations	between	EU	institutions	and	industrial	actors	on	border	
security	is	both	complex	and	crucial	for	unravelling	the	multileveled	governance	of	the	EU	borders.	
First,	focusing	only	on	security	discourses	fails	to	reflect	how	language	is	imbricated	within	
the	 technocratic	 networks	 responsible	 for	 producing	 and	 disseminating	 the	 discourses.	 Such	
approaches	therefore	often	do	not	embed	discourses	in	particular	social	practices	and	epistemic	
communities,	and,	consequently,	 risk	not	 relating	 the	power	of	 language	 in	 relation	 to	specific	
political	and	economic	processes	(cf.	Husymans,	2006).	Moreover,	there	is	a	tendency	to	privilege	
and	widely	report	statements	on	border	governance	and	security	by	national	political	leaders	and	
government	officials,	whereas	the	institutions	of	the	European	Union	are	not	reported	nearly	as	
widely.	 Although	 they	 are	 crucial	 for	 both	 common-European	 and	 national	 legislation,	 policy-
making	and	bordering	practices,	these	still	tend	to	be	debated	by	a	narrow	and	specialist	audience	
(Neal,	 2009).	 Naturally,	 this	 lack	 of	 public	 insight	 into	 discourses,	 networks	 and	 processes	
fundamental	for	EU	border	policy-making	is	even	more	prevalent	when	it	comes	to	how	the	more	
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informal	and	extra-institutional	interactions	between	technocratic,	commercial	and	public	actors	
influence	the	border	governance	of	the	EU.	
Second,	 norms	 are	 both	 embedded	 in	 and	 diffused	 through	 technologies	 (Guittet	 and	
Jeandesboz,	2010):	Border	technologies	like	EU	satellites,	databases	or	externalized	surveillance	
co-create	 certain	 knowledge	 regimes	 replete	 with	 cultural	 frames	 of	 reference	 about	 the	
legitimate	 functions	 and	 consequences	 of	 border	 control	 practices.	 Hence,	 technologies	 like	
biometrics,	but	also	satellite	and	drone	surveillance	or	infra-red	and	motion	detection,	are	more	
than	 apolitical	 wish	 lists.	 They	 are	 sites	 shaped	 by	 the	 continuously	 converging	 interests	 of	
multiple	actors,	both	shaped	by,	and	shaping,	the	preferences	of	EU	policy-makers	and	companies	
alike.	
Here,	 some	 studies	have	 focused	on	how	companies	may	 seek	 to	 influence	EU	policy	 through	
“regulatory	 capture”	 (Dal	 Bo,	 2006),	 understood	 as	 processes	 through	which	 special	 interests	
affect	public	governance	through	processes	so	that	companies	are	able	to	manipulate	or	subvert	
the	formulation	of	 laws	or	the	public	agencies	supposed	to	regulate	their	activities.	Regulatory	
capture	is	thus	often	understood	as	industrial	actors’	indirect	formulation	of	regulation	through	
public	agencies	and	institutions	(cf.	Posner,	2013;	Stigler,	1971).	Such	processes	can	be	facilitated	
by	a	constant	flux	of	brokering	events,	such	as	roundtables,	Commission-initiated	expert	groups,	
consultations	about	research	programmes	and	hardware/software	fairs	and	meetings	hosted	by	
industry	or	public	actors,	co-shape	EU	border	control	priorities	and	technological	capacity.	These	
brokering	events	can	be	described	as	“blurred	forums”	because	they	bring	together	public	policy-
makers	with	the	private	interest	of	technology	suppliers.	
Through	FP7	and	Horizon2020	consortium,	academic	institutions	are	increasingly	
partnering	with	commercial	actors	from	these	industries,	and	thereby	become	intimately	
imbricated	in	the	development	of	EU	border	control	technology.	This	has	implications	for	the	
formation	of	knowledge,	as	they	enter	into	certain	epistemic	communities	already	ripe	with	
norms.	Moreover,	the	industrial	conglomerates	also	use	consortiums	to	engineer	academic	
research,	course	content,	or	to	recruit	researchers.	University	managements	on	their	side	enter	
into	these	collaborations	expecting	“up-take”	of	technology	through	patents	or	business	venture	
spin-offs.	
The	security	and	military	 industry	seeks	to	exercise	 influence	on	the	formulation	of	EU	
border	policies.	This	happens	through	numerous	meetings	with	Commission	representatives,	the	
intergroups	working	around	the	Parliament,	extra-parliamentary	forums	like	the	Kangaroo	Group,	
and	interest	organizations	like	the	EOS	and	ASD.	Yet	other	forums	are	not	created	by	industry,	but	
by	EU	institutions	themselves,	such	as	Frontex	or	EU-Lisa	(see	also	section	4).	At	the	same	time,	
through	discourses	on	the	“dual	purposes”	and	“civilian	spill-over	effects”	of	military	and	security	
technology,	 the	 major	 actors	 on	 the	 market	 for	 EU	 border	 control	 lobby	 EU	 institutions	 by	
replicating	 their	 focus	 on	 resisting	 market	 “fragmentation”	 through	 standardized	 and	
interoperable	border	technologies.	The	commercial	 influence	on	multileveled	governance	must	
also	 include	 the	Commission’s	decision	 to	establish	Advisory	Groups	and	European	Technology	
Platforms,	and	to	appoint	industry	representatives	to	sit	on,	or	chair	these,	to	advise	on	FP7	and	
Horizon2020	funding	priorities.		
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	 The	framing	of	technological	border	infrastructures	as	a	politically	neutral	growth	area	to	
be	cultivated	in	order	to	promote	European	industrial	competitiveness,	abstracts	from	the	violent	
and	politically	contested	character	that	EU	border	politics	have	attained	during	the	last	decades.	
There	is	a	worrying	correlation	between	the	last	decade’s	roll-out	of	border	control	interventions	
and	 associated	 technological	 infrastructure,	 and	 increasingly	 perilous	 and	 life-threatening	
migration	 routes	 for	 third	 country	 nationals.	 The	 EOS	 statement	 that	 fundamental	 rights	 are	
politically	 correct	 but	 not	 necessarily	 a	 competitive	 advantage,	 testifies	 to	 the	 troubling	
implications	 of	 depoliticized	 narratives	 of	 technological	 optimization	 concerning	 EU	 border	
governance.	 At	 another	 level,	 this	 framing	 ignores	 how	 the	 standardized	 technological	
infrastructures	lobbied	for	by	the	security	and	defence	industry	also	have	the	effect	of	shaping	EU	
governance	 around	 contested	 norms.	 In	 this	 regard,	 framing	 societal	 reluctance	 to	 accept	
surveillance	technologies	as	an	image	problem	to	be	overcome	by	an	“EU	single	market	brand”	
does	not	address	the	key	challenges	at	stake.	
Another	dominant	discourse	deployed	by	industry	in	order	to	justify	increased	subsidies	
is	 the	 need	 to	 level	 the	 security-industrial	 playing	 field	 with	 Asian	 and	 American	 economies.	
Accordingly,	 the	 ETPs	 and	 later	 ETIPs	 and	 their	 role	 in	 shaping	 EU	 border	 technologies	 are	
promoted	 as	 fostering	 EU	 competitiveness.	 However,	 the	 AGs	 and	 ETPs/ETIPs	 have	 also	 been	
criticized	 for	 prioritizing	 capital-intensive,	 technological	 and	 industrial	 conglomerates	 at	 the	
expense	of	civil	society	actors,	SMEs	and	socio-economic	research.	Pre-commercial	procurement	
can	therefore	undermines	the	free	exchange	of	 ideas	alongside	market	competitiveness,	whilst	
facilitating	monopoly-like	tendencies	by	pre-empting	it	through	already-established	procurement	
demands.	This	despite	the	fact	that	market	competition	is	a	prime	justification	offered	by	the	same	
industry	 and	 Commission	 for	 increased	 subsidies.	 While	 heralded	 as	 innovation	 by	 the	
Commission,	these	initiatives	mirror	the	interests	of	a	narrow	elite	of	the	largest	European	security	
and	 defence	 companies	 in	 establishing	 complete	 end-to-end	 supply	 chains	 for	 their	 soft-	 and	
hardware	for	the	EU	borders.	
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5. Interoperable,	Biometric	Borders	
The	development	of	large-scale	border	control	systems	has	occurred	at	a	rapid	pace	during	the	
last	 decades.	 Parallel	 to	 industrial	 calls	 for	more	 standardization	 and	 interoperability,	 political	
visions	of	integrated	border	systems	have	grown.	This	has	tied	the	political	and	technical	processes	
closely	 to	 procurement	 and	 research	 and	 development	 from	 corporate	 and	 industrial	 actors.	
These	 have	 been	 hired	 to	 consult	 on,	 design,	 develop,	 maintain	 and	 evolve	 the	 information,	
identification	and	surveillance	systems.		
The	 following	 section	 details	 this	 development	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 four	 EU	
databases	pertaining	to	the	entry	of	migrants	and	deploying	biometrics	to	that	end.	These	are	the	
Schengen	 Information	 System	 (SIS),	 Eurodac,	 the	 Visa	 Information	 System	 (VIS),	 the	 uropean	
Criminal	Records	Information	System	for	Third	Country	Nationals	(ECRIS-TCN)	and	the	Entry/Exit	
System	 (EES);	 the	 construction	 of	 all	 of	which	 have	 involved	 actors	 from	 the	 ICT,	 defence	 and	
biometrics	sectors.	These	function	as	a	digital	border	registering	alphanumeric	and	biometric	data	
from	all	third-country	nationals	(TCNs)	and	visa-holding	or	exempt	travellers	entering	the	Union.	
EU-Lisa	has	been	incremental	to	the	pursuit	of	this	development	since	its	2011-inception	through	
EU	Regulation	No	1077/2011.	Its	headquarter	lies	in	Talinn,	Estonia,	and	an	operational	office	in	
Strasbourg,	France.		
5.1	EU-Lisa	and	the	four	information	systems	
EU-Lisa	was	established	as	the	agency	responsible	for	the	operational	management	of	the	major	
four	 large-scale	 IT	 systems	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	 European	 Dactyloscopy	 Database	 (Eurodac),	 the	
Schengen	Information	System	(SIS),	the	Visa	Information	System	(VIS)	and	the	future	Entry/Exit	
System	(EES)	(EU-LISA,	2019b).	This	has	been	framed	in	terms	of	a	desire	to	protect	the	internal	
Schengen	zone	from	what	the	European	Commission	has	defined	as	“terrorism,	cross	border	crime	
and	irregular	migration”	and	for	“stronger	control	of	our	external	borders”	so	that	in	the	future,	
“no	critical	 information	should	ever	be	lost	on	potential	terrorist	suspects	or	 irregular	migrants	
crossing	our	external	borders	(European	Commission,	2016a).		
EU-Lisa	manages	data	via	its	Biometric	Matching	System	(BMS),	which	is	a	search	engine	
that	systematizes	biometric	data	through	technologies	measuring,	analyzing	and	processing	digital	
representations	of	unique	biological	data	traits	for	the	purpose	of	identification	and	verification	
(Ajana,	2013).	Biometric	technologies	are	widely	used	because	they	are	supposed	to	be	cheaper,	
faster,	lesser	prone	to	errors	and	easier	to	share	than	human	verification.	Most	of	the	EU	systems	
under	scrutiny	here	function	for	identification	purposes;	that	is,	where	biometric	data	stored	in	a	
computer	 system	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 a	 person	who	 is	 otherwise	 not	 identifiable,	 for	 instance	
because	they	do	not	have	ID	or	travel	documents	(known	as	one-to-many	matches);	rather	than	
for	the	purposes	of	verification,	where	biometric	data	is	used	to	verify	an	already-known	identity	
(one-to-one	matches).	The	most	common	way	to	register	those	crossing	EUs	external	borders	is	
by	entering	their	alphanumeric	(e.g.	name,	gender,	age)	or	biometric	data	(e.g.	fingerprints,	iris	
scans,	 palm	 prints).	 As	 such,	 biometric	 data	 is	 particularly	 sensitive	 as	 it	 is	 unique	 for	 those	
registering.		
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The	 EU	 databases	 have	 been	 developing	 according	 to	 which	 types	 of	 individuals	 are	
registered;	Irregular	migrants	found	in	member	states	can	be	registered	into	SIS,	asylum	seekers	
are	 registered	 in	Eurodac	and	 those	entering	on	a	 legal	visa	are	 registered	 in	VIS.	The	 four	EU	
information	 systems	 combine	 biometric	 identification	 technology	 with	 computerised	 data	
processing,	 that	 is,	diffuse	borders	 that	cannot	be	geographically	 localised,	but	 instead	rely	on	
both	physical	and	virtual	 locations	as	well	as	 institutions	of	control	and	surveillance	connected	
through	digital	data	networks	(Tsianos	and	Kuster,	2016;	Amoore,	2006;	Amoore,	Marmura	and	
Salter,	2008;	Guild,	Carrera	and	Geyer,	2008).		
The	Schengen	Information	System	 (now	SIS	 II)	was	the	first	 large-scale	 IT	system	put	 in	
place	in	the	EU,	and	was	designed	to	compensate	for	the	abolition	of	internal	border	controls	in	
the	 Schengen	 Area	 by	 facilitating	 the	 free	 movement	 of	 people	 within	 the	 Schengen	 Area	
(European	Commission,	2016a).	It	was	set	up	through	the	1990	Schengen	Convention	and	became	
operational	in	1995	by	the	Member	States	Germany,	France,	Netherlands,	Belgium,	Luxembourg,	
Portugal	and	Spain,	a	number	later	expanded	successively,	in	particular	in	2001,	when	four	Nordic	
countries	were	included.	At	the	time,	the	system	was	discursively	framed	as	a	more	efficient	fight	
against	illegal	immigration	(Broeders,	2007).	SIS	II	was	then	established	in	2006	by	Regulation	(EC)	
1987/2006	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council.	In	2007,	it	was	once	more	expanded	
to	include	the	nine	eastern	European	countries	that	had	joined	the	EU	three	years	earlier.	In	2013	
then	followed	the	launch	of	the	SIS	II	system.	The	SIS	functionality	consists	of	three	components:	
A	central	database	and	system	physically	located	in	Strasbourg;	national	systems	located	in	each	
member	 state,	 but	 continuously	 communicating	 with	 the	 central	 database;	 and	 an	 in-build	
communication	 infrastructure	making	 it	possible	 for	Member	State	authorities	 to	enter,	delete	
and	 search	 for	 data	 via	 their	 national	 systems.	 Searches	 take	 place	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 both	
alphanumeric	data	(for	instance	name,	sex,	birth,	nationality)	but	also	on	biometric	data,	such	as	
fingerprints.	The	latter	is	typically	framed	to	be	the	most	secure	and	correct	way	of	identifying	a	
person,	and	is	used	as	a	way	to	verify	the	identity	of	a	person	who	has	already	been	registered	on	
the	basis	of	his/her	name.	The	database	does	not	only	contain	data	on	those	registered,	but	also	
instructions	 for	 competent	 authorities	 on	 what	 to	 do	 with	 the	 person	 or	 object	 once	 found	
(European	Commission,	2016a).	
The	Eurodac	was	established	in	2000	via	Council	Regulation	2725/2000	as	an	information	
system	to	compare	the	fingerprints	of	asylum	seekers,	in	order	to	determine	if	persons	had	applied	
for	asylum	in	more	than	one	EU	Member	State.	In	2013	it	was	revised,	such	that	it	enabled	national	
and	 Europol	 law	 enforcement	 access	 to	 the	 database	 (Orav	 and	 D’Alfonso,	 2017).	 Eurodac	
underpins	the	Dublin	III	Regulation	and	its	predecessors	and	their	aim	to	limit	the	possibility	of	
applying	for	asylum	in	more	than	one	country,	and	singling	out	one	Member	State	as	responsible	
for	 processing	 such	 applications.	 Originally,	 Eurodac	 stored	 fingerprint	 data	 and	 alphanumeric	
data	concerning	 the	gender	of	 the	person,	but	 the	2013	Regulation	expanded	 this	purpose	by	
demanding	fingerprints	from	all	persons	over	the	age	of	14.	These	were	further	divided	into	three	
groups	of	people:	asylum	seekers	(category	1),	persons	who	cross	European	borders	in	irregular	
manners	 (category	 2)	 and	 people	 found	 to	 be	 staying	 irregularly	 on	 EU	 territory	 (category	 3)	
(European	Commission,	2016c)	Data	on	category	3	is,	for	the	time	being,	only	processed	and	not	
stored	 in	the	system.	Additionally,	Eurodac	also	stored	 information	about	the	member	state	of	
origin,	place	and	date	of	application	of	asylum,	fingerprint	data,	gender,	reference	number	used	
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by	the	member	state	of	origin,	the	date	on	which	the	fingerprints	were	taken	and	the	date	on	
which	the	data	was	transmitted	to	the	central	unit.	In	2014,	the	central	unit	of	Eurodac	was	moved	
from	Luxembourg	to	EU-Lisa’s	data	centers	in	Strasbourg,	although	this	is	a	matter	of	contention	
in	the	discussions	surrounding	the	Eurodac	recast	proposal.	
The	 Visa	 Information	 System	 (VIS)	 was	 created	 via	 Council	 Decision	 2004/512/EC	 in	
response	to	a	call	by	the	2002	Seville	Council	 for	a	common	 identification	system	for	visa	data	
under	the	heading	“measures	to	combat	illegal	immigration”.	The	system	became	operational	in	
2011	and	made	it	possible	for	Member	States	to	identify	migrants	who	travel	legally	to	the	EU,	but	
then	 overstayed	 their	 visa.	 This	 system	 is	 used	 by	 member	 states	 to	 facilitate	 short-stay	 visa	
procedures,	while	at	the	same	time	helping	border,	asylum	and	migration	authorities	to	check	the	
necessary	information	on	TCNs,	who	need	to	travel	to	the	EU	(European	Commission,	2018b).	It	
consists	 of	 a	 central	 IT	 system	 physically	 located	 together	 with	 the	 SIS,	 in	 Strasbourg,	 and	 a	
communication	infrastructure	that	link	the	central	system	to	national	systems.	It	contains	data	on	
visas	requested,	issued,	refused,	annulled,	revoked	or	extended;	and	on	fingerprints,	photographs,	
and	links	to	other	visa	applications.	Additionally,	the	system	also	store	details	about	the	person	or	
company	that	issued	an	invitation	or	is	liable	for	the	cost	of	living	during	the	stay,	meaning	that	
the	family	members	or	companies	“vouching	for”	visa	applicants	can	be	held	accountable	if	they	
overstay	their	visas.		
The	European	 Criminal	 Record	 Information	 System	 for	 Third	 Country	Nationals	 (ECRIS-
TCN)	allows	the	authorities	of	Member	States	to	obtain	information	about	previous	convictions	of	
so-called	third	country	nationals,	thus	“contributing	to	EU’s	fight	against	cross-border	crime	and	
terrorism”	(EU-Lisa	2019e).	It	will	be	based	on	identity	information,	such	as	biographic	data,	and	
biometrics	 like	 fingerprints	and	potentially	also	 facial	 images.	 It	was	an	extension	of	 the	ECRIS	
database	 on	 EU	 nationals,	 wich	 was	 grounded	 in	 2012	 through	 Regulation	 (EU)	 2018/1726	
allowing	for	the	exchange	of	information	on	a	decentralized	basis	between	the	Member	States.	
The	ECRIS-TCN	was	created	through	Regulation	(EU)	2019/816,	which	amended	the	previous	one,	
expecting	the	database	to	be	operational	by	2020/2021	(European	Commission	2017).	ECRIS-TCN	
aims	 to	 enable	 authorities	 to	 quickly	 establish	 whether	 any	 EU	Member	 State	 holds	 criminal	
records	 of	 a	 TCN.	 It	 includes	 data	 on	 dual	 nationals,	who	 possesses	 the	 nationality	 of	 a	 third	
country	and	of	an	EU	country,	in	order	to	prevent	such	individuals	from	hiding	previous	convictions	
by	virtue	of	having	two	passports.	If	a	Member	State	wish	to	identify	a	person’s	criminal	record	
information	it	can	do	so	by	performing	a	“hit/no	hit”	search	in	the	central	TCN	system.	Europol,	
Eurojust	 and	 the	 future	 European	 Public	 Prosecutors’	 Office	 will	 have	 access	 to	 ECRIS-TCN,	
alongside	judges	and	prosecutors	from	EU	member	states	(EU-Lisa	2019).	EU-Lisa	is	responsible	
for	 the	maintenance,	 evolution	 and	management	 of	 ECRIS-TCN,	which	will	 also	 have	 national	
access	points.		
The	Entry/Exit	System	(EES)	was	prepared	through	a	feasibility	study	that	the	Commission	
contracted	the	company	Unisys	to	conduct	in	2008	(Unisys,	2008).	It	was	then	announced	by	the	
Commission	in	2013	(European	Commission,	2013a)	and	further	developed	in	a	communication	
to	 the	 Parliament	 and	 Council	 (European	 Commission,	 2016d),	 and	 established	 in	 2017	 via	
Regulation	 2017/2226,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 package	 of	 legislative	 proposals	 on	 so-called	 “Smart	
Borders”.	It	was	framed	as	modernising	the	Schengen	Area’s	external	borders,	and	expected	to	be	
rolled	out	in	2020.	It	consisted	of	three	components:	The	recording	of	time	and	place	of	entry	and	
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exit	for	TCNs	entering	the	Schengen	Area	(a	type	of	data	not	recorded	by	the	other	databases);	a	
regulation	 for	 a	 Registered	 Traveller	 Programme	 (RTP)	 so	 that	 pre-screened	 third-country	
nationals	could	benefit	from	smooth	entry	at	the	EU’s	external	borders;	and	an	amendment	of	the	
Schengen	Borders	Code,	taking	into	account	the	existence	of	the	EES	and	RTP.	The	EES	is	to	be	
applied	to	TCNs	who	are	admitted	for	a	short	stay	visa	to	the	territory	of	the	Schengen	member	
states	or	whose	entry	for	a	short	stay	has	been	refused	(European	Parliament,	2017a,	paragraph	
9).	 It	 is	 based	 on	 the	 explicit	 aim	 of	 facilitating	 the	 mobility	 of	 visa-holding	 travellers	 while	
intensifying	the	identification	of	TCNs	not	fulfilling	their	visa	requirements.	
	 Taken	together,	the	Eurodac,	SIS	II,	VIS,	ECRIS-TCN	and	the	EES,	have	been	framed	as	the	
next	generation	of	border	and	migration	enforcement	aspects	of	entry	governance	of	the	EU.	In	
so	doing,	it	is	clear	that	in	its	vision	of	a	forward-looking	entry	governance,	the	Commission	relies	
tremendously	on	the	idea	of	technological	fixes.	The	next	section,	however,	details	how	very	little	
reflection	has	been	made	on	the	feasibility	and	realizability	of	such	technological	fixes	for	solving	
diverging	interests	between	Member	States.	This	despite	the	fact	that	such	divergence	has	also	
impacted	the	development	of	 the	databases,	effectively	creating	windows	used	by	commercial	
and	other	informal	interests	to	intervene	in	EU	policy-making.	It	is	therefore	critical	to	investigate	
what	kinds	of	public-private	relations,	economies	and	trajectories	are	at	work	beneath	the	surface	
of	the	large-scale	border	infrastructures,	and	how	they	impact	the	discourses	and	proposals	for	
establishing	and	recasting	the	databases	
5.2	Commercial	interests	and	the	early	rise	of	interoperable	EU	borders		
From	 the	 beginning,	 the	 political	 drive	 towards	 contructing	 border	 infrastructures	 with	
interoperable	 information	 systems	 has	 involved	 actors	 from	 the	 ICT,	 defence	 and	 biometrics	
sectors	of	Member	States.	These	have	been	hired	to	consult	on,	design,	develop,	maintain	and	
evolve	the	information	systems,	including	their	biometric	functions.	Their	activities	illustrate	that	
the	market	for	such	technologies	is	extremely	lucrative	and	growing.	Thus,	a	2010	market	analysis	
estimated	that	products	for	biometric	fingerprint	technologies	would	reach	a	market	volume	of	
around	$15	billion	in	2015	(Tsianos	and	Kuster,	2016).	By	2019,	the	global	biometric	market	was	
estimated	to	grow	from	$33	billion	to	$65,3	billion	by	2024	(Market	and	Markets,	2020).	
Since	its	operational	launch	in	2013,	EU-Lisa	has	been	responsible	for	issuing	contracts	for	
the	 development	 of	 the	 large-scale	 information	 systems.	 The	 Agency	 has	 also	 been	 made	
responsible	for	additional	framework	contracts	covering	services	for	management,	supervision,	
corrective	 and	 evolutionary	 measures	 and	 external	 support.	 This	 therefore	 requires	 constant	
interaction	with	the	European	ICT,	defence	and	biometrics	sectors.	With	yet	another	large-scale	IT	
system,	the	EES,	to	go	online	in	2020,	it	is	however,	worth	noting	how	the	creation	of	EU-Lisa	itself	
was	a	direct	result	of	complex	problems	during	the	development	of	the	SIS	II	system,	stemming	
from	diverging	political	and	economic	interests	between	Member	States,	their	national	industries	
and	the	Commission.	
The	contract	for	SIS	I,	launched	in	1995,	was	granted	to	French	company	Atos.	This	took	
place	within	 a	 context	where	 transnational	 networks	 of	 security	 professionals	 and	 justice	 and	
home	 affairs	 bureaucrats	 were	 actively	 reconfiguring	 EU	 mobility	 governance	 towards	 the	
governance	 of	 borders	 as	 the	 management	 of	 insecurity.	 The	 securitization	 policy	 drive	 was	
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strengthened	after	the	terror	attacks	on	9/11	in	2001.	Yet,	between	the	EU	institutions,	this	policy	
drive	also	created	difficulties	in	reaching	political	agreement	on	the	legal	basis	of	SIS	I.	This	made	
for	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 system’s	 functions	 and	 purposes	 and	 created	 problematic	 path	
dependencies	influencing	also	the	SIS	II	system,	and	later	the	Union’s	Smart	Borders	package.		
Relations	 between	 EU	 institutions,	 Member	 States	 but	 also	 commercial	 actors	 from	
Member	 States’	 national	 industries	were	 crucial	 for	 this	 development.	 In	 2004,	 the	 European	
Commission	signed	a	€40	million	contract	for	the	development	of	a	combined	SIS	 II/VIS	with	a	
multinational	consortium	of	European	ICT	companies.	This	was	the	first	of	many	increases	in	the	
budget	compared	with	the	Commission’s	original	estimate	in	2001,	of	€15	million.	The	consortium	
was	led	by	French	Steria	and	Belgian	HP,	and	also	included	Belgian	Ateria,	German	Mummert	und	
Partner	and	Primesphere	from	Luxembourg	(European	Commission,	2004a).	The	contract	decision	
was,	however	challenged	by	Dutch	Capgemini	Nederland	B.V.	who	filed	a	court	case	against	the	
Commission	in	2004,	leading	the	Court	of	First	Instance	to	put	the	SIS	II	project	on	hold	for	months	
in	2005,	before	resuming	the	contract.	
SIS	 II	 was	 projected	 to	 be	 completed	 by	October	 2007,	 but	 political	 pressure	 for	 new	
functions	from	Member	States	like	Germany,	Spain	and	France	in	line	with	the	securitization	of	
immigration,	such	as	storage	and	transfer	of	biometric	data,	and	access	to	SIS	II	to	Europol	and	
Eurojust,	posed	challenges	for	the	design	process	(Council	of	the	EU,	2009a;	European	Parliament,	
2004).	The	Steria	and	HP-led	consortium	was	instructed	to	design	the	SIS	II-system	so	that	new	
functions	could	continuously	be	added	to	its	infrastructure	–	even	if	no	political	agreement	had	
actually	been	reached	about	what	these	functions	should	be	(Parkin,	2011).	Paradoxically,	then,	
the	design	of	SIS	II’s	technological	 infrastructure	had	been	determined	in	advance	of	a	political	
agreement	about	the	database’s	scope	and	purpose.	A	path	dependency	can	be	observed	from	
these	earlier	development,	and	to	today,	where	EU-Lisa	also	requests	such	open-ended	designs	in	
its	contract	tenders.	
The	political	problems	spilled	over	into	design	and	contractor	issues	that	would	end	up	
postponing	the	launch	of	SIS	II	for	six	years.	The	legislative	process	was	rushed	through	the	EU	
decision-making	 bodies	 after	 pressure	 from	 the	Council	 of	Ministers,	 but	 the	 systemic	 design-
process	did	not	match	the	political	time	table.	Technically,	the	Steria	and	HP-led	consortium	was	
unable	to	meet	the	deadline	of	October	2007,	and	also	experienced	a	series	of	critical	test	failures	
between	2008-2010.	Politically,	this	led	to	a	tug	of	war	between	the	Commission	favouring	the	SIS	
II,	 and	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 interests	 of	 a	 group	 of	 Member	 States,	 arguing	 that	 the	
Commission	did	not	safeguard	national	investments;	that	it	overruled	national	influences	on	the	
technological	development	of	the	system;	and	that	the	SIS	II	costs	were	spiralling	out	of	control	
from	the	original	estimate	of	€15	million	in	2001	to	one	of	€143	in	2010.1	
In	2007,	the	Portuguese	government	successfully	seized	the	opportunity	created	by	the	
technical	 deadlock	 and	 successfully	 lobbied	 for	 an	 interim	 solution	 where	 the	 Portuguese	
database,	 developed	 by	 Portugal's	 Border	 and	 Foreigners	 Service	 and	 the	 Portuguese	 ICT	
																																								 																				
1	The	group	of	Member	States	intervening	the	most	against	the	Commission’s	SIS	II-plans,	were	
the	same	who	had	been	developing	the	Schengen	I,	illustrating	a	fight	over	ownership	of	the	SIS	
infrastructure	(see	Parkin,	2011,	p.	18).	
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company,	Critical	Software,	was	cloned.	This	was	reluctantly	accepted	by	the	Commission,	and	the	
result	was	the	“SISone4all”-system	capable	of	facilitating	the	lifting	of	internal	border	checks	to	
the	EU	Member	States	that	were	expected	to	join	the	Schengen	area	by	December	2007.	Pressure	
mounted	to	abandon	the	SIS	II	project	altogether	in	favour	of	another	option	supported	by	Austria,	
Germany	 and	 France,	 the	 so-called	 SIS	 1+RE.	 This	 was	 argued	 to	 be	 cheaper	 than	 the	 SIS	 II	
infrastructure.		
The	Council	and	Commission	agreed	that	as	a	plan	B,	the	French	authorities	launched	a	
call	for	tender	for	SIS	1+RE	with	the	desired	SIS	II	functionalities	on	April	1	2009.	The	contract	was	
awarded	to	French	company	Atos	(also	behind	SIS	I)	and	the	infrastructure	to	be	developed	by	
technical	experts	from	the	Member	States	in	accordance	with	the	French,	German	and	Austrian	
preferences	(Council	of	the	EU,	2009b).	The	SIS	1+RE	contract	was,	however,	never	effectuated	
because	 the	Council	 finally	opted	 to	continue	with	 the	original	Steria-contract	 for	SIS	 II.	 It	was	
implemented	on	May	27,	2013,	and	announced	shortly	thereafter	(Sopra	Steria,	2013).		
But	 by	 then,	 the	 Commission	was	 already	 fast	 at	 work	 with	 visions	 of	 new	 upgraded	
functionalities	to	the	database.	Thus,	a	few	months	earlier,	it	had	announced	the	Smart	Borders	
package,	 consisting	 of	 the	 RTP	 and	 the	 EES.	 The	 initiative	 was	 framed	 as	 the	 Union	 “moving	
towards	a	more	modern	and	efficient	border	management	by	using	state-of-the-art	technology”	
(European	Commission,	2013a).	However,	even	if	this	was	shrouded	in	many	political	statements,	
the	RTP	and	the	Smart	Borders-terminology	was	taken	off	the	table	again	quickly	thereafter.	But	
the	 EES	 remained,	 now	 with	 a	 stated	 ambition	 of	 interoperability	 with	 the	 existing	 systems,	
including	 the	SIS	 II.	At	 the	 same	 time,	EU-Lisa	had	commenced	 its	operations	out	of	Tallinn	 in	
December	2012,	and	it	was	hoped	that	that	the	new	agency	would	be	able	to	balance	the	intricate	
political-economic	 interests	underpinning	 the	EU	border	systems	 (Jeandesboz,	Bigo,	Hayes	and	
Simon,	2013).		
EU-Lisa	would	not,	however,	commence	its	balancing	act	between	maintaining	the	EU’s	
large-scale	 information	 systems	 and	 entertaining	 too	 close	 relations	 with	 European	 industrial	
interests,	on	a	blank	slate.	The	situation	was	 in	fact	quite	the	opposite,	since	the	technological	
research	 and	 development	 structuring	 EU	 border	 control	 systems,	 had	 been	 proceeding	 fast	
alongside	the	SIS	 II	controversy.	This	had	taken	place	 in	yet	another	 level	open	for	commercial	
interventions,	 namely	 the	 formulation	 of	 FP7	 and	 later	 Horizon	 priorities	 for	 research	 and	
development.	
5.2.1	Commercial	interventions	–	priorities	under	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	
The	 Security	 Advisory	 Group	 (SecAG)	 appointed	 by	 the	 Commission	 to	 inform	 the	 research	
priorities	of	the	FP7	annual	Work	Programmes	(2007-2013)	included	several	experts	affiliated	with	
major	companies	from	the	European	security	and	defence	industry.	The	recommendations	and	
focus	of	the	group	appeared	to	reflect	this	constitution.	
For	instance,	during	an	October	2009	SecAG-meeting,	the	group	concluded	that	the	EU	
security	 research	needed	 to	be	more	 “mission	oriented”,	 and	 that	 the	Commission	needed	 to	
require	more	technological	experiments,	tests,	validation	and	demonstration	of	almost	all	topics.	
Standardization	and	interoperability	were	also	highlighted	as	something	“positive	for	the	security	
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providers	as	well	as	for	the	end	users	and	the	citizens”,	and	were	to	be	reinforced	through	R&D	
projects.	 A	 note	 recommending	 this	 focus	 for	 the	 Work	 Programmes	 for	 2011-2013	 was	
accordingly	prepared	for	the	Commission	(European	Commission,	2009).	
During	the	ninth	meeting	of	the	group,	in	April	2010,	the	willingness	of	the	Commission	
“to	emphasize	the	industrial	policy	dimension	of	the	programme”	was	lauded,	as	its	reflections	on	
standards	for	the	security	domain	were	welcomed	(European	Commission,	2010a).	Some	months	
later,	the	group	set	up	seven	sub-groups	to	pro-actively	facilitate	the	choice	of	priorities	in	the	FP7	
Work	Programme	2012	on	security.	As	part	of	this	effort,	workshops	were	organized,	including	on	
Maritime	 Border	 Security	 and	 intelligence	 gathering	 and	 information	 sharing	 (European	
Commission,	2010b).	
At	the	twelfth	meeting	of	the	SecAG,	a	representative	of	the	Joint	Research	Centre	of	the	
Commission	was	invited	to	the	meeting	and	agreed	with	the	members	that	standardization	of	the	
security	sector	was	important	to	support	innovation	and	reduce	“the	fragmentation	of	the	security	
market	 and	 enhance	 interoperability	 of	 security	 systems	 in	 Europe.”	 (European	 Commission,	
2010c).	In	its	final	report	for	2011-2012,	for	instance,	the	SecAG	emphasized	the	need	to	“increase	
the	engagement	of	end-users	in	the	research	projects	[as]	an	important	way	to	focus	research	and	
accelerate	its	uptake”	(European	Commission,	2012a).	Recommendations	along	these	lines	had	
dominated	 the	 SecAG	 since	 its	 inception	 at	 the	beginning	of	 FP7,	 and	 its	 effect	 can	be	 traced	
observing	the	resulting	formulation	of	Work	Programmes	and	their	calls.	
For	instance,	during	the	2007	Work	Programme,	a	topic		was	called	“SEC-2007-3.1-01	–	
Integrated	 border	 management	 system	 (phase	 1)”.	 The	 Work	 programme	 describes	 it	 as	 a	
demonstration	programme	defining	the	strategic	roadmap	for	ensuring	EU-wide	awareness	with	
the	goal	to	be	“the	demonstration	of	a	comprehensive	and	integrated	border	management	system	
relating	to	the	Schengen	co-operation	and	the	European	Union’s	external	borders”.	This	system,	
the	Commission	stated	under	this	topic,	should	provide	concentric	layers	of	protection	from	pre-
entry	control	measures	through	to	co-operation	inside.	This	was	seen	as	requiring,	in	one	layer,	
surveillance	 systems	 capable	 of	 “improving	 situational	 awareness	 and	 detecting	 anomalous	
behavior	of	people	and	platforms	(vehicles,	boats,	aircraft)”.	
	For	the	other	layers,	the	topic	requested	that	projects	developed	“[i]dentity	management	
systems	including	documentation,	equipment	and	supporting	for	the	accurate	identification	and	
authentication	of	 individuals	as	well	as	positioning	and	 localization	systems	“to	track	and	trace	
individuals,	 goods	and	platforms.”	 It	 also	 requested	projects	able	 to	 “fuse	data	 from	disparate	
systems	 (identity	 management,	 inteliigence	 etc.)”	 (European	 Commission,	 2007,	 p.	 20).	 The	
specificity	 of	 the	 call	 clearly	 links	 to	 the	 then-ongoing	 discussion	 about	 SIS	 II,	 but	 also	 flags	
interoperability	as	a	Commission	priority.	Moreover,	the	call	also	illustrates	how	in	the	mid-00’s,	
the	visions	of	 large-scale	EU	surveillance	systems	had	not	yet	been	distilled	 into	the	two	more	
separate	tracks	of	database	and	a	surveillance	network	for	the	land	and	maritime	borders.	
The	research	consortium	European	Global	Border	Environment	(GLOBE)	won	this	specific	
call.	The	project	lasted	between	2009-2011	with	the	EU	funding	the	entire	budget	of	€9.600.000,	
and	 was	 coordinated	 by	 Italian	 E-Geos.	 It	 also	 included,	 among	 others,	 GMV	 Aerospace	 and	
Defence,	 Indra	 Sistemas,	 the	 Italian	 and	 French	 branches	 of	 Thales,	 Thales	 Alenia,	 Airbus,	
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Deutsches	Zentrum	für	Luft	und	Raumfahrt,	as	well	as	German	and	Italian	universities		and	the	
Joint	Research	Centre	of	the	European	Commission.	
	Among	GLOBE’s	objectives	was	listed	the	creation	of	the	framework	for	an	“integrated	
global	border	management	system”.	It	also	promised	to	look	further	into	the	social	and	economic	
impact	 of	 border	 problems	 and	 to	 pay	 special	 attention	 to	 conceptualizing	 the	 needs	 of	 “end	
users”,	such	as	coast	guards,	police	and	other	national	institutions	from	several	Member	States,	
which,	it	noted,	was	therefore	“well	known	by	the	partners	of	the	consortium	due	to	the	close	
relationship	with	these	institutions	through	the	hands-on	experience	that	all	companies	have	in	
the	different	border	control	areas.”	GLOBE	lasted	from	2008-2009,	and	was	awarded	the	total	cost	
of	€999.891.	it	was	coordinated	by	Spanish	Telvent	Interactiva,	and	also	included,	among	others	
Spanish	GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence,	French	Altran,	Austrian	Cogent,	Portuguese	GMVIS	Skysoft	
and	Norwegian	Institutt	for	Fredsforskning.	
The	 SecAG	 for	Horizon	 2020	was	 chaired	 by	 the	 former	 Finmeccanica	 CEO	Alberto	 de	
Benedictis.	It	immediately	struck	chords	similar	to	its	predecessor,	when	it	came	to	public-private	
interactions	 in	 EU	 border	 systems.	 During	 its	 first	 meeting	 on	 February	 27,	 2014	 the	 group	
discussed	 how	 to	 handle	 cases	 of	 funding	 close-to-market	 research	 topics.	 Distinguishing	 first	
between	 practices	 for	 “public	 procurement	 for	 innovative	 solutions”	 and	 those	 for	 “pre-
commercial	 procurement”,	 the	 group	 then	 argued	 the	 need	 for	 their	 convergence.	 To	 the	
Commission,	 it	 suggested	 that	 the	SecAG	 itself	 should	develop	a	pre-commercial	procurement	
strategy	involving	the	fusion	of	civil	and	military	needs	(European	Commission,	2020).	Moreover,	
in	July	2016,	PASAG	published	a	report	where	it	determined	five	key	areas	that	should	structure	
research	and	development	on	security,	which	included	border	and	external	security,	fighting	crime	
and	 counter-terrorism,	 and	 building	 a	 competitive	 European	 security	 industry	 (European	
Commission,	2016,	p.	5).	They	then	proceeded	to	set	out	2030-visions	for	each	area	“to	ensure	
that	what	gets	funded	today	represents	stepping	stones	along	a	technology	roadmap	that	has	the	
ultimate	objective	of	delivering	tomorrow’s	vision”	(Ibid).	These	visions	included	that	“EU	citizens	
of	good	standing	should	be	able	to	cross	all	 land,	sea	and	air,	internal	and	external	EU	borders,	
with	 no	 physical	 barriers”.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 controls	 should	 be	 “triggered	 by	 alerts	 activated	
throughout	 the	EU	and	not	exclusively	at	border	 crossings”	 leading	 to	 “a	 single	EU-wide	entry	
protocol	and	monitoring”	of	non-European	citizens	mobility	within	the	EU“.	(Ibid.)	
To	achieve	this,	the	group	argued,	it	would	be	necessary	to	step	up	investments	in	security	
technology	 in	 order	 to	 create	 “an	 integrated	 border	 management”	 through	 a	 “technology	
investment	road	map”	and	large-scale	pilots	in	cooperation	with	industry	and	end-users	covering	
“systems,	equipment,	 tools,	processes	 for	 rapid	 identification	 for	both	control	and	surveillance	
issue.”	(Ibid.).	PASAG	informed	the	Commission	that	such	an	effort	would	lead	to	the	creation	of	
“new	markets”	for	advanced	security	products	“with	access	to	an	open	EU	and	export	market”,.	
Among	 the	 emerging	 technologies	 it	 recommended	 were	 IT	 architectures	 and	 AI	 embedded	
autonomous	systems,	the	management	of	which	should	also	be	undertaken	by	the	private	sector	
(Ibid.,	p.	6).	
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Figure	14	-	Phases	and	private	actors	developing	interoperable	EU	borders,	2003-2019	
	
When	observing	the	policy	drive	for	interoperability	from	a	more	elevated	vantage	point,	
it	 transpires	 how	 commercial	 interests	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 shaping	 the	 infrastructures	 of	
interoperable	and	standardized	border	and	entry	control	on	multiple	 levels.	As	such,	Figure	15	
illustrates	 the	 path	 dependency,	 or	 lock-in	 effect	 (Menz,	 2013)	 characterizing	 the	multileveled	
evolution	of	interoperable	EU	border	systems.		
These	 include	the	Commission’s	 launch	of	blurred	forms	 like	the	GoP,	ESRAB	and	ESRIF	
between	 2003-2007	 and	 the	 AGs	 and	 ETPs	 after	 2005.	 Through	 these,	 European	 biometrics,	
security	and	defence	companies	have	not	only	been	influencing	the	formulation	of	annual	Work	
Programmes	and	specific	topics	under	FP7	and	Horizon	2020’s,	in	Figure	21,	exemplified	by	SEC-
2007-3-2-03	 or	 SEC-2012.3.4-6.	 They	 have	 also	 participated	 in	 the	 research	 consortiums	
responding	to	these	calls,	and	thus	placed	themselves	on	the	receiving	end	of	EU	research	funds.	
In	Figure	15,	these	consortiums	are	represented	by	the	projects	EFFISEC	and	ABCG4EU	(FP7)	and	
ARIES	 and	 PROTECT	 (Horizon	 2020),	 but	 this	 is	 only	 for	 illustrative	 purposes,	 as	 both	 funding	
instruments	channel	 funds	out	 to	a	myriad	of	other	projects,	many	of	which	pertain	to	border	
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control.	Finally,	Figure	15	also	conveys	how	some	companies	have	also	been	reaping	the	contracts	
on	interoperable	and	standardized	border	systems	awarded	by	EU-Lisa	since	2013.	
Illustrating	the	SecAG	focus	on	interoperability	and	standardization,	combined	with	the	
recommendation	 of	 autonomous	 and	 robotic	 border	 systems,	was	 the	 autonomous	 swarm	 of	
heterogeneous	Robots	for	BORDER	surveillance	(ROBORDER)	project	(Figure	16).	
			 	
Figure	 15	 -	 H2020	 project,	 The	 autonomous	 swarm	 of	 heterogeneous	 Robots	 for	 BORDER	 surveillance	
(ROBORDER)	project	
ROBORDERS’	 funding	derived	 from	 the	2016	Work	Programme,	which,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	
SecAG	 recommendations	 featured	 a	 topic	 entitled	 “SEC-20-BES-2016	 –	 Border	 Security:	
autonomous	 systems	 and	 control	 systems”	 and	 a	 sub-topic	 on	 “autonomous	 surveillance”.	 It	
requested	from	applicants	systems	that	would	be	“interconnected,	interoperable	and	capable	of	
exchanging	information	among	themselves”.	ROBORDER	was	granted	the	funds,	and	supported	
with	€7.999.315,82	out	ouf	€8.997.781,50	by	the	EU.	Its	members	included	Estonian	Academy	of	
Security	 Sciences	 (€130.812.50),	 the	 English	 Sheffield	 Hallam	 University	 (€473.375)	 and	 the	
National	 and	 Kapodistrian	 University	 of	 Athens	 in	 Greece	 (€418.750).	 Moreover,	 just	 like	 the	
PROTECT	 consortium	 in	 Figure	 21,	 ROBORDER	 illustrates	 an	 observable	 development	whereby	
securitized	militaried	 research	previously	undertaken	by	defence	actors,	 are	 increasingly	being	
pursued	by	academic	institutions	under	the	label	of	border	surveillance.		
	 Alongside	 the	 trajectory	 of	 interoperability	 designs	 identifiable	 between	 AG	
recommendations	for	EU	research	priorities	and	the	consortiums	awarded	funds,	the	commercial	
interests	 in	 interoperable,	 standardized	 and	 large-scale	 border	 systems	 were	 also	 purused	 by	
other,	networking	means.	
5.2.2	Commercial	interventions	-	events,	studies	and	roundtables	
EU	border	control	is	imbricated	in	multiple	associations	and	interests.	These	have	been	constantly	
re-assembled	through	a	series	of	events	and	conferences	organized	by	EU	agencies	like	Frontex	
and	EU-Lisa,	and	meetings	with	Commission	representatives.	Figure	17	visualizes	 the	meetings	
between	biometrics	companies	and	the	Digital	Single	Market	representative	for	the	Commission.		
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Figure	16	-	Digital	Single	Market	Commission	representative	meetings	with	biometrics	
companies,	2015-2019	
Following	the	Commission’s	Smart	Borders	proposal	in	2013,	a	Pilot	was	initiated,	resulting	in	a	
report	in	2015.	At	the	same	time,	the	European	Commission	contracted	the	consultancy	company	
PriceWaterhouseCoopers	 to	undertake	a	cost	analysis	of	 the	Technical	Study	on	Smart	Borders	
(Price	Waterhouse	Coopers,	2014).	The	pilot	tested	and	researched	18	air,	sea	and	land	borders	
crossing	points	in	12	Member	States,	involving	58.000	travellers	and	around	350	border	guards.	
Biometrics	such	as	fingerprints,	facial	images	and	iris	scans	were	rolled	out	in	Automated	Border	
Gates	 and	 kiosks	 (EU-Lisa,	 2015).	 In	 terms	 of	 commercial	 supply,	 the	 pilot	 assessed	 that	 the	
required	technologies	for	fingerprinting	and	facial	imagining	were	already	widely	available	on	the	
market;	while	the	technology	for	iris	scanning	existed,	and	was	available.	Automated	Border	Gates	
technology	for	exit	checks	was	already	in	place	along	several	Schengen	borders,	and	thus	available,	
whereas	 further	 refinements	 to	 existing	 technology	 were	 needed	 to	 assemble	 the	 devices	 of	
kiosks	(Ibid.).	A	questionnaire	about	the	cost	of	equipment	was	circulated	and	five	companies	on	
the	market	 for	biometric	borders	 responded.	However,	 in	both	 reports,	 all	market	actors	have	
been	anonymized,	and	neither	deals	with	the	political	economy	of	the	biometric	market	for	border	
control	(cf.	Ibid.).		
PriceWaterhouseCoopers	 identified	 costs	 for	 the	 development,	 implementation	 and	
subsequent	operational	management	of	a	Smart	Borders	system.	 In	 the	end,	 the	Cost	Analysis	
estimated	that	for	three	years	of	development	and	one	year	of	operations,	the	costs	of	a	 joint	
Entry/Exit	and	Registered	Travelling	Person	system	would	be	€381	million,	while	the	same	for	a	
seven-year	period	would	be	€553	million	(Price	Waterhouse	Coopers,	2014).	So-called	Member	
State	toolboxes	were	recommended,	whereby	Member	States	would	estimate	the	magnitude	of	
the	costs	that	they	will	need	to	fund	using	national	budgets	(Ibid.).	
Another	 level	 through	which	 the	 EU	 policy-making	 developed	was	when,	 on	 June	 14,,	
2016,	 EU-Lisa	 organized	 an	 Industry	 Workshop	 in	 Strasbourg	 focused	 on	 how	 the	 hotspot	
approach	 in	 Greece	 and	 Italy	 had	 to	work	 properly	 to	 ensure	 the	 internal	 security	 of	 the	 EU.	
Besides	speakers	from	the	two	agencies,	also	representatives	from	Oracle,	Accenture	and	Sopra	
Steria	were	invited.	EU-Lisa	related	to	the	industrial	actors	that	“[t]echnologies	were	needed	to	
address	aspects	related	to	IT	security,	interoperability,	networks,	mobility,	infrastructure	and	data”	
(EU-Lisa,	2016,	p.	2).	The	two	former	companies	presented	the	promise	and	speed	with	which	
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their	contracts	with,	respectively,	the	German	BAMF	agency	(for	processing	asylum	applications)	
and	the	UNHCR	(for	extracting	iris,	face	and	fingerprint	biometrics	from	refugees	in	camps)	were	
completed.	By	contrast,	and	perhaps	born	out	of	the	SIS	II-experience,	Sopra	Steria	underscored	
that	new	large-scale	systems	are	complex,	may	take	years	to	implement	and	involve	building	new	
layers	upon	existing	systems	(Ibid.).	The	following	year,	the	Commission	called	for	identifying	gaps,	
and	 promoting	 interoperability	 between,	 strengthened	 existing	 IT	 systems	 for	 border	
management	 (European	 Parliament,	 2016b).	 To	 this	 end,	 it	 established	 the	 High-Level	 Expert	
Group	on	Information	Systems	and	Interoperability.	Coordinated	by	the	Directorate-General	for	
Migration	and	Home	Affairs,	its	experts	were	nominated	by	Member	States,	Schengen	Associated	
Countries,	and	EU	Agencies.		
The	Group	met	five	times	between	June	2016	and	April	2017,	before	producing	its	final	
report.	Among	their	recommendations	featured;	that	the	Commission	continued	to	fully	associate	
the	European	Data	Protection	Supervisor	 (EDPS)	and	 the	EU	Fundamental	Rights	Agency	 (FRA)	
with	system	developments	 in	 the	area	of	 justice	and	home	affairs;	 that	Member	States	should	
prioritize	assessing	the	feasibility	of	facilitating	access	for	law	enforcement,	asylum	and	migration	
authorities	to	Eurodac.	Moreover,	it	was	recommended	that	Member	States	should	redouble	their	
efforts	to	fully	implement	the	SIS	I	and	the	VIS	and	continue	to	cooperate	with	the	Commission	
and	EU-Lisa	on	 introducing	 technical	 and	operational	 improvements	of	 the	 systems	within	 the	
existing	legal	bases.	This	recommendation,	however,	illustrates	the	continued,	uneasy	relationship	
between	the	political,	technical	and	legislative	evolutions	of	the	interoperable	EU	borders,	since	
the	Group	also	 recognized	 that	 these	 legal	bases	were	 in	 the	process	of	 substantive	 recasting.	
Furthermore,	the	report	was	completely	void	of	any	discussions	about	industrial	actors,	as	well	as	
their	 competition	 and	 connections	 to	 the	 national	 industries	 of	 Member	 States	 (European	
Commission	2017a).	Other	conferences	in	this	period	included	the	Frontex-EU-Lisa	conference	on	
EU	Borders	–	Getting	Smart	through	Technology	in	Tallinn,	Estonia	on	October	16-17,	2018,	and	
on	October	9-10,	2019	the	International	Conference	of	Biometrics	for	Borders	in	Warsaw,	Poland,	
which	brought	together	experts,	practitioners	from	private	sectors	with	representatives	from	EU	
institutions,	 like	the	Commission,	Europol	and	EU-Lisa,	as	well	as	the	IOM,	the	Organization	for	
Security	 and	 Co-operation	 in	 Europe	 (OSCE),	 the	 Fundamental	 Rights	 Agency	 (FRA)	 and	 the	
International	Centre	for	Migration	Policy	Development	(ICMPD).	
EU-Lisa	has	thus	interpreted	its	role	to	mean	the	quick	establishment	of	extremely	close	
relations	to	commercial	actors	in	the	EU	borders.	Its	close	orbit	to	these	interests	is	manifested	
through	a	series	of	tenders	and	framework	contracts	for	maintenance,	upgrades	and	evolutions.	
Traversing	 the	 problematic	 and	 co-constitutive	 relation	 between	 policy	 and	 technology	
development,	these	coincided	with	the	Commission’s	proposals	between	2016	and	2018	to	recast	
Eurodac	(2016),	SIS	II	(2016),	and	VIS	(2018).	
5.3	Shifting	from	smart	to	interoperable	borders	
The	proliferation	of	Commission	recasts	2016-2018,	after	the	fall	of	the	Smart	Borders	package,	
coincided	with	tense	political	debates	about	the	increase	in	migration	to	the	Union	since	2015.	
The	 Commission	 perceived	 this	 as	 a	 “migration	 crisis”	 characterized	 by	migrant	 invisibility	 for	
Member	States	authorities	(European	Commission,	2016c).	In	line	with	the	already	existing	drive	
towards	interoperability,	 it	proposed	as	a	remedy	the	upgrading	and	expansion	of	“information	
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exchange”-infrastructures	allowing	 collaboration	between	Member	States	on	 the	 identification	
and	return	of	migrants	(cf.	European	Parliament,	2018a).		
The	introduction	of	new	layers	of	assessment	for	persons	entering	EU	territory	through	
large-scale	information	systems	coincides	both	with	urgency-driven	political	dynamics,	and	with	
measures	for	migration	management	adopted	on	the	basis	of	Article	77	TFEU.	Coupled	with	the	
technical	drive	towards	standardization	and	interoperability	characterizing	the	evolution	of	these	
information	systems,	these	developments	could	have	the	effect	of	further	harmonizing	EU	border	
governance	(Koopmans	and	Gonzales	Beilfuss,	2019,	pp.	76-7).		
Motivating	the	Commission	focus	on	interoperability,	seems	to	be	assumptions	that	such	
technologically	driven	solutions	can	solve	the	deep	political	problems	of	 lacking	Member	State	
collaboration	 and	 solidarity	 on	 matters	 of	 migration	 management.	 As	 such,	 the	 spill-over	 of	
challenges	 from	 intra-EU	 -struggles	 and	 into	 the	 ambitions	 for	 standardized,	 large-scale	
information	systems	illustrates	one	notable	risk	with	an	exclusive	focus	on	technological	fixes	to	
complex	political	situations.	This	indicates	a	lack	of	reflection	on	the	interests	of	commercial	actors	
who	are	pro-actively	pursuing	contracts	and	market	shares	by	connecting	to	the	interoperability	
agenda	through	EU	forums	and	institutions.	Arguably,	however,	the	drive	to	marketize	EU	border	
control	is	an	influential	reason	for	the	belief	in	technological	remedy	to	perceived	challenges	with	
immigration.	
In	this	context,	the	Commission’s	2016	proposal	to	recast	Eurodac	is	noteworthy	because	
it	widens	the	kinds,	categories	and	storage	of	data	in	the	system,	such	as	a	data	retention	period	
extended	from	18	months	to	five	years;	a	lowered	age	of	registration	from	fourteen	to	six	years	of	
age;	and	facial	recognition	technology.	But	it	also	opens	up	for	third	country	authorities	to	be	able	
to	 access	 Eurodac	 for	 return	 purposes,	 transfering	 some	 personal	 data	 to	 that	 effect.	 This	
exchange	of	highly	sensitive	biometric	data	was	framed	by	the	Commission	as	solving	the	problem	
of	asylum	applicants	 refusing	 to	have	 their	 fingerprints	 taken,	and	as	making	 sure	 that	asylum	
seekers	and	refugees	were	registered	in	their	first	countries	of	arrival	(Orav	amd	D’Alfonso,	2017;	
European	Commission,	2016c).	However,	 this	 is	 controversial	as	 it	would	also	 require	 selective	
interoperability	with	the	information	systems	of	third	countries.	
Concerning	the	VIS	database,	the	European	Commission	proposed	to	revise	its	regulation	
in	2018.	This	would	transform	it	into	a	system	more	capable	of	“preventing	security	risks	and	the	
risk	of	irregular	migration	to	the	EU”	on	account	of	the	Commission’s	perception	that	Union-wide	
visa	 policies	 had	 changed	 “drastically”	 due	 to	 “migration	 and	 security	 challenges”	 (European	
Commission,	2018c).	The	means	 to	achieve	 this	was	 to	make	VIS	 interoperable	with	 the	other	
large-scale	systems	through	the	European	Search	Portal	(ESP)	and	the	Biometric	Matching	System	
(BMS).	BMS	had	been	constructed	through	a	2006-contract	from	the	Directorate	General	–	Justice	
Freecom	 and	 Security.	 It	 was	 budgeted	 at	 €157,	 which	 was	 awarded	 to	 a	 Bridge	 consortium,	
consisting	of	Sagem	Défénsé	Sécurité	(part	of	Safran),	Accenture	and	Daon,	as	well	as	Bull	and	
Uniqkey	(Accenture	2008;	Daon	2008).		
The	Portal	would	allow	border	guards,	through	one	single	search,	to	trawl	both	the	VIS,	
Eurodac,	 SIS	 II,	 EES,	 Interpol	 System,	 European	 Travel	 Information	 and	 Authorization	 System	
(ETIAS),	and	the	European	Criminal	Records	Information	System	(ECRIS	and	ECRIS-TCN)	all	at	once	
(European	Parliament,	2017b).	Moreover,	this	 interoperability	was	to	make	 it	easier	to	transfer	
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categories	 of	 data,	 which	 were	 to	 be	 expanded,	 like	 Eurodac.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Commission	
suggested	to	store	also	information	lowered	fingerprinting	age	(from	14	years	to	6	years)	and	on	
longer	stay	visas	and	residence	permits	issued	by	Member	States.	If	realized,	this	would	add	an	
additional	22	million	entries	to	the	system’s	current	52	million	visa	applicants	(Statewatch,	2018b).		
	 Concerning	the	recast	to	SIS	 III,	 the	European	Commission	undertook	a	comprehensive	
evaluation	of	SIS	II,	which	concluded	that	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	the	database	should	
be	strengthened	(European	Commission,	2016c).	To	this	end,	three	new	proposals	for	expanding	
the	 use	 of	 the	 database	 were	 included:	 increased	 border	 management;	 increased	 police	 and	
juridical	 cooperation;	 and	 increased	 returns	 of	 TCNs	 from	 EU	 territory,	 all	 of	 which	 required	
expanded	 interoperability	and	 standardization	 (European	Parliament,	2017b).	According	 to	 the	
Commissioner	 for	 Migration,	 Home	 Affairs	 and	 Citizenships,	 Dimitris	 Avramopoulos,	 these	
extensions	were	necessary	in	order	to	“close	information	gaps	and	improve	information	exchange	
on	 terrorism,	 cross-border	 crime	 and	 irregular	 migration.	 In	 the	 future,	 he	 said;	 “no	 critical	
information	should	ever	be	lost	on	potential	terrorist	suspects	or	irregular	migrants	crossing	our	
external	borders”	(European	Commission,	2016e).	To	this	end,	more	data	should	be	collected	and	
more	searches	be	made	mandatory.	The	biometric	data	should	also	be	made	multi-modal,	that	is,	
based	on	 fingerprints,	 facial	 images,	photographs	and	palm	prints,	 claimed	 to	 constitute	more	
reliable	 references	 points	 for	 accurate	 and	 conclusive	 comparisons.	 	 Second,	 by	 making	 it	
mandatory	to	store	and	share	information	about	return	decisions	and	entry	bans	in	the	new	SIS	
III,	the	system	would	evolve	into	an	instrument	for	monitoring	TCNs	subject	to	return	decisions	
(European	Parliament,	2018b).		
The	original	EES-package	 ratified	 in	2017	proposed,	among	other	 things,	 to	 record	 the	
time/place	of	entry	and	exit	for	TCNs	entering	the	Schengen	Area,	information	that	none	of	the	
other	 databases	 record.	 In	 registering	 and	 tracking	 people’s	 travel	 histories,	 the	 EES	was	 also	
envisioned	 as	 complementing	 alerts	 already	 recorded	 in	 SIS.	Moreover,	 a	 Registered	 Traveller	
Programme	(RTP)	was	 to	allow	pre-screened	 third-country	nationals	 to	benefit	 from	facilitated	
border	checks	at	the	EU’s	external	borders.	However,	only	the	EES	component	was	adopted,	while	
the	RTP	and	the	smart	borders-terminology	was	dropped.	
Similar	to	the	VIS	and	SIS	II,	the	EES	is	to	consist	of	a	central	system	that	operates	as	a	
computerised	central	database	of	biometric	and	alphanumerical	data.	All	member	states	will	have	
National	Uniform	Interfaces	on	their	territory.	The	system	is	moreover	to	be	interconnected	and	
thus	 interoperable	 with	 the	 VIS	 database	 via	 a	 Secure	 Communication	 Channel	 established	
between	them,	as	well	as	between	the	EES	Central	System	and	the	National	Uniform	Interface	
(EU-Lisa,	2017;	European	Parliament,	2017b).	The	EES-plans	also	 include	the	development	of	a	
web	 service	 through	 which	 carriers,	 such	 as	maritime	 transport	 and	 airplane	 companies,	 can	
determine	whether	TCNs	holding	a	Schengen	short-stay	visa	have	already	used	 the	number	of	
entries	authorised	by	their	visa.	As	a	result	of	this,	also	private	companies	will	be	integrated	into	
the	daily	management	of	the	technological	infrastructure	of	third	country	nationals’s	entry	into	
the	EU.	This	represents	an	extension	of	the	carrier	liability	regulations	in	place	since	the	1990s.	
This	expansion	of	the	political	wish	list	visible	in	the	three	Eurodac,	SIS	and	VIS-recasts	as	
well	as	the	envisioned	EES	system	corresponds	to	a	similarly	significant	expansion	in	the	volume	
of	 technological	upgrades	and	 infrastructures	 required	 to	 realize	 those	wishes.	 This	 fast-paced	
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evolution	 of	 the	 interoperable	 EU	 border	 systems	 means	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	
infrastructures,	and	upgrading	these	has	become	a	central	and	permanent	priority	in	EU	border	
policy-making.	Moreover,	the	flurry	of	new	systems,	such	as	the	SIS	to	SIS	II,	Eurodac,	the	BMS,	
VIS,	 and	now	EES,	also	 serve	as	 simplifying	arguments	 for	one	another	 (cf.	 Jeandesboz,	2016).	
Trading	on	the	 lock-in	effect	generated	by	the	need	for	 interoperability,	each	system	is	used	to	
justify	 the	 continuous	 evolution	 of	 the	 others,	 leading	 to	 circular	 arguments	 for	 the	 technical	
feasibility	and	functional	interoperability	of	the	large-scale	systems.		
When	it	comes	to	commercial	 interventions	 in	the	multileveled	EU	border	governance,	
the	flurry	of	systems	and	upgrades	also	leads	to	a	corresponding	flurry	of	border	contracts.	It	is	
pivotal	 to	 identify	 these	and	 the	actors	behind	 them	 in	order	 to	comprehend	the	multileveled	
governance	processes	behind	the	EU	borders.	
5.4	EU-Lisa	Roundtables	
Illustrating	the	close	relations	between	EU-Lisa	and	industrial	actors,	however,	are	the	Agency’s	
Roundtables.	During	these,	representatives	from	EU	institutions,	industry	actors	as	well	as	foreign	
agencies	are	regularly	invited	as	experts	within	the	field.	From	the	first	roundtable	in	2014	until	
mid-2019,	 EU-Lisa	 has	 hosted	 ten	 such	 roundtables	 (see	 Figure	 18).	 This	 recurrent	 dialogue	
between	the	Agency	and	 industry	 is	motivated	as	a	way	to	ensure	clearer	communication,	but	
may	 also	 result	 in	 a	 natural	 affinity	 for	 public-private	 cooperation	 between	 the	 partners	
(Akkerman,	2016).	At	the	Roundtables,	it	possible	for	industrial	actors	to	liaise	with	government	
representatives	 and	 communicate	 their	 preferences	 and	
suggested	 solutions	 to	 the	 development	 of	 IT	 systems.	
Roundtables,	as	well	as	conferences,	are	important	sites	for	the	
industry	 in	 order	 to	 influence	 the	 policies	 and	 choices	 of	
technological	solutions	underpinning	the	large-scale	information	
systems.		
	
Figure	17	-	EU-Lisa	Roundtables,	themes	and	participants,	2014-2019	
	
The	Roundtables	have	 several	 effects.	On	 the	one	hand,	 if	 the	
same	company	is	invited	to	several	roundtables,	their	chances	to	
influence	EU-Lisa	decisions	on	technological	solutions	becomes	
proportionately	 higher.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 strategy	 also	
requires	 companies	 to	 constantly	 develop	 high-tech	 solutions,	
even	 before	 problems	 corresponding	 to	 the	 technological	
capacities	exist.	As	such,	they	both	influence	the	political	agenda	
so	it	corresponds	to	the	already	developed	solutions,	but	also	be	
challenged	 to	 respond	 to	 sudden,	 and	 potentially	 infeasible,	
political	wishes.		
Through	the	EU-Lisa	Roundtables,	the	relations	between	
the	 Agency,	 companies,	 functional	 preferences	 and	 awarded	
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contracts	can	be	further	examined.	For	instance,	during	the	2014	Roundtable	which	focused	on	
the	“potential	future	of	biometric	solutions	for	Smart	Borders”	and	Automated	Border	Gates,	the	
main	 aim	 of	 the	 roundtable	 was	 to	 establish	 contact	 between	 eu-LISA	 and	 the	 industry	 to	
“exchange	information	and	views	regarding	proven	methods	and	solutions	and	to	share	ideas	for	
future	developments	that	may	be	relevant	in	the	context	for	and	the	purpose	of	the	forthcoming	
Smart	Borders	pilot”	and	its	testing	of	technical	solutions	for	the	EES	and	RTP	(EU-Lisa	2014a).		
Based	on	this	need	for	technological	solutions	in	identification	processes,	EU-Lisa	stated	that	they	
needed	 to	 “be	 aware	 of	 state-of-the-art	 hardware	 and	 software	 solutions	 and	 upcoming	
developments	that	could	be	useful	in	Smart	Borders	and	that	may	improve	system	performance	
and/or	effectiveness”.	However,	 the	Agency	also	stated	that	“the	aim	 is	 to	assemble	and	share	
thoughts;	under	no	circumstances	should	the	event	be	considered	as	a	prelude	or	an	advantage	
to	future	procurement	exercises”.	Twenty-five	companies	were	invited	to	the	Roundtable	(EU-Lisa,	
2014b,	 p.	 14).	 For	 the	 2015	 Roundtable,	 headlined	 “Future	 of	 Secure	 and	 Efficient	 IT	 service	
provision”,	 nine	 companies	were	 invited	 alongside	 representatives	 from	DG	Home,	 a	Member	
State	and	the	EU	funded	research	project	ABC4EU.	The	companies	included	Morpho,	Augmentiq,	
Accenture,	 Jenetric,	 AOS,	 Secunet	 and	 CrossMatch.	 Two	 industry	 sessions	were	 organized,	 on	
“identity	and	risk”	and	“biometric	hardware	and	software”	(EU-Lisa	2015b).	
	 In	 2016,	 under	 the	 heading	 “Interoperable	 IT	 systems	 for	 Europe:	 Towards	 greater	
standardisation	 and	 better	 efficiency”	 EU-Lisa,	 once	 again	 invited	 industry	 to	 a	 Roundtable.	
Invitees	included	three	representatives	from	the	Agency	itself,	one	from	Europol	and	seven	from	
the	industry	(EU-Lisa,	2016b).	EU-Lisa	framed	the	event	with	reference	to	the	Commissions	recent	
communication	on	Stronger	and	Smarter	Information	Systems	for	Border	and	Security.	Then,	three	
representatives	 from	the	 industry	presented	their	perspectives	on	 interoperability,	namely	one	
from	the	German	ITC	company,	Oracle,	the	tech	company	SAP,	and	from	French	Safran	(Ibid.,	p.3).		
After	the	presentation	followed	a	panel	discussion	with	participation	of	Deloitte,	Space	
Hellas,	 Aware,	 and	 HP.	 The	 2017	 Roundtable	 focused	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 single	 search	
European	 portal	 and	 shared	 Biometric	 Matching	 Service.	 At	 the	 event,	 55	 representatives	
participated	from	industry,	alongside	staff	 from	eu-LISA,	EASO	and	Frontex,	and	on	the	agenda	
was	 a	 follow-up	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 High	 Level	 Expert	 Group	 on	 Information	 Systems	 and	
Interoperability	which	had	worked	throughout	2016-17.	Amongst	the	industry	participants	were	
Accenture,	SAP,	Guardtime,	Augmentiq	and	SAS	providing	inputs	on	potential	architectures	for	the	
interoperable	systems,	including	blockchain	technology.	
	 In	 2018,	 EU-Lisa	 hosted	 two	 industry	 Roundtables.	 The	 first	was	 entitled	 “EU	 External	
Borders	–	Streamlining	of	information	exchange”.	The	stated	goal	was	to	facilitate	a	platform	for	
entities	involved	in	the	carriers	of	travellers	to	and	from	the	EU	by	air,	sea	and/or	land.	Industry	
input	 on	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 tools	 for	 advanced	 passenger	 checks	 was	
requested.	It	gathered	39	representatives	from	the	industries,	including	the	companies	Amadeus,	
SITA	 and	 Idemia,	 as	 well	 as	 four	 EU	 member	 states,	 three	 EU	 Agencies	 and	 the	 European	
Commission	(EU-Lisa,	2018a).		
The	second	industry	Roundtable	in	2018	focused	on	technologies	to	facilitate	land	border	
crossings	 at	 the	EU’s	 external	 borders	 and	how	 they	 could	be	 governed	after	 the	EES	became	
operational.	Here,	 15	 industry	 presentations	were	 given,	 and	 in	 total,	 the	 event	 gathered	 101	
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participants	 from	 38	 different	 companies,	 industry	 associations,	 academia	 and	 government	
agencies.		
EU-Lisa’s	executive	director,	Krum	Garkov	opened	the	event	saying	that	there	is	“a	great	
need	 for	 end-to-end	 solutions	 fulfilling	 the	 needs	 of	 EU	 external	 control,	 particularly	 at	 land	
borders”	and	continued	by	stating	that	EU-Lisa	is	open	to	dialogue	with	the	industry	in	order	to	
fully	understand	what	the	industry	can	offer	(EU-Lisa,	2018b).	The	Director	for	the	Border	Security	
Programme	from	Uniysys	held	a	presentation	together	with	a	colleague	from	Mobile	Edge,	and	
other	 industry	 representatives	 came	 from	 Accenture,	 Atos,	 Gemalto	 (owner	 of	 3M,	 Jenetric),	
Integrated	Biometrics,	Crossmatch	and	SITA.	Also,	a	representative	of	In	Groupe	stated	that	land	
“border	 crossing	processes	must	 be	 adapted	 to	 local	 populations,	 infrastructures	 and	 threats”	
(Ibid.).		
A	 representative	 from	 Gemalto	 repeated	 earlier	 statements	 that	 the	 company	 was	
“particularly	interested	in	the	EES	initiative	which	is	hugely	dependent	on	biometrics	and	checking	
of	 travel	 documents”.	 The	 company	 thus	 viewed	 biometrics	 as	 “the	 big	 winners	 of	 the	 EES	
initiative.	And	no	longer	just	in	airports,	as	is	currently	the	case.	Particularly	busy	sea	terminals	
and	land	border	posts	will	become	the	first	clients	of	the	famous	eGates	currently	reserved	only	
for	air	travellers”	(Gemalto,	2019a).		
Finally,	in	2019,	EU-Lisa	hosted	two	Roundtables	in	April	and	October,	but	invitees	have	
only	been	announced	for	the	former	(EU-Lisa,	2019f).	The	theme	for	the	April	event	was	“Making	
EU	 Land	 and	 Sea	 Border	 Crossings	 Seamless	 and	 Secure	 –	 Operational	 Solutions”.	 Invited	 as	
speakers	 were	 two	 representatives	 coming	 from	 The	 United	 States	 and	 Canada,	 one	
representative	from	a	EU	member	state,	two	eu-LISA	representatives	and	lastly	six	representatives	
from	different	companies.	Participating	companies	included	Unisys,	In	Groupe,	Secunet,	SITA	and	
Idemia	(former	Morpho	and	Safran).	
5.4.1	Tracing	EU-Lisa	contracts	
Commercial	 interests	 have	 been	 a	mainstay	 during	 the	 development	 of	 the	 interoperable	 EU	
border	 systems.	 This	 transpires	 in	 several	ways.	 First,	 the	winners	 of	 framework	 contracts	 are	
placed	 favourably	 for	harvesting	 future	chains	of	contracts	 (for	 the	 first	 such	EES	contract,	 see	
Figure	 17).	 Second,	 the	 political	 desire	 for	 open-ended	 systems	 capable	 of	 being	 continuously	
updated	allows	for	(controversial)	functions	to	be	inserted	into	the	design	of	border	systems,	even	
if	no	political	agreement	has	been	reached.	Third,	such	EU-wide	framework	contracts	also	create	
path	dependency	at	 the	national	 level,	 since	systems	 like	SIS,	VIS,	Eurodac	and	EES	 (as	well	as	
EUROSUR)	require	that	Member	States	update	their	national	systems	along	the	technological	lines	
set	out	by	those	contracts.		
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However,	 as	 feared	 by	 Member	 States	 during	 the	 SIS	 II	 controversy,	 such	 framework	
contracts	also	place	a	few	companies	favourably	on	the	EU	border	database	market.2	At	the	same	
time,	the	seemingly	upscaled	roll-out	of	expensive	and	advanced	surveillance	infrastructures	also	
illustrate	 how	 this	 outcome	may	 have	 been	 facilitated	 by	 commercial	 actors	 using	 the	 role	 as	
security	experts	to	frame	ever-larger	spheres	of	grave	security	concerns	in	need	of	technological	
solutions	they	themselves	supply.	
The	discourses	of	technological	fixes	and	optimized	information	sharing	are	prevalent	and	
have	 continued	 to	 influence	 the	 chains	 of	 contracts	 awarded	 by	 EU-Lisa,	 and	 before	 that,	 the	
Commission.	 This	 illustrates	 that	 expensive	 border	 infrastructures	 are	 sometimes	 developed	
before	problems	corresponding	to	the	technological	capacities	have	come	into	existence,	or	for	
problems	that	may	never	actually	do	so.	At	other	times,	 the	volatile	conditions	of	 immigration	
politics	in	the	Member	States	have	meant	that	technological	solutions	are	constantly	reconfigured	
and	repurposed	beyond	their	original	intent.	Technological	supply	may	sometimes	create	its	own	
demand,	while	political	dictates	seek	to	create	their	own	realities.	
While	the	future	flexibility	of	systems	might	be	useful	from	a	political	perspective,	there	
are	also	political	 risks	with	the	 large	framework	contracts	 for	the	Eurodac,	SIS	and	VIS	systems	
managed	 by	 EU-Lisa.	 This	 is	 because	 these	 frameworks	 require	 contractors	 to	 design	 systems	
allowing	possible	expansions	and	updates	inserted	by	future	political	preferences.	Figures	19-22	
illustrate	 how,	 since	 its	 inception,	 EU-Lisa	 has	 served	 as	 an	 accelerator	 for	 the	 technical	 and	
commercial	vision	of	interoperable	EU	borders	upon	which	political	proposals	for	recast	have	been	
modelled.	 Accordingly,	 since	 2016,	 this	 has	 led	 to	 an	
upscaling	 of	 the	 advanced	 border	 systems	 regulating	 the	
arrival	of	migrants	to	the	EU.	Notably,	this	has	also	resulted	
in	multiple	large	framework	contracts,	which	have	typically	
been	awarded	to	the	same		companies	and	consortiums.	
	
Figure	18	-	EES	contracts	awarded	by	EU-LISA,	2019	
	
																																								 																				
2	Many	of	these	required	national	projects	funded	by	the	EU’s	External	Border	and	Internal	
Security	Fund.	For	reports	on	the	case	of	Spain,	see	(cf.	Fundación	Por	Cause,	2017;	Casajuna,	
2017,	p.	50)	
Profit	and	Protection	in	EU	Markets	for	Border	Control		
	 	 p.	67	
 
Figure	19-	SIS	II	contracts	awarded	by	EU-Lisa,	2013-2018	
Figure	20	-	Eurodac	contracts	awarded	by	EU-Lisa,	2013-2018 
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Figure	 21	 -	 VIS-contracts	 awarded	 by	 EU-Lisa,	
2014-2019	
Earlier	 research	 (Jeandesboz,	 Bigo,	 Hayes	 and	
Simon,	2013,	p.	47)	has	critically	examined	the	
feasibility	of	the	Commission’s	cost	and	impact	
assessment	of	the	EU’s	smart	borders	package,	
by	 comparing	 it	 with	 similar	 large-scale	
database	 projects	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (US	
VISIT),	United	Kingdom	(UK	e-Borders)	and	the	
Union’s	own	SIS	II.	It	found	that,	similar	to	the	
SIS	II	process,	the	total	estimated	costs	for	the	
EES	 and	 RTP	 have	 risen	 from	 €100	 million	
(estimated	by	the	Commission	in	2008)	to	€1.34	
billion	 in	 a	 2011-estimate.	 The	 repeatedly	
spiralling	costs	of	the	EU	border	databases,	and	
their	lacking	transparency	and	inaccuracy,	was	
found	 to	 be	 created	 by	 project	 management	
issues	 arising	 particularly	 from	 the	 multiple	
interventions	 from	 the	 contracts	 with	
commercial	 actors,	 especially	 “when	 the	
number	 of	 bodies	 able	 to	 intervene	 into	 the	
implementation	 process	 is	 significant,	 which	
results	 in	 lines	 of	 responsibility	 and	
accountability	being	blurred”	(Ibid.).	
This	 development	 also	 yields	 risks	 in	
terms	 of	 lock-in	 effects.	 Thus,	 when	 EU-Lisa	
grant	 successive	 contracts	 not	 just	 for	
development,	 but	 also	 for	 maintenance	 and	
evolution,	 to	 the	 same	 consortiums,	 the	
involved	companies	become	indispensable,	and	
are	 granted	 roles	 as	 unrivalled	 experts	 in	 the	
systems	of	border	control	they	themselves	have	
designed.		
	
5.5	Controversies	and	criticism	
Following	the	turn	from	the	so-called	smart	borders	towards	a	renaissance	for	the	longer-spanning	
policy	drive	towards	interoperable	and	standardized	information	systems,	several	concerns	have	
been	 voiced.	 While	 the	 Commission	 have	 tabled	 many	 expansion	 and	 linkages	 between	 the	
information	systems	during	the	renegotiations	of	Eurodac,	VIS	and	SIS,	ECRIS-TCN	and	the	launch	
of	EES,	the	reasons	given	for	them	have	not	been	sufficiently	motivated.	This	despite	the	fact	that	
they	involve	aspects	like	increased	data	retention	periods,	lowering	age	of	biometric	registration	
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(Statewatch,	 2018b),	 multi-modalities	 or	 the	 inclusion	 of	 commercial	 companies	 in	 searches	
across	 the	 systems	 have	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 motivated.	 Instead,	 the	 overall	 rationale	 of	
interoperability	 risk	 being	 used	 to	 conflate	 distinct	 phenomena	 like	 migration	 management,	
internal	security	and	the	fight	against	terrorism,	is	invoked.	It	has	been	pointed	out	that	while	the	
European	 Commission	 has	 presented	 the	 aim	 of	 interoperability	 as	 a	 way	 to	 effectivize	 the	
interaction	of	systems,	it	also	appear	to	aim	for	cross-matching	data	between	these.	According	to	
the	 European	 Data	 Protection	 Supervisor	 (EDPS)	 this	means	 that	 interoperability	 implies	 new	
forms	 of	 data	 processing	 that	 are	 “not	 covered	 by	 existing	 legal	 bases”,	 leading	 to	 a	 strong	
recommendation	 that	 “their	 impact	 on	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 privacy	 and	 data	 protection	
needs	 to	 be	 carefully	 assessed.”	 (EDPS	 2017,	 6-7).	 Moreover,	 even	 though	 interoperability	 is	
portrayed	as	an	apolitical	and	technological	development,	it	cannot	be	separated	from	the	political	
and	legal	contexts	it	is	implemented	in.		
Such	 political	 contexts	 include	 the	 contested	 and	 life-threatening	 context	 of	 irregular	
immigration	to	the	EU,	as	well	as	the	spill-over	effect	when	political	challenges	stemming	from	
intra-EU	-struggles	are	deemed	solvable	by	being	transferred	into	information	exchanges	via	large-
scale	 information	 systems.	 It	 has	 been	 stressed	 that	 within	 the	 interoperability	 agenda,	 even	
though	 references	 to	 public	 interests	 are	 made,	 these	 remain	 underdetermined	 and	 vague,	
focusing	on	technical	rather	than	ethical	and	societal	achievements.	However,		technical	feasibility	
is	not	equal	to	legally	or	ethically	justifiability	(EDPS	2019,	7-8).	This	has	led	to	criticisms,	like	that	
agaist	 the	 Eurodac	 system´s	 breach	 of	 the	 purpose	 limitation	 principle,	 since	 the	 database´s	
original	 purpose	 and	 scope	 has	 been	 expanded	 beyond	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Dublin	
Regulation.	Also,	the	new	ECRIS-TCN	database	expands	Member	States´	use	of	fingerprinting,	as	
well	as	increasing	the	risk	of	discrimination	against	nationals	from	third	countries	(cf.	Jones	2019,	
2).	The	EDPS	(2016,	19)	has	also	raised	as	a	serious	concern	the	use	by	EU-Lisa	of	real	biometric	
data	for	the	purposes	of	testing	systems.	
The	 interests	 and	 activities	 of	 commercial	 actors	 pro-actively	 pursuing	 contracts	 and	
market	 shares	 by	 connecting	 to	 the	 interopability	 agenda	 form	 yet	 another	 crucial	 political	
context,	 which	 remain	 unrecognized	 by	 EU	 policy-makers.	 However,	 the	 tracing	 of	 EU-Lisa	
workshops	and	framework	contracts	illustrates	how	commercial	interests	have	been	a	mainstay	
throughout	the	development	of	the	interoperable	EU	border	systems.	Closely	associated	with	this,	
is	the	debates	about	opaque	and	spiralling	costs,	as	in	the	case	of	SIS	II,	or	associated	with	the	
required	subcontracts	 for	national	systems	yielded	by	 larger	 framework	contracts	harvested	by	
the	same	small	group	of	conglomerates.	
Although	 EU-Lisa	 activity	 is	 an	 obvious	 entry	 point	 to	 analyze	 the	 political	 economy	
underlying	 the	 interoperability	 agenda,	 an	 arguably	 more	 influential	 stage	 in	 EU	 border	
governance	is	found	in	the	influence	yielded	on	the	strategic	funding	priorities	of	FP7	and	Horizon	
2020.	 Here,	 European	 Technology	 Platforms	 and	 Advisory	 Groups,	 both	 with	 members	 from	
industry,	are	supposed	to	provide	neutral	and	divested	advice,	yet	the	analysis	indicates	that	they	
instead	have	framed	the	EU’s	research	agenda	in	ways	which	have	channelled	millions	of	euros	to	
projects	 performing	 tests,	 demonstrations	 and	 validations	 of	 various	 aspects	 of	 interoperable	
border	systems.	This	represents	subsidies	and	pre-commercial	procurement	practices,	and	is	as	
such	aligned	with	 the	discourses	of	 increased	 investments	and	competitiveness	of	 the	security	
and	military	industry.	
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EU	policy-makers	face	several	challenges	arising	from	the	lock-in	effects	generated	by	EU-
Lisa’s	 close	 interactions	with	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 industrial	 actors.	 The	 continued	 reliance	 on	
contracts	with	external	partners	 risks	creating	an	 internal	 institutional	vacuum	for	 the	kinds	of	
knowledge	 required	 to	 understand	 the	 infrastructural-technological	 dimension	 of	 EU	 border	
control.	This	challenge	is	of	a	general	kind	and	means	that	it	becomes	difficult	for	policy-makers	
to	disentangle	the	perspective	of	potential	commercial	profit	from	that	of	technological	expertise,	
when	dealing	with	technology	suppliers.	That	is,	it	become	difficult	to	discern	whether	the	alleged	
expert	input	is	guided	by	crucial	technological	assessments,	or	by	a	company’s	desire	to	win,	or	
position	 itself	 for,	 future	 contracts.	Also,	profit-driven	actors	may	not	perceive	a	need	 to	 raise	
critique	of	fundamental	assumptions	for	EU	policies,	if	this	undermines	potential	future	contracts.	
Combined,	 these	 three	 challenges	mean	 that	 EU	 policy-makers	may	 experience	 a	 knowledge-
asymmetry	when	 negotiating	with	 commercial	 actors	 about	 the	 shape	 and	 form	 of	 EU	 boder	
control;	they	may	not	be	able	identify	profit-driven	rather	than	expertise-driven	recommendation;	
and	they	may	have	limited	access	to	crucial	critique	of	their	own	political	priorities.	
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6. EUROSUR:	 Building	 a	 European	 market	 for	 external	 border	
surveillance	
The	European	Border	Surveillance	System	is	a	multipurpose	system	for	monitoring	and	controlling	
migration	 accross	 the	 EU’s	 external	 borders,	 employing	 technologies	 such	 as	 satelites,	 radars,	
drones,	aircrafts	and	offshore	sensors.	In	December	2011,	EUROSUR	was	given	a	projected	budget	
of	€244m	Euros	until	2020	through	COM(2011)	0873.	Under	this	regulation,	each	Member	State	
is	to	create	a	National	Coordination	Centre	(NCC)	responsible	for	national	border	crossing	points.	
EUROSUR	is	thus	designed	to	connect	National	Coordinations	Centres	(NCC)	of	all	Member	States	
in	the	Schengen	Area	as	well	as	some	other	associated	countries	(Migration	and	Home	Affairs,	
2019).		
By	2013,	EUROSUR	was	set	to	be	operational,	and	preparations	were	made	to	extend	the	
system	from	the	initial	19	to	all	30	Schengen	countries.	In	2014,	the	Council	announced	an	Action	
Plan	 for	 a	 European	 Union	 Maritime	 Security	 Strategy	 (EUMSS),	 aligned	 with	 the	 plans	 for	
EUROSUR	 (Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 2014).	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 11	 remaining	 National	
Coordination	 Centres,	 replete	with	 technological	 infrastructure	 and	 networks,	 were	 set	 up.	 In	
2015,	the	Commission	adopted	a	EUROSUR	Handbook	that	specified	the	technical	and	operational	
guidelines	for	the	system.		
The	Frontex	Agency	occupies	a	key	role	in	EUROSUR	by	maintaining	a	common-European	
situational	picture	and	“common	pre-frontier	intelligence	picture”	about	the	situation	at	Europe’s	
borders	 and	 the	 pre-frontier	 area.	 Frontex	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 coordinating	 the	 so-called	
common	application	of	surveillance	tools,	that	is,	the	monitoring	of	specific	areas,	vessels	through	
satellite	 of	 ship	 monitoring	 systems.	 The	 ambition	 is	 the	 rapid	 exchange	 of	 information,	
cooperation	and	joint	border	control	response.	
Dominating	 the	 technical	 studies,	 pilots	 and	 policy	 documents	 that	 have	 facilitated	
EUROSUR	are	discourses	on	“a	system	of	systems”,	“real-time	border	monitoring”	and	the	“life-
saving	of	migrants”.	At	the	same,	scholars	have	pointed	to	the	existence	of	a	time	lag	between	the	
registration	of	events,	and	their	translation	into	meaning	(and	urgency)	by	the	EUROSUR	system	
(Pugliese,	 2013;	 Tazzioli,	 2016).	Moreover,	 others	 have	noted	 that	 alongside	 the	 humanitarian	
appeal,	another	standard	justification	for	many	of	the	EUROSUR	components	and	subprojects	has	
been	an	alleged	fight	against	 illegal	migration	(cf.	Lemberg-Pedersen,	2013),	while	others	again	
argue	 that	 the	 system’s	 evolution	 represents	 a	 steady	 and	 technocratic	 development	 towards	
more	encompassing	border	surveillance	(Rijpma	and	Vermeulen,	2013).	
The	 processes	 through	 which	 EUROSUR	 have	 been	 pursued	 since	 2003	 are	 highly	
illustrative	 of	 the	 multileveled	 governance	 of	 EU	 border	 politics.	 More	 particularly,	 they	 are	
characterized	by	the	interests	and	influence	of	large	European	military	and	security	companies.	
More	concretely	still,	the	development	of	this	infrastructure	have	been	closely	intertwined	with	a	
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policy	drive	to	make	the	border	surveillance	of	the	EU	space-based.	Moreover,	it	is	also	linked	to	
the	longer-spanning	tendency	to	externalize	border	control.	
6.1	EUROSUR	and	externalization	
EUROSUR	is	linked	to	European	externalization	policies	through	the	function	ambition	of	building	
relations	 with	 third	 countries.	 For	 instance,	 the	 2015	 EUROSUR	 Handbook	 states:	 “A	 well-
structured	 and	 permanent	 exchange	 of	 information	 and	 cooperation	 by	Member	 States	 with	
neighbouring	third	countries	is	key	to	preventing	illegal	immigration	and	cross-border	crime	and	
for	contributing	to	the	saving	of	migrants’	lives.”	(European	Commission,	2015a,	p.	52).	
While	externalization	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	inquiry,	it	 is	worth	noting	that	
since	 the	mid-1990s,	 and	accelerating	 through	 the	00s,	 European	externalization	policies	have	
facilitated	a	profitable	export	market	 for	 the	 security	 and	defence	 industry.	 In	order	 to	 set	up	
border	 control	 infrastructures,	 third	 countries	 purchase	 traditional	 military	 hardware,	 like	
helicopters,	ships	and	vehicles,	and	other	technologies,	like	biometrics,	drones	and	surveillance	
infrastructures	 (Briani	 et.al.,	 2010;	 Lemberg-Pedersen,	 2013).	 Thus,	 between	 2005	 and	 2014,	
companies	from	the	EU	member	states	granted	arms	export	licenses	to	the	Middle	East	and	North	
Africa	worth	€82	billion	(Akkerman,	2016).		
In	 general,	 externalization	 illustrates	 how	 EU	 border	 policies	 have	 blurred	 the	 line	
between	 border	 control	 and	 pre-emptive	migration	 control.	 And	while	 such	 exports	 are	 often	
pursued	through	bilateral	venues,	common-European	activities	like	EU	Trust	Fund	for	Africa	and	
EUROSUR	have	also	evolved	to	support	the	material	infrastructures	of	control	spanning	between	
EU	 and	 third	 countries.	 This	 is	 intertwined	 with	 the	 aforementioned	 increase	 in	 security	 and	
military	assistance	to	third	countries	located	along	main	migration	routes,	stated	as	a	policy	goal	
the	Valetta	Summit	and	the	Khartoum	Process.		
However,	 although	 EUROSUR	 documents	 are	 generally	 careful	 not	 to	 state	 any	 direct	
connections	to	controversial	actors	 involved	 in	border	control	 in	collaborating	states,	 the	same	
care	is	not	always	reciprocated	by	those	actors.	For	instance,	the	president	of	the	the	contested	
Libyan	Government	of	National	Accord	(GNA)	has	repeatedly	requested	that	Libyan	authorities	be	
granted	access	to	the	EUROSUR	system	(Akkerman,	2018,	p.	51).	While	Libya	has	so	far	not	had	
any	formal	success,	its	naval	operations	are	de	facto	functioning	through	the	EUROSUR	system,	as	
the	Italian	MRCC,	and	authorities	from	other	Member	States,	which	have	been	integrated	in	the	
system,	 are	 already	 providing	 the	 technological	 infrastructure	 (Moreno-Lax	 and	 Lemberg-
Pedersen,	2019).	
	
6.2	Early	contracts	before	EUROSUR	–	CIVIPOL,	MEDSEA	and	BORTEC	
One	of	the	earliest	plans	for	a	surveillance	system	for	the	EU’s	external	borders	was	formulated	in	
a	2003	feasibility	study	of	the	European	Union’s	maritime	borders,	which	was	outsourced	to	the	
consulting	firm	CIVIPOL	Conseil.	Exemplifying	the	blurred	boundaries	between	public	and	private	
interests,	CIVIPOL	is	part	of	the	French	Ministry	of	Interior,	but	while	the	French	state	owns	40%	
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of	the	firm,	several	European	security	and	defence	companies,	like	Airbus,	Safran	and	Thales,	each	
own	10%	(cf.	Akkerman,	2017,	pp.	78-9).		
In	 the	 2003	 feasibility	 study,	 CIVIPOL	 framed	 immigration	 through	 militaristic	 and	
criminalizing	discourses.	Immigration	to	the	EU	was	described	as	placing	“migratory	pressure”	on	
the	 Union,	 and	 those	 facilitating	 irregular	 migration	 as	 “transnational	 crime	 organisations”.	
Remarkably,	 the	 report	 even	 stated	 that	 because	 of	 undocumented	migrants,	 the	 situation	 in	
certain	EU	countries	was	 reaching	a	critical	point	 that	 threatened	“industrial	peace.”	 (CIVIPOL,	
2003,	18).	According	to	the	CIVIPOL	analysis,	 this	put	pressure	on	EU	“front-line	states”,	which	
thereafter	 offloaded	 the	 associated	 costs	 to	 “second-line	 countries”.	 The	 feasibility	 study	
recommended	as	“an	absolute	necessity”	setting	up	a	comprehensive	system	of	integrated	border	
management	(CIVIPOL,	2003,	p.	46).		
Ambitiously,	but	perhaps	unrealistically,	the	report	states	that	the	aim	of	such	a	system	
should	be	“100%	security	along	the	coastlines	of	the	Schengen	area	[which]	involves	improving	
surveillance	 of	 approaches,	 streamlining	 and	 automating	 control	 of	 entry	 and	 exit	 points	 and	
boosting	operational	intelligence	capabilities”	(CIVIPOL,	2003,	p.	76).	It	also	repeatedly	stressed	
that	 the	 countries	 from	 which	 migrants	 seek	 to	 move	 or	 escape,	 should	 be	 encouraged	 and	
supported	in	checking	and	setting	up	surveillance	systems	on	their	coastlines	(cf.	CIVIPOL,	2003,	
pp.	54,	73).		
As	to	the	financing	of	this	border	surveillance	vision,	CIVIPOL	(2003,	p.	80)	stated	that	not	
enough	resources	were	committed,	and	argued	that	while	the	capital	costs	of	setting	up	of	the	
control	 infrastructure	 would	 be	 high,	 the	 running	 costs	 of	 automated	 surveillance	 operations	
would	be	lower	than	the	price	of	staffing	border	points,	so	the	investment	in	such	a	technological	
option	should	be	promoted.	However,	reflecting	the	attitude	of	Member	States’	towards	common-
European	initiatives	taking	over	national	priorities	of	border	control	that	dominated	the	early	00s,	
CIVIPOL	 described	 itself	 as	 “rather	 cautious”	 on	 the	 issue,	 but,	 crucially,	 did	 not	 “rule	 out”	
European	financing.	In	fact,	it	went	on	to	lay	out	three	possible	courses	of	financial	action,	namely	
joint	European	services,	measures	targeting	non-European	countries	and	pilot	operations.		
The	CIVIPOL	study	is	noteworthy	for	several	reasons.	First,	because	it	is	a	clear	example	of	
how	 industrial	 security	 and	 defence	 actors	 are	 both	 positioning	 themselves	 and	 also	 being	
positioned	by	EU	institutions,	as	unrivalled	experts	on	a	policy	area,	even	though	they	have	clear	
commercial	 interests	 in	 it.	 Second,	 because	 the	 study,	 at	 a	 very	 early	 stage,	 and	 through	
controversial	 framings,	 introduced	 a	 set	 of	 ideas	 for	 border	 surveillance	 and	 control,	 and	 its	
financing,	which	would	be	followed.	Indeed,	more	than	15	years	on,	many	of	the	ideas,	then	found	
controversial	and	drastic,	have	since	then	come	to	characterize	the	EU	border	practices,	such	as	
SIVE-like	 maritime	 surveillance,	 drone	 patrols	 and	 the	 investment	 in	 biometric	 identification	
technology	in	coordination	with	the	VIS	and	Eurodac	systems	of	all	authorized	crossing	points	in	
Schengen.	Alongside	the	French	state’s	ownership	of	stocks	in	these	three	companies,	CIVIPOL	can	
be	 seen	 as	 illustrating	 the	 public-private	 collusion	 of	 commercial	 interests	 in	 border	 control	
contracts	(see	also	section	6).	
The	 GoP	 appointed	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 2003	 to	 provide	 strategic	 advice	 on	 future	
European	 security	 research,	mirrored	 these	 priorities.	 Thus,	with	 representatives	 from	 Thales,	
EADS/Airbus,	BAE	Systems	and	Finmeccanica,	industry	interests	dominated	the	resulting	report.	It	
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framed	the	need	for	increased	surveillance	and	monitoring	against	a	backdrop	of	the	fight	against	
terrorism	and	organized	crime	and	recommended	systems	interoperability	through	sensor,	space-
based	 and	 IT	 technologies	 (GoP,	 2003,	 p.	 18).	 This	 coincided	with	 an	 agreement	 between	 the	
European	 Commission	 and	 the	 European	 Space	 Agency	 (ESA)	 to	 prepare	 for	 a	 GMES	 Space	
Component,	namely	the	Sentinel	family	of	satellites.	GMES	operations	would	commence	in	2011.	
ESA	has	launched	the	Sentinel	satellites	from	the	Spaceport	in	French	Guiana,	a	South	American	
former	 colonial	 territory,	 originally	 colonized	 during	 the	westward	 European	 expansion	 of	 the	
slave-based	Atlantic	sugar	economy.	
Several	of	these	CIVIPOL	and	GoP-recommendations	were	picked	up	by	the	Commission.	
In	 2005,	 the	 European	 Council	 adopted	 the	 "Global	 approach	 to	 migration:	 Priority	 actions	
focussing	on	Africa	and	the	Mediterranean"	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2005).	This	included	
a	 request	 to	explore	 the	 technical	 feasibility	of	establishing	a	 surveillance	 system	covering	 the	
whole	southern	maritime	border	of	the	EU	and	the	Mediterranean	Sea.	While	the	Frontex	Agency	
had	just	been	launched	in	2004	with	a	coordinating	mandate,	the	Commission	attempted	to	seize	
the	policy	trend	and	proposed	to	establish	a	permanent	Coast	Patrol	Network	for	the	southern	
maritime	external	borders.	This	was	undertaken	by	two	 initiatives	coordinated	by	Frontex.	The	
first	was	the	MEDSEA	study	consisting	of	the	Agency	and	a	core	team	consisting	of	France,	Greece,	
Italy	and	Spain.	The	MEDSEA	final	report	about	the	establishment	of	a	Mediterranean	coast	patrol	
network	was	published	in	July	2006.	It	identified	as	fundamental	“the	coverage	of	the	entire	EU	
southern	maritime	borders,”	emphasizing	the	need	for	operational	cooperation	and	coordination	
between	 national	 and	 EU	 authorities	 as	 well	 as	 a	 coordinated	 EU	 approach.	 Moreover,	 it	
encouraged	EU	support	for	the	development	of	third	countries’	border	infrastructure,	to	the	point	
that	these	could	be	included	in	the	surveillance	network	(MEDSEA,	2006).	
Following	the	Council	and	Commission	ideas	about	a	border	surveillance	network	in	2005	
and	2006,	the	Commission	decided	to	launch	and	support	several	projects	aiming	at	developing	
EUROSUR-like	infrastructures.	This	happened	through	several	different	instruments,	one	of	which	
was	the	2006	Preparatory	Action	for	Security	Research	(PASR),	which	also	dealt	with	security	and	
anti-terrorism	more	generally.	However,	a	particular	project	of	relevance	for	EUROSUR	was	the	
Surveillance	of	Border	Coastlines	and	Harbours	(SOBCAH)	with	the	stated	goal	of	identifying	“the	
main	threats	relevant	to	“green”	and	“blue”	borders”	by	analyzing	scenarios	including	container	
security,	 vehicles	 and	 small	 boats	 “anomalous	 behaviours	 and	 biometrics.	 SOBCAH	 lasted	 18	
months	and	 the	Commission	 supported	 the	project	with	€2.010.600	out	of	€3.007.109.	 It	was	
coordinated	 by	 the	 Finmeccanica	 (now	 Leonardo)	 subsidiary,	 Galileo	 Avionica,	 and	 partners	
included	 SELEX	 Sensors	 and	 Airborne	 Systems,	 SELEX	 SI,	 Hellenic	 Aerospace	 Industry,	 Thales	
Research	&	Technology,	Thales	Underwater	Systems,	Rheinmetall,	Indra	Sistemas,	as	well	as	The	
Netherlands	 Organization	 for	 Applied	 Scientific	 Research	 and	 Frauenhofer-Gesellschaft	 zur	
Förderung	der	angewandten	Forschung	(Preparatory	Action	for	Security	Research,	2006,	p.58).	
Frontex	also	carried	out	the	BORTEC	study	on	a	EU	Border	Surveillance	System,	which	was	
presented	 to	 Member	 States	 in	 January	 2007,	 but	 immediately	 classified	 and	 therefore	 not	
published.	As	with	MEDSEA,	it	also	relied	on	input	from	the	Joint	Research	Centre.	Moreover,	the	
BORTEC	core	team	experts	came	from	the	Member	States	from	the	region.	It	was	supported	by	
Member	States,	the	Commission,	as	well	as	the	European	Maritime	Safety	Agency	(EMSA),	ESA	
and	 the	 European	Union	 Satellite	 Centre	 (EUSC)	 among	others.	 Its	 aim	was	 early	 detection	of	
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targets	so	that	they	could	be	intercepted	before	hiding	or	disappearing	at	sea	or	land.	To	this	end,	
it	made	an	analysis	of	maritime	surveillance	systems	and	operators	in	Portugal,	Spain,	France,	Italy,	
Slovenia,	Malta,	Greece	and	Cyprus.	It	also	suggested	exact	numbers	and	types	of	equipment	to	
be	purchased,	such	as	patrol	boats,	aircraft	or	vehicles	(European	Commission,	2011h,	Annex	1.2,	
p.	24).	The	conclusions	of	the	BORTEC	study	aligned	with	a	Commission	Communication	issued	a	
few	months	earlier,	on	November	30,	2006,	which	had	also	reaffirmed	the	need	to	reinforce	the	
management	 of	 the	 EU’s	 southern	 maritime	 borders.	 Soon	 thereafter,	 the	 European	 Council	
confirmed	the	priority	of	creating	such	a	European	Surveillance	System.	
Then,	 in	 2007	 Decision	 No.574/2007/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	
meant	the	adoption	of	new	strategic	guidelines	for	the	External	Borders	Fund	between	2007-2013.	
These	new	strategic	priorities	were	beneficial	for	industrial	actors	as	the	decision	emphasized	the	
need	 for	 “support	 for	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 national	 components	 of	 a	
European	Surveillance	System	for	the	external	borders”	through	the	External	Borders	Fund,	and	
for	the	creation	of	a	permanent	European	Patrol	Network	at	the	EU’s	southern	maritime	borders.	
The	Decision	also	noted	 that	 for	 such	projects,	 the	 financial	Community	contribution	could	be	
increased	 to	 75%	 for	 certain	 priorities,	 like	 investments	 in	 establishing	 or	 upgrading	 national	
coordination	centres;	national	surveillance	systems;	and	“for	the	purchase	and/or	upgrading	of	
equipment	 for	 detection,	 identification	 and	 intervention	 at	 the	 borders	 (e.g.	 vehicles,	 vessels,	
aircraft,	helicopters,	sensors,	cameras)”	(European	Commission,	2011h,	Annex	1.2,	p.	11).	
In	February	2008,	the	Commission	communicated	eight	steps	of	the	EUROSUR	Roadmap.	
These	included	a	Phase	1	with	streamlining	and	interlinking	national	border	surveillance	systems	
through	 national	 coordination	 centres	 (NCCs),	 a	 EUROSUR	 communication	 network	 and	
collaboration	with	third	countries.	Phase	2	then	planned	the	development	of	common	tools	for	
border	 surveillance	 at	 EU	 level	 through	 research	 and	 development	 projects,	 the	 common	
application	 of	 surveillance	 tools	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 common	 pre-frontier	 intelligence	
picture.	Phase	3	then	involved	setting	up	a	common	information	sharing	environment	(CISE)	for	
the	 EU	 maritime	 domain,	 both	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 internal	 Member	 State	 security	 and	 for	
common-European	coordination	(European	Commission,	2008).		
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Figure	22-	Early	contracts	and	studies	related	to	EUROSUR,	2003-2008	
	
Also	 in	 2008,	 and	 following	 the	 path	 developed	 through	 the	 CIVIPOL,	 MEDSEA	 and	 BORTEC	
studies,	the	EU's	Directorate	General	for	Justice,	Freedom	and	Security	called	for	a	technical	study	
to	be	completed	in	2013.	This	was	for	a	system	providing	full	situational	awareness	of	cross-border	
movement	 through	 a	 "common	 pre-frontier	 intelligence	 picture"	 (CPIP)	 by	 aerial	 and	 satellite	
images	including	on	migrant	mobility	in	third	countries.	As	illustrated	by	Figure	23	The	study	was	
awarded	to	the	German	conglomerate	ESG,	which	then	subcontracted	parts	of	the	study	to	the	
Finmeccanica	subsidiary	SELEX-SI,	French	Thales,	US-based	AGIS	and	the	European	conglomerate	
EADS	(Lemberg-Pedersen,	2013,	p.	157).	Between	January	2009	and	January	2010,	technical	and	
management	concepts	for	national	border	surveillance	systems	and	the	NCCs	were	examined,	as	
well	as	the	system	architecture	for	the	EUROSUR	communication	network	and	the	CPIP.	Moreover,	
in	November	2009,	a	mini	pilot	was	conducted	at	the	land	borders	of	Finland,	Poland	and	Slovakia,	
and	the	sea	borders	of	France,	Italy	and	Spain.	Three	different	scenarios,	namely	terrorist	strike	
across	“green	borders”	(land	borders),	Chechen	women	migrating	irregularly	across	green	borders	
and	 irregular	migration	and	search	and	rescue	 in	the	Central	Mediterranean,	were	tested.	This	
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took	place	in,	respectively,	Poland,	conducted	by	ESG	and	Frontex,	in	Rome	conducted	by	SELEX,	
and	in	Toulouse,	conducted	by	Thales	
	
	
	
Figure	23	-	Early	contracts	and	studies	related	to	EUROSUR,	2003-2008	
In	the	final	report,	ESG	proposed	a	network	architecture	of	
EUROSUR	along	four	major	functionalities:	communication,	
information	 sharing,	 coordination	 and	 exchange	 of	
situational	 pictures.	 When	 it	 came	 to	 the	 more	 specific	
planning	 of	 border	 equipment,	 the	 ESG-study	 had	 the	
appearance	of	a	general	and	vast	procurement	list	for	the	
Commission	 and	 the	 Member	 States.	 Thus,	 33	
“phenotypical”	 border	 segments	 were	 identified	 and	
technical	 cost	estimates	 for	establishing	or	upgrading	 the	
technological	infrastructure	were	given.	This	list,	however,	
encountered	 dissatisfaction	 in	 the	 EUROSUR	 Member	
States'	 expert	 group,	 where	 appointed	 national	 experts	
contested	it.	It	was	argued	that	the	technical	concepts	were	
underdeveloped	 and	 not	 specific	 enough	 as	 binding	
technical	 requirements.	 What	 followed	 would	 be	 a	
diffusion	 into	parallel	 streams.	One	where	 Frontex	would	
take	 over	 contractual	 responsibility	 for	 EUROSUR’s	
framework	 contracts,	 and	 another	 where	 the	 continued	
research	and	development	into	the	infrastructure	would	be	
channelled	 out	 to	 actors	 of	 the	 European	 defence	 and	
aerospace	industry	through	the	newly	established	FP7.		
6.3	Lobbying	for	EUROSUR	–	FP7,	Horizon	
2020	and	GMV	
The	later	stages	that	transformed	the	militarized	visions	of	
a	surveillance	network	for	the	EU	borders	into	what	became	
known	 as	 EUROSUR	 were	 connected	 to	 Commission’s	
launch	of	the	FP7	(between	2007-2013)	and	Horizon	2020	
(between	 2013-2020).	 These	 funding	 instruments	 were	
instrumental	in	building	the	system,	with	more	than	twenty	
FP7	projects	dedicated	to	different	aspects	of	the	network	
(cf.	Heller	and	Jones,	2014;	Baird,	2016).		
As	 was	 also	 the	 case	 with	 the	 drive	 towards	
interoperable	 information	systems	 for	border	control,	 the	
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blurred	boundaries	between	commercial	 interests,	public	
subsidies	 and	policy-making	were	also	observable	during	
the	 annual	 work	 programmes.	 Accordingly,	 the	 drive	
towards	a	space-based	surveillance	network	for	 land	and	
maritime	 borders	 can	 also	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 both	 the	
Advisory	 Group	 on	 Secutiry,	 SecAG,	 and	 the	 Advisory	
Group	 for	 Space,	 SAG,	 guiding	 Commission	 and	 the	
Proogramme	Committee	on	the	priorities	of	 the	FP7	and	
Horizon	2020	work	programmes.	
Like	 SecAG,	 	 SAG	 also	 featured	 several	members	
with	ongoing	or	past	ties	to	the	European	aerospace	and	
defence	 industry.	 In	 a	 preliminary	 2011-report	 sketching	
priorities	 for	 the	 future	 Horizon	 2020	 programme,	 SAG	
noted	that	“European	space	budgets	have	stagnated”,	that	
Horizon	 2020	 “must	 support	 the	 competitiveness	 of	
European	industry”.	Moreover,	it	framed	as	a	problem	“an	
unfortunately	 fragmented	 European	 institutional	 market	
leading	 to	 insufficiently	 exploited	 synergies	 between	 the	
civil	and	defence	sectors.”	(SAG,	2011,	p.	17)	
	
Figure	24	-	GMV	contracts	under	FP6,	FP7	and	Horizon	
2020	contracts	related	to	EUROSUR,	2006-2021	
	
In	the	final	2012-report	on	Horizon,	SAG	summarized	their	
views	 on	 the	 use	 of	 space	 for	 the	 security	 of	 European	
citizens,	 noting	 that	 earth	observation	 alongside	 satellite	
communications	 and	 navigation	 can	 be	 used	 to	monitor	
humanitarian	sitautions,	borders,	movements	and	changes	
that	 could	 threaten	 national	 civil	 security.”	 (European	
Commission,	 2012c,	 20,	 26).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 also	
reiterated	 earlier	 comments	 that	 the	 many	 funds	
committed	 for	 the	 GEMS	 development	 during	 FP7	 had	
effectively	been	blocked	 for	 innovation	and	research	and	
development.		
The	Space	theme	was	allocated	€1,43	billion	under	the	FP7	2007-2013	budget,	while	€1,4	
billion	 was	 allocated	 to	 the	 Security	 theme.	 Both	 of	 these	 instruments	 were	 used	 to	 build	
EUROSUR	in	accordance	with	the	2008	EUROSUR	Roadmap.	Overall,	the	company	GMV	turned	
out	to	be	one	of	the	main	beneficiaries	of	such	research	and	development	funds,	and	thus	also	
one	of	 the	most	 influential	 actors	when	 it	 came	 to	 shaping	 the	 infrastructure	of	EUROSUR,	as	
visualized	in	Figure	24.	
Profit	and	Protection	in	EU	Markets	for	Border	Control		
	 	 p.	79	
This	evolved	through	the	formulation	of	several	topics	 like	“SEC-2007-3.2-01	Main	port	
area	security	system	(including	container)”;	“SEC-2007-3.3-02	Surveillance	in	wide	maritime	areas	
through	active	and	passive	means”;	“SEC-2009.3.2.2	Sea	border	surveillance	system	–	integrated	
project”;	“SEC-2009.3.4.1	Continuity,	coverage,	performance	(incl.	UAV),	secure	data	link”;	SEC-
2010.3.1-1	European-wide	integrated	maritime	border	control	system	–	phase	II	Demonstration	
Programme”;	 “SEC-2012.3.1-1	 Increasing	 trustworthiness	 of	 vessel	 reporting	 system”;	 “SEC-
2012.3.5-1	 Development	 of	 airborne	 sensors	 and	 data	 link	 –	 integration	 project”	 and	 “SEC-
2012.3.1-2	Pre-Operational	Validation	 (POV)	at	EU	 level	of	 common	application	of	 surveillance	
tools”.	 These	 were	 then	 to	 evolve	 onwards	 into	 a	 Common	 Information	 Sharing	 Environment	
(CISE).	
Thus,	 for	 instance,	 the	 FP7	 Security	 call,	 formulated	 the	 topic	 “SEC-2007-3.3-02	 –	
Surveillance	in	wide	maritime	areas	through	active	and	passive	means”.	In	it,	the	requirements	of	
applicants	was	stated	clearly:	“The	task	 is	 to	develop	novel,	automatic	surveillance	capabilities	
through	manned	and	unmanned	platforms	(land/sea/air/space),	equipped	with	several	sensors	
and	sophisticated	data	fusion	processes.”	(European	Commission,	2007,	p.	23).		
Two	 of	 the	 projects	 granted	 funds	 under	 this	 topic	 were	 the	 Autonomous	 maritime	
surveillance	 system	 (AMASS),	 and	 the	 Wide	 maritime	 area	 airborne	 surveillance	 (WIMAAS)	
projects.	AMASS,	running	between	2008-2011,	was	granted	€3.450.460	out	of	an	overall	budget	
of	 €5.465.308.	 It	 was	 coordinated	 by	 Carl	 Zeiss	 Optronics	 from	 Germany,	 and,	 among	 others	
included	 Spanish	 research	 and	 education	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Armed	 Forces	 of	 Malta.	
WIMAAS,	 also	 running	 between	 2008-2011,	 was	 granted	 €2.737.169	 out	 of	 €4.001.123,	
coordinated	 by	 French	 Thales,	 and	 included	 the	 Finmeccanica	 subsidiary	 Selex	Galileo,	 French	
Dassualt	 Aviation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 university	 of	 Malta	 and	 Spanish	 engineering	 and	 aviation	
companies.	
The	 topic	 “SEC-2007-7.0-02	 –	 European	 Security	 Research	 Networks	 (incl.	 for	
standardisation”	stated	that	“the	task	is	to	establish	European	networks	of	Member	States	and	
Associated	Countries,	private	sector	security	research	requirement	owners,	operative	end-users	
and	technology	supply	chain	experts.”	(European	Commission,	2007,	p.	34).	This	was	awarded	to	
An	interoperable	approach	to	the	European	Union	maritime	security	management (OPERAMAR),	
who	in	its	project	statement	described	an	ambition	to	“provide	the	foundations	for	pan-European	
Maritime	 Security	 Awareness	 by	 addressing	 the	 insufficient	 interoperability	 of	 European	 and	
national	 assets.”	 (Cordis,	 OPERAMAR).	 OPERAMAR	 lasted	 from	 2008-2009,	 and	 was	 granted	
€669.132	 out	 of	 €669.134	 -	 having	 to	 pay	 €2	 itself.	 It	was	 coordinated	 by	 Thales	 Underwater	
Systems	and	also	included	Finmeccanica	subsidiary	Selex	SI,	Indra,	the	Joint	Research	Centre	of	
the	European	Commission,	as	well	as	Thales	Systemes	Aeroportes.	
Similarly,	 the	 2010	 Cooperation	 Work	 Programme	 for	 Space	 formulated	 the	 topic	
“SPA.2010.1.1-05	 -	 Contributing	 to	 the	 “S”	 in	 GMES	 –	 Developing	 pre-operational	 service	
capabilities	 for	Maritime	Surveillance”.	 Linking	 closely	 together	 the	EU’s	Global	Monitoring	 for	
Environment	and	Security	(GMES)	with	priorities	for	border	control,	the	call	 informed	potential	
applicants	that	EU	“border	surveillance	can	benefit	from	tools	developed	for	surveillance	in	the	
maritime	domain”	and	that	it	“is	therefore	important	for	Europe	to	advance	its	technology	in	the	
surveillance	of	the	maritime	domain”	through	satellite	technology.	In	particular,	the	call	specified	
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that	 “the	 development	 of	 further	 monitoring	 capabilities	 from	 space	 is	 needed,	 for	 example	
overcoming	 constraints	 in	 relation	 to	 new	 surveillance	 and	 tracking	 technologies	 such	 as	 the	
detection	of	small	boats	used	for	illegal	migration	and	related	cross-border	crime	by	using	satellite	
based	 radar	 and	 optical	 imaging.”	 Thus,	 “space-based	 data	 may	 also	 lead	 to	 information	 on	
suspicious	behaviour	inside	or	outside	EU	waters,	including	Exclusive	Economic	Zone	(EEZ)	of	EU	
member	states	globally.”	(European	Commission,	2009,	p.	21).	Among	expected	impacts,	the	call	
listed	“significant	end-user	involvement”	and	“significant	uptake	of	products	and	services”	(Ibid.,	
p.	23).	
Three	 consortiums	 used	 to	 test	 and	 evolve	 the	 plans	 for	 a	 space-based	 surveillance	
network	were	granted	funds	under	this	topic.	These	were	namely	Development	of	Pre-operational	
Services	for	Highly	Innovative	Maritime	Surveillance	Capabilities	(DOLPHIN),	Simulator	for	Moving	
Target	 Indicator	 System	 (SIMTISYS)	 and	 New	 service	 capabilities	 for	 integrated	 and	 advanced	
maritime	surveillance	(NEREIDS).	Singling	out	NEREIDS	as	a	way	of	example,	it	lasted	from	2011-
2014,	received	€3.999.852	out	of	€6.026.984,	was	coordinated	by	GMV	Aerospace	and	Defence	
and	included	also	Thales,	GMVIS	Skysoft,	Eosphere,	the	Guardia	Civil,	the	European	Union	Satellite	
Centre,	NATO	and	the	Joint	Research	Centre	from	the	European	Commission.		
Projects	 like	 PERSEUS,	 AMASS,	WIMAAS,	OPERAMAR	 and	NEREIDS	 illustrates	 how	 the	
border	governance	of	the	EU	has	been	shaped	continuously	by	multileved	governance	realized	
through	 the	 framework	 programmes.	 Before	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 surveillance	 network	 spanning	 all	
external	EU	borders	was	named	EUROSUR,	the	Work	Programmes	of	FP7	Security	and	Space	were	
highly	active	in	distributing	millions	of	euros	on	to	a	mushrooming	market	for	EU	border	security	
dominated	by	a	handful	of	the	largest	security	and	defence	companies.	
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Figure	25	-	Phases	and	private	actors	developing	space-based	surveillance	networks,	2003-2018	
	
As	 illustrated	by	 Figure	25,	 both	before,	 during	 and	after	 EUROSUR	was	developed,	GMV	also	
participated	in	many	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	consortiums	for	the	development	of	its	infrastructure,	
such	as	earth	satellite	observation	systems,	through	projects	like	NEREIDS,	LOBOS,	ANDROMEDA,	
MARISA	as	well	as	Services	Activation	for	Growing	Eurosur’s	success	(SAGRES),	to	name	a	few.	In	
a	manner	similar	to	EU-Lisa,	the	relations	to	the	aerospace	and	defence	industry	that	surrounds	
Frontex’s	management	of	contracts	pertaining	to	EUROSUR	also	exhibits	tendencies	of	capture,	
path	 dependency	 and	 lock-in	 effects.	 Frontex	 has	 thus	 shown	 a	 remarkable	 consistency	 in	 its	
choices	regarding	the	companies	of	the	main	framework	contracts	for	EUROSUR.		
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Since	2010,	when	the	Agency	put	up	for	tender	
a	 €1,5	 million	 contract	 for	 a	 pilot	 project	 testing	
Eurosur	between	Frontex	and	selected	Member	States,	
until	 today,	 it	 has	 been	 the	 Spanish	 Aerospace	 and	
Defence	company	GMV,	which	has	won	all	contracts.	In	
2012,	GMV	won	a	contract	for	the	enlargement	of	the	
EUROSUR	project	as	regards	the	National	Coordination	
Centers	and	Frontex,	the	amount	of	which	was	secret.	
That	 same	 year,	 the	 company	 issued	 a	 press	 release	
saying	that	“the	EUROSUR	project	fits	in	perfectly	with	
GMV's	 ongoing	 strategy	 of	 internationalizing	 its	
defense	 and	 seurity	 activities	 and	 consolidates	 its	
leadership	 within	 European	 border	 surveillance	
activities”	(GMV,	2012).		
After	 the	European	Parliament	had	approved	
the	 EUROSUR	 package	 in	 2013,	 more	 contracts	
followed;	 In	 2013	 came	 a	 €1756.895	 contract	 for	
maintenance	 and	 development	 of	 the	 network.	 In	
2014,	GMV	again	won	a	€12.5	million	contract	for	the	
evolution,	support	and	maintenance	of	the	EUSOSUR	
system.	 In	another	press	release,	the	company	called	
EUROSUR	 the	 “the	 brain	 child”	 of	 Frontex	 (a	
description	 bypassing	 the	 CIVIPOL	 study	 in	 2003),	
celebrated	 that	 the	 European	 Parliament	 had	 “taken	
in”	the	system	developed	by	GMV,	and	noted	that	GMV	
would	 now	 assume	 responsibility	 for	 “execution,	
management	 and	 supervision”	 of	 the	 project	 until	
2018	(GMV,	2014).		
	
	
	
Figure	26	-	Frontex	contracts	to	GMV	related	to	EUROSUR,	2010-2018	
	
Accordingly,	during	this	period,	GMV	was	awarded	a	series	of	framework	contracts	visualized	in	
Figure	24.	In	2014	and	2015	followed	by	two	other	contracts	that	and	the	following	year	worth	
€1.264.264	 and	 €2.042.403.	 Similarly,	 in	 2016	 and	 2017,	 the	 company	was	 awarded	 contracts	
worth	 €2.597.863	 and	 €1.744.950	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 and	 delivery	 of	 goods	 during	
maintainance	and	development	of	the	EUROSUR	network,	and	in	2018	a	similar	contract	worth	
€889.863.	 Moreover,	 the	 close	 relations	 to	 Frontex	 were	 also	 lucrative	 for	 GMV	 outside	 the	
EUROSUR	context,	as	the	company	was	also	awarded	an	increasing	number	of	other	contracts,	
unspecified	 expect	 for	 “software	 development	 services”	 or	 sometimes	 “border	 surveillance”.	
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Thus,	in	2015,	it	also	won	a	contract	for	software	development	service	worth	342128,.15.	Similar	
contracts	 followed	 in	2016	 (worth	€1.018.742),	 in	2017	 (worth	€833.803)	 and	 in	2018	 (worth,	
respectively,	€810.819	and	€1.887.738).	In	2018,	GMV	won	a	framework	contract	for	ICT	products	
and	services	associated	to	EUROSUR	(European	Commission,	2011h;	GMV,	2014;	Frontex,	2014;	
2018).	This	flurry	of	contracts	is	visualized	in	Figure	26	above.	
And	while	GMV	has	been	a	big	beneficiary	of	contracts	during	the	evolution	of	EUROSUR	
has	 shaped	 and	 profited	 from	 the	 development	 of	 this	 space-based	 EU	 border	 surveillance	
network,	a	number	of	the	other	largest	aerospace	and	defence	contractors	have	also	benefited,	
such	as	Spanish	Indra,	who	lead	the	consortium	for	PERSEUS	and	also	the	Seahorse	Network,	and	
has	been	responsible	for	selling	much	of	the	satellite	equipment	which	the	EU	has	purchased	on	
behalf	of	its	North	African	partners	in	border	control	(European	Parliament,	2018c).		
	
Figure	27	-	H2020	project,	Bridging	Innovative	Downstream	Earth	Observation	and	Copernicus	
enabled	Services	for	Integrated	maritime	environment,	surveillance	and	security	
A	range	of	national	and	common-European	public	institutions	have	also	benefited	from	funds	to	
border	control	 research,	exemplifying	the	pre-emption	of	market	competition	stated	clearly	by	
the	AGs.	This	 is	 illustrated	by	the	Marine-EO	consortium	shown	 in	Figure	27.	Derived	from	the	
topic	“EO-2-2016	–	Downstream	services	for	public	authorities”,	it	teamed	up	an	“end	user	group”	
consisting	of	 five	maritime	authorities	and	 four	 research	organizations	 from	Member	States	 in	
order	 to	develop,	 test	 and	 validate	 services	 covering	marine	monitoring	 and	 security,	 propose	
support	 sets	 to	 integrate	 these	 services	 into	 operations,	 and	 strengthen	 transnational	
collaboration	in	maritime	awareness	and	surveillance.	As	a	project	objective,	it	notes	that	“Pre-
Commercial	Procurement	is	a	powerful	tools	to	tackle	these	three	points”	
Yet,	 while	 the	 EUROSUR	 project	might	 be	 tailored	 by	 a	mushrooming	 border	 security	
market,	 its	 costs	 have	 long	 been	 problematized,	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 the	 interoperable	 EU	
information	systems.	In	fact,	one	year	before	it	was	launched,	an	influential	study	raised	concerns,	
similar	 to	 those	 against	 the	 EES,	 that	 the	 estimated	 budget	 was	 radically	 miscalculated	 and	
speculative	(Hayes	and	Vermeulen,	2012,	pp.	51-2).	Points	of	critique	were	that	the	estimate	did	
not	include	operational	costs,	or	the	roll-out	of	required	sub-systems	for	national	border	crossing	
points.	The	authors	instead	provided	alternative	estimates	ranging	between	€318	million	and	€913	
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million.	They	also	noted	that	the	plans	of	funding	the	project	through	the	ESRP	and	the	External	
Borders	Fund,	both	of	which	channel	money	through	Member	State	authorities,	and	through	their	
discretion,	would	only	add	to	the	lacking	transparency	(Ibid.).	
Although	EUROSUR	published	a	report	in	2018,	suggesting	that	the	system	had	only	cost	
around	€130m	 (European	Commission,	2018e,	p.	8),	 the	ways	 in	which	 this	number	had	been	
reached	were	not	extrapolated.	Moreover,	the	foreseen	further	roll-out	of	the	system	to	national	
border	crossing	points	through	the	 Internal	Security	Fund	and	the	upcoming	Integrated	Border	
Management	Fund	(IBMF)	was	also	not	detailed.	A	2019	report	by	Mark	Akkerman	estimated	the	
system	to	have	cost	€338	million	–	based	on	EUROSURs	own	numbers	from	2012,	(Akkerman	2019,	
p.	23)	and	in	the	2019	ICF-study	on	possible	evolutions	of	the	system,	the	proposal	is	valued	at	
€1,1	billion	between	2021-2027	(ICF,	2019,	p.	43).		
The	issue	of	Member	State	discretion	is	controversial.	Further	confirming	the	uncertainty	
and	lacking	transparency,	the	ICF	study’s	statement	that	the	extent	to	which	NCC’s	operational	
plans	are	shared	with	 third	countries	 is	 left	at	 the	discretion	of	Member	States	 (Ibid.,	p.	48)	 is	
contradicted	 by	 the	 operating	 rules	 of	 EUROSUR	 as	 they	 were	 approved	 by	 the	 European	
Parliament	 in	 2013,	 namely	 that	 Member	 States	 “states	 must	 not	 use	 Eurosur	 to	 send	 third	
countries	any	information	that	could	be	used	to	identify	a	person	whose	request	for	international	
protection	 is	 being	 processed	 or	 whose	 life	 or	 physical	 integrity	 could	 be	 at	 risk”	 (European	
Parliament,	2013a).	
	
6.4	 Border	 control	 from	 outer	 space.	 The	 Frontex-EUROSUR-Copernicus	
connection		
In	2012,	GMES	was	renamed	Copernicus,	and	in	November	2015	the	programme	entered	into	a	
partnership	with	Frontex	(Copernicus,	2019).	Under	this	agreement,	the	European	Commission	
delegated	the	border	surveillance	component	of	Copernicus	Security	Service	to	Frontex	with	the	
objective	to	support	EUROSUR	through	the	provision	of	“real	time	data	on	what	is	happening	on	
land	and	sea	around	the	EU’s	borders	(Copernicus,	2019).	Copernicus	received	a	total	funding	from	
the	 EU	 Commission	 of	 €3,24mia	 for	 2014-2021,	 a	 budget	 increased	 to	 €5,8	 billion	 by	 the	
Parliament	 in	 April	 2019	 (Copernicus,	 2018;	 Space	 News,	 2019).	 Out	 of	 this,	 €500	 million	 is	
earmarked	 for	 security	purposes,	 such	as	border	protection,	 civil	 protection	and	humanitarian	
interventions,	 through	 the	 Space	 and	 Situational	 Awareness	 (SSA)	 programme	 and	 the	 new	
Governmental	 Satellite	 Communication	 initiative	 (GOVSATCOM)	 (Legislative	 Train	 Schedule,	
2020).	
To	this	end,	the	Commission	allocated	€47,6	million	to	Frontex	between	2015-2020	for	
activities	such	as	the	coastal	monitoring	of	international	waters,	maritime	surveillance,	vessel	and	
anomaly	detection,	tracking	and	reporting	and	environmental	assessment.	In	2016,	the	European	
Parliament’s	Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs	produced	a	report	on	Space	capabilities	for	European	
security	 and	 defence	 (Committee	 on	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 2015).	 In	 the	 report,	 the	 Committee	
expressed	a	conviction	that	“current	and	future	space-based	capabilities	[…]	will	provide	Member	
States	and	the	Union	with	improved	dual-use	operational	capacity	for	the	implementation	of	the	
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common	 security	 and	 defence	 policy”	 including	 areas	 such	 as	 “external	 action,	 border	
management,	 maritime	 security,	 disaster	 management,	 humanitarian	 aid	 and	 transport”	
(Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs,	2015,	p.	5).	
In	 2018,	 in	 a	 European	 Commission	 proposal	 to	 regulate	 Frontex,	 the	 provision	 of	
Copernicus	data	to	generate	EUROSUR	Fusion	Services	was	suggested.	These	were	to	be	expanded	
to	support	checks	at	Border	Crossing	Points,	Air	Border	Surveillance	and	monitoring	of	migration	
flows	 and	 also	 to	 “significantly	 step	 up	 the	 effective	 return	 of	 irregular	 migrants”	 (European	
Commission,	2018f,	p.	27).	However,	illustrating	the	discursive	slide	between	framing	migrants	as	
a	risk	and	at	risk	that	characterizes	the	ongoing	“humanitarianization	of	border	control”	(Lemberg-
Pedersen,	 2019),	 Frontex	 Executive	 Director	 Fabrice	 Leggeri	 at	 the	 same	 stated	 that	 the	
Copernicus	Programme	“has	the	potential	to	reduce	the	death	toll	of	migrants	at	sea	by	spotting	
vessels	in	need	of	assistance”	(Frontex,	2015).	As	such,	Copernicus	and	before	it	GMES	were	pulled	
into	the	orbit	of	security	priority,	that	is,	illustrating	how	the	final	frontier	for	more	than	a	decade	
has	been	transformed	into	a	medium	through	which	to	pursue	national	or	EU	domestic	security	
objectives	in	the	form	of	border	control,	deportation	and	externalization	politics	(cf.	Akkerman,	
2019,	pp.	31-2).	
The	 volume	 of	 projected	 investment	 has	 attracted	 attention	 from	 the	 aerospace	 and	
defence	industry;	this	has	also	been	observable	in	the	European	Parliament’s	discussions.	Many	
of	 the	 biggest	 aerospace	 and	 defence	 contractors	 involved	 in	 EU	 border	 control	were	 already	
receiving	multiple	contracts	from	Copernicus	(see	Table	4).	Thus,	in	2015,	Airbus	received	a	string	
of	contracts	for	satellite	production	at	its	facilities	in	Stevenage	and	Farnborough	(UK),	Toulouse	
(France)	and	Leiden	(Netherlands),	totalling	around	€200	million	(European	Space	Agency,	2019).	
Its	subsidiary	Astrium	was	contracted	for	€350	million	at	their	Munich	plant.	EADS	–	also	under	
the	Astrium	umbrella	of	Airbus	–	received	a	number	of	contracts	totaling	nearly	€25m	for	satellite	
construction	in	Madrid.	Furthermore,	another	subsidiary,	the	Ariane	Group,	received	a	contract	
worth	€70	million.	Leonardo	received	contracts	for	satellite	construction	worth	€50,	while	GMV	
Aerospace	and	Defence	won	contracts	 for	€9	 in	Spain	and	Germany.	Moreover,	Telespazio,	 the	
Leonardo-Thales	 joint	 venture	 also	 won	 €65	 million	 in	 contracts	 for	 systems	 operation,	
maintenance	and	evolution.	Thales	 itself	won	contracts	 for	€500.	The	year	after,	Airbus	won	a	
further	fifteen	contracts	totaling	€130	million,	while	Leonardo’s	contracts	were	worth	€9,2	million	
and	Thales’	€42	million.	
	
6.5	Controversies	and	criticism		
The	early	phases	of	EUROSUR	exemplifies	how	the	project	was	framed	in	militaristic	terms	from	
the	CIVIPOL	study	in	2003	and	onwards.	But	even	though	the	fatal	reality	at	the	European	borders	
has	 undoubtedly	 deteriorated	 in	 the	 following	 period,	 the	 accelerating	 and	 comprehensive	
development	of	EUROSUR	has	increasingly	invoked	also	humanitarian	purposes	–	as	well	as	the	
original	environmental	use	-	for	the	use	of	space-based	monitoring	technology.	
The	Advisory	Groups	linked	to	research	funding	used	to	develop	and	evolve	the	EUROSUR	
system	-	SecAG,	PASAG	and	SAG	–	have	struck	somewhat	different	balances	towards	the	project,	
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with	the	two	security	groups	more	eagerly	embracing	the	border	surveillance	narrative	than	the	
SAG,	which	has	correctly	noted	how	the	development	of	GMES,	and	later	Copernicus,	has	shifted	
funds	away	from	space	R&D.	All	groups	have,	however,	framed	investments	in	border	surveillance	
networks	as	important	in	order	to	boost	European	industrial	competitiveness,	a	discourse	which	
is	mirrored	by	the	Sky	and	Space	Intergroup.	Much	of	this	development	has	been	engineered	in	
specialized	and	closed	forums,	such	as	expert	task	forces,	feasibility	studies,	groups	and	platforms,	
with	minimal	and	critical	oversight	from	civil	society.		
GMV	 has	 been	 a	 big	 beneficiary	 of	 the	 EUROSUR	 evolution	 and	 Pre-Commercial	
Procurement	 strategy,	 involving	 pro-actively	 shaping	 the	 EU	 research	 environment	 in	 order	 to	
receive	 subsidies	under	both	 FP7	and	Horizon	2020.	And	 in	 general,	 Frontex’s	 relations	 to	 the	
aerospace	and	defence	industry	and	the	management	of	contracts	pertaining	to	EUROSUR	exhibits	
similar	 tendencies	of	 capture,	 path	dependency	and	 lock-in	 effects	 as	 EU-Lisa.	However,	while	
massive	investments	are	desired	by	industrial	actors,	civil	society	and	parliamentary	circles	have	
been	more	skeptical,	taking	issue	with	opaque	estimates	and	costs	for	the	“system	of	systems”.	
Criticism	 has	 turned	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 original	 €338	million	 estimate	 did	 not	
include	operational	costs,	nor	the	roll-out	of	required	sub-systems	for	national	border	crossing	
points.	The	borderline	study	instead	provided	alternative	estimates	ranging	between	€318	million	
and	€913	million.	
A	 serious	 implication	 of	 the	 turn	 towards	 remote	 border	 surveillance	 is	 the	 way	 it	
abrogates	European	border	authorites	from	the	responsibility	to	save	lives,	in	favor	of	transferring	
that	responsibility	to	partnering	countries	with	problematic	human	rights	records.	Early	on	in	the	
development	of	the	Copernicus	Programme,	critical	voices	pointed	to	the	absence	of	reflections	
on	privacy	or	data	protection	despite	the	swathes	of	information	collected	through	the	growing	
satellite	 surveillance	 technologies	 and	 initiative	 (Hayes	 2009,	 54).	 As	 noted	 by	 the	 Council	 of	
Europe	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	such	large-scale	profiling	and	data	mining	technologies	
may	seem	to	work,	but	“inevitably	lead	to	actions	against	large	numbers	of	innocent	people	[…]	
on	a	scale	that	[…]	renders	the	`trawl´	useless”	(Hammarberg	2008,	4).	This	illustrates	how	space,	
the	final	frontier,	is	being	turned	into	a	medium	through	which	to	pursue	the	surveillance	of	the	
national	or	EU	frontier	in	the	form	of	border	control,	such	as	data	facilitating	deportations	or	the	
externalization	of	control	and	containment	of	refugees	to	non-European	countries.	
As	such,	the	measures	developed	under	the	pretext	of	EUROSUR	also	face	the	challenges	
of	necessity	and	proportionaly,	as	stipulated	by	the	European	Data	Protection	Supervisor	(EDPS).	
The	challenge	consist	in	the	fact	that	by	and	large,	neither	EU	agencies,	nor	the	commercial	actors	
with	which	 they	 collaborate	on	developing	border	 surveillance	 systems,	 attempt	 to	 assess	 the	
necessity	 of	 these	 measures,	 but	 rather	 repeatedly	 opt	 for	 more	 expansive	 and	 open-ended	
evolutions	of	the	systems.	This	makes	it	close	to	impossible	to	follow	the	four	steps	stipulated	by	
the	 EDPS	 for	 assessing	 necessity,	 namely:	 Factual	 descriptions	 of	 the	measure;	 identifying	 the	
fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	limited	by	the	data	measure;	defining	the	object	of	the	measure,	
and	 establishing	 the	 most	 officient	 and	 least	 intrusive	 option	 (EDPS	 2019).	 Similarly,	 the	
development	of	border	surveillance	also	sidesteps	the	four	steps	stipulated	by	the	EDPS	regarding	
the	assessment	of	proportionality,	namely:	The	importance	of	the	objective	and	whether	it	is	met;	
the	 scope,extent	 and	 intensity	 of	 the	 interference;	 the	 fair	 balance	 of	 the	 measure;	 and	 the	
identification	of	safeguards	if	the	measure	is	not	proportional	(Ibid).	
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7. Financial	dynamics	underpinning	the	political	economy	of	EU	border	
control	
Most	analyses	of	PMSC	involvement	in	border	control	in	the	EU	or	elsewhere	stop	at	the	level	of	
private	 companies	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 analyzing	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 border	 control	 (see	
however	 Lemberg-Pedersen,	 2013;	 Kumar,	 2017).	 EU	 subsidies	 for	 research	 and	 development	
certainly	represent	important	and	vied-for	pre-commercial	infusions	of	capital	for	actors	on	the	
market	 for	EU	border	control.	But	although	such	a	 focus	 is	 therefore	crucial	 for	examining	 the	
political	 economy	 of	 multileveled	 EU	 border	 governance,	 it	 is	 incomplete	 unless	 the	 scale	 of	
inquiry	is	elevated	to	include	the	financial	sector	as	well.	These	actors	include	the	banking	sector,	
investment	 firms,	 European	 financial	 institutions,	 pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies	 and	
Member	 States’	 export	 credit	 agencies	 (ECAs).	 Tables	 5-14	below	 illustrate	 one	 aspect	 of	 this,	
namely	the	shareholders	of	the	largest	companies	involved	in	EU	border	control	infrastructures.	
Sources	are:	marketscreener.com,	cnn.com	and	investors3M.com	
	
Table	5	-	Shareholders,	Airbus,	December	5,	2019.	
	
Table	6	-	Shareholders,	Leonardo,	December	5,	2019.		
	
Table	7	-	Shareholders,	Thales,	December	5,	2019.		
Airbus	SE %	of	shares Shares	owned
Société	de	Gestion	de	Participations	Aéronautiques 11.0 85,835,477
Gesellschaft	zur	Beteiligungsverwaltung	GZBV	mbH	&	Co.KG 11.0 85,709,822
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co.	(World	Investors) 7.06 54,941,887
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co.	(Global	Investors) 4.95 38,485,639
Sociedad	Estatal	de	Participaciones	Industriales 4.16 32,330,381
PRIMECAP	Management	Co. 2.12 16,513,798
Fidelity	Management	&	Research	Co. 2.09 16,285,922
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 2.04 15,867,684
Invesco	Advisers,	Inc. 1.41 10,978,315
FIL	Investment	Advisors	(UK)	Ltd. 1.34 10,410,049
Leonardo %	of	shares Shares	owned
Italian	Ministry	of	Economy	and	Finance 30.2 174,626,554
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co.	(World	Investors) 3.64 21,016,851
Norges	Bank	Investment	Management 2.98 17,252,008
Fidelity	Management	&	Research	Co. 2.32 13,400,022
FIL	Investment	Advisors	(UK)	Ltd. 2.25 13,018,551
Schroder	Investment	Management	Ltd. 2.17 12,544,913
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 1.92 11,109,933
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co.	(Global	Investors) 1.54 8,908,270
DWS	Investments	(UK)	Ltd. 1.41 8,123,867
AllianceBernstein	LP 1.33 7,668,183
Thales %	of	shares Shares	owned
TSA 25.7 54,788,714
Dassault	Aviation	SA 24.7 52,531,431
Thales	SA	Employees	Stock	Ownership	Plan 2.62 5,575,167
DNCA	Finance	SA 1.96 4,166,939
DWS	Investments	(UK)	Ltd. 1.88 4,009,373
Ostrum	Asset	Management	SA 1.82 3,876,838
Amundi	Asset	Management	SA	(Investment	Management) 1.55 3,295,295
T.	Rowe	Price	International	Ltd. 1.50 3,202,618
BlackRock	Investment	Management	(UK)	Ltd. 1.41 3,007,084
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 1.38 2,937,885
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Table	8	-	Shareholders,	Indra	Sistemas,	December	5,	2019.		
	
Table	9	-	Shareholders,	Safran,	December	5,	2019.		
	
Table	10	-	Shareholders,	Accenture,	December	4,	2019.	
	
Table	11	-	Shareholders,	Atos,	December	4,2019.		
	
Indra	Sistemas %	of	shares Shares	owned
Sociedad	Estatal	de	Participaciones	Industriales 18.7 33,052,038
Corporación	Financiera	Alba,	S.A. 10.5 18,584,043
Fidelity	Management	&	Research	Co. 9.16 16,186,689
Norges	Bank	Investment	Management 3.56 6,286,384
FIL	Investment	Advisors	(UK)	Ltd. 3.51 6,206,027
Invesco	Asset	Management	Ltd. 2.98 5,262,198
Threadneedle	Asset	Management	Ltd. 2.94 5,199,369
Schroder	Investment	Management	Ltd. 2.93 5,184,511
T.	Rowe	Price	International	Ltd. 2.86 5,056,529
BlackRock	Fund	Advisors 2.65 4,676,644
Safran %	of	shares Shares	owned
Agence	des	participations	de	l’État 11.7 47,983,131
Sagem	SA	Employee	Stock	Ownership	Plan 7.32 29,956,234
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co.	(World	Investors) 4.38 17,937,656
TCI	Fund	Management	Ltd.	(The	Childrens	Investment	Fund) 4.06 16,624,819
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co.	(Global	Investors) 3.14 12,863,597
BNP	Paribas	Asset	Management	France	SAS 2.31 9,441,897
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 2.25 9,207,423
Fidelity	Management	&	Research	Co. 2.02 8,258,229
Wellington	Management	Co.	LLP 1.79 7,329,753
BlackRock	Investment	Management	(UK)	Ltd. 1.74 7,121,936
Accenture %	of	shares Shares	owned
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 8.69 55,179,593
Massachusetts	Financial	Services	Co. 4.52 28,676,323
SSgA	Funds	Management,	Inc. 4.19 26,586,655
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co.	(Global	Investors) 2.50 15,899,364
BlackRock	Fund	Advisors 2.50 15,894,399
Wellington	Management	Co.	LLP 1.90 12,063,872
Geode	Capital	Management	LLC 1.63 10,374,886
Northern	Trust	Investments,	Inc.(Investment	Management) 1.55 9,860,994
Fidelity	Management	&	Research	Co. 1.29 8,204,834
Morgan	Stanley	Investment	Management	Ltd. 1.19 7,534,013
Atos %	of	shares Shares	owned
Siemens	Aktiengesellschaft 11.4 12,483,153
Fidelity	Management	&	Research	Co. 3.06 3,342,208
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 2.44 2,663,836
DWS	Investments	(UK)	Ltd. 2.20 2,406,198
Norges	Bank	Investment	Management 2.16 2,354,685
Invesco	Advisers,	Inc. 1.92 2,101,567
Janus	Capital	Management	LLC 1.87 2,044,332
JPMorgan	Asset	Management	(UK)	Ltd. 1.84 2,013,338
BNP	Paribas	Asset	Management	France	SAS 1.59 1,740,422
DWS	Investment	GmbH 1.57 1,710,780
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Table	12	-	Shareholders,	3M,	December	4,	2019.			
	
Table	13	-	Shareholders,	IBM,	December	4,	2019.	
	
Table	14	-	Shareholders,	HP,	December	4,	2019.		
The	markets	for	military	and	border	control	procurement	are	characterized	by	massively	capital-
intensive	investments	and	contracts,	the	operations	and	strategic	visions	of	many	of	the	PMSCs	
involved	in	EU	border	control	would	not	be	possible	without	the	involvement	of	these	financial	
actors,	 providing	 both	 public	 and	 private	 equity.	 Through	 the	 owning	 of	 shares	 or	 bonds,	 the	
distribution	of	grants,	the	underwriting	of	loans	or	credit	facilities	these	infusions	of	capital	are	
pivotal	for	the	border	and	defence	industrial	actors.	As	such,	the	financial	sector	also	partakes	in	
the	multileveled	processes	shaping	EU	border	politics,	and	at	a	foundational	level.		
Observing	 the	 share	 ownership	 across	 the	 ten	 companies	 represented	 in	 Tables	 5-14,	
certain	patterns	stand	out;	namely	the	involvement	of	certain	actors	across	multiple	companies	
and	sectors	of	border	control.	Notably,	a	company	like	GMV	is	not	publicly	listed,	but	wholly	owned	
by	 private	 capital.	 Representing	 	 free-floating	 private	 equity,	 the	 Vanguard	 Group	 is	 the	 top	
shareholder	of	3M,	HP,	IBM	and	Accenture,	while	also	owning	smaller	portions	of	shares	in	Airbus,	
Leonardo,	Thales,	Safran	and	Atos.	Through	its	ownership,	the	Vanguard	Group	thus	dominate	a	
number	 of	 companies,	 which	 have	 been	 central	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 EU	 databases	
controlling	borders,	whilst	also	exercising	lesser	influence	on	the	companies	involved	in	EUROSUR.	
Similarly,	 different	 BlackRock	 funds	 own	 large	 numbers	 of	 shares	 in	 3M,	 HP,	 IBM,	 Accenture,	
3M %	of	shares Shares	owned
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc.			 8.58 49,381,311
State	Street	Global	Advisors	(SSgA)							 7.36 42,360,021
BlackRock	Fund	Advisors 4.77 27,439,143
State	Farm	Investment	Management	Corporation 1.94 11,131,700
MFS	Investment	Management 1.69 9,746,650
Geode	Capital	Management,	LLC									 1.53 8,807,242
Capital	Research	Global	Investors	(U.S.)								 1.15 6,601,003
Northern	Trust	Investments,	Inc. 1.15 6,592,131
BlackRock	Investment	Management,	LTD						 1.11 6,374,003
Franklin	Advisers,	Inc. 0.95 5,469,698
IBM %	of	shares Shares	owned
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 8.01 70,940,240
SSgA	Funds	Management,	Inc. 6.08 53,860,075
BlackRock	Fund	Advisors 4.93 43,631,205
Geode	Capital	Management	LLC 1.41 12,446,460
Northern	Trust	Investments,	Inc. 1.33 11,762,581
Norges	Bank	Investment	Management 0.99 8,723,741
Morgan	Stanley	Smith	Barney	LLC 0.93 8,199,607
Charles	Schwab	Investment	Management 0.85 7,482,761
BlackRock	Investment	Management 0.79 6,970,122
Mellon	Investments	Corp. 0.79 6,957,882
HP %	of	shares Shares	owned
The	Vanguard	Group,	Inc. 8.54 126,502,896
Dodge	&	Cox 8.03 118,961,571
Capital	Research	&	Management	Co. 5.26 78,005,000
SSgA	Funds	Management,	Inc. 4.86 72,072,025
Icahn	Associates	Holding	LLC 4.24 62,902,970
Putnam	LLC 3.41 50,475,354
PRIMECAP	Management	Co. 3.15 46,702,056
Nomura	Securities	Co.,	Ltd.	(Private	Banking) 2.93 43,357,950
BlackRock	Fund	Advisors 2.68 39,648,817
Wellington	Management	Co.	LLP 2.45 36,348,706
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Safran,	Indra,	Thales.	Also,	different	Capital	Research	(9)	and	Fidelity	Management	&	Research	(5)	
funds	owns	many	shares	among	the	companies	highlighted	here.	BNP	Paribas	also	owns	shares	in	
Safran.	
Through	 government-controlled	 funds	 and	 companies,	 EU	 Member	 States	 are	 also	
strategically	involved	in	the	ownership	of	certain	companies.	Thus,	on	the	4-5	of	December	2019,	
Norges	 Bank	 Investment	Management,	 the	 asset	 management	 unit	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 central	
bank,	 owned	 shares	 in	 both	 Indra,	 IBM	 and	 Atos,	 and	 was	 in	 fact	 the	 third	 largest	 owner	 of	
Leonardo,	 after	 the	 states	 of	 Italy	 and	 Libya.	 The	 Italian	 Ministry	 of	 Economy	 and	 Finance,	
however,	 remains	 the	 largest	 shareholder,	 owning	 30,2%	 of	 the	 company.	 Similarly,	 the	 vast	
majority	of	the	controlling	interests	behind	Airbus	were	held	by,	respectively,	Societé	de	Gestion	
de	 Participations	 Aéronautiques	 (SOGEPA),	 a	 French	 holding	 company	 owned	 by	 the	 French	
government	(11%),	Gesellschaft	zur	Beteiligungsverwaltung	(GZBV)	(11%),	which	is	a	subsidiary	of	
the	development	bank,	KfW	Bankengruppe,	owned	by	Germany,	and	the	Government	of	Spain	
(416%).	Moreover,	the	Spanish	government	is	the	majority	owner	of	Indra	Sistemas	with	18.7%,	
while	its	French	counterpart	is	also	the	biggest	shareholder	of	both	Thales	with	25,.7%	and	Safran	
with	11,7%.	EU	Member	States’	 complete	or	 shared	ownership	of	 these	 companies,	 alongside	
free-floating	private	capital,	represents	a	strategic	choice	on	the	part	of	states.	It	allows	states	to	
pursue	national	political	and	economic	interests	through	the	companies,	and	conversely,	to	pursue	
company	interests	through	state	policies	(see	also	Kumar,	2017,	pp.	102-107).		
This	 is	 an	 important	 financial	 backdrop	 for	 understanding	 the	 complex	 processes	 and	
conflicts	 constantly	 evolving	 at	 the	 level	 of	 technological	 development,	 recommendations	 of	
national	experts	and	spiralling	contracts	observable	in	both	the	databases	and	EUROSUR	policy	
drives.	Moreover,	state-ownership	also	represents	an	additional	level	of	strategy,	when	it	comes	
to	 distributing	 research	 and	 development	 funds	 through	 FP7	 and	 Horizon	 2020	 calls,	 since	
governments,	MEPs,	Commission	representatives	or	national	experts	may	intervene	on	behalf	of	
companies	from	their	national	industries.	Below	is	visualized	the	influence	of	major	shareholders	
on	the	companies	involved	in,	respectively,	the	contracts	for	Eurodac,	SIS	II,	VIS	and	EES	databases	
awarded	by	EU-Lisa	 (Figure	28),	 the	 contracts	 for	EUROSUR	 infrastructure	awarded	by	Frontex	
(Figure	29),	as	well	as	the	contracts	for	the	Copernicus	programme	linked	to	EUROSUR,	awarded	
by	the	ESA	(Figure	30).	
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Figure	28	-	Shareholders,	companies,	EU	agencies	and	programmes	involved	in	Eurodac,	SIS	II,	
VIS	and	EES	contracts	
	
Figure	29	-	Shareholders,	companies,	EU	agencies	and	programmes	involved	in	EUROSUR	
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Figure	30	-	Shareholders,	companies,	EU	agencies	and	programmes	involved	in	Copernicus	
	
7.1	Border	control	on	credit		
The	R&D	funds	channelled	through	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	pale	in	comparison	with	those	provided	
by	the	global	financial	sector.	At	the	level	of	Member	States,	the	export	of	control	infrastructure	
to	European	or	non-European	countries,	can	be	supported	by	private	investment	funds,	but	also	
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providers	 of	 export	 credit.	 These	 include	 actors	 like	 the	 British	 Export	 Credits	 Guarantee	
Department,	German	Hermes,	Italian	SACE,	and	French	Coface	(Lemberg-Pedersen,	2013).	These	
actors	are	often	situated	in	a	grey	area	as	neither	fully	public	nor	private	entities,	but	their	main	
task	is	to	support	national	industries.	While	bound	by	legislation	and	arms	embargos,	the	market	
for	 border	 control	 illustrate	 the	 increasingly	 blurred	 divide	 between	 civil	 and	military	markets	
which	has	been	actively	pursued	by	the	defence	sector.	Technological	 infrastructures	such	as	IT	
systems,	identification	and	authentication	through	biometrics,	patrolling	and	monitoring	or	space-
based	surveillance	are	then	some	of	the	ways	through	which	exports	have	bypassed	restrictions,	
and	continued	the	militarization	of	EU	borders.	
The	subsidizing	of	national	actors	active	on	the	markets	for	border	control	is	replicated	at	
the	common-European	level,	through	loans	and	grants	from	instruments	like	Horizon	2020,	the	
European	Investment	Bank	(EiB),	European	Investment	Finance	(EIF)	and	InnovFin	Space	Equity	
Pilot.	For	 instance,	the	EiB	has	repeatedly	stepped	in	as	guarantor	with	a	series	of	 loans	worth	
billions	of	euro	to	the	largest	companies	on	the	European	defence	and	border	markets	by	raising	
funds	on	capital	markets	and	then	loaning	them	on	favourable	terms	to	these	actors.	As	shown	in	
Table	15,	some	of	these	have	been	granted	to	the	Finmeccanica-subsidiary	Alenia	Aeronautica,	
and	later	Leonardo,	EADS,	and	later	Airbus,	Safran,	as	well	as	Indra	and	Ariane,	the	joint	venture	
between	Airbus	and	Safran.	
	
Table	15	-	Selected	European	Investment	Bank	(EiB)-loans	to	European	PMSCs,	2009-2019.	
Source:	EiB	website	
The	EiB	 loans	are	driven	forward	by	the	discourses	of	 fighting	“market	 fragmentation”	and	the	
desire	 to	 foster	 a	 Single	Market	 through	 interoperability	 and	 standardization.	While	 industrial	
actors	and	interest	organizations	frame	investments	in	such	infrastructures	as	cheapest	in	the	long	
run,	this	assumption	has,	however,	been	challenged	by	research	into	the	projected	costs	of	both	
border	databases	and	the	EUROSUR	project,	not	least	when	it	comes	to	spin-off	contracts	required	
at	national	 level.	At	any	rate,	the	spiralling	costs	associated	with	both	infrastructures	illustrates	
the	capital-intensive	character	of	 this	policy	drive	and	the	crucial	 strategic	 role	of	 the	 financial	
sector	for	these	commercial	actors.	
	 Moving	from	EU	instruments	to	the	commercial	financial	sector,	more	actors	are	involved	
in	 the	 financing	of	 the	operations,	R&D	and	contracts	of	 the	 largest	border	 industrial	actors	 in	
Europe.	 Most	 of	 the	 companies	 involved	 in	 EU	 border	 control	 infrastructures	 operate	 with	
revolving	 credit	 lines,	 or	 facilities,	 which	 means	 that	 they	 borrow	 money	 from	 financial	
institutions,	against	certain	fees,	and	can	then	use	that	money	to	finance	running	operation	costs.	
Agency Year
Value	of	
contract	(€) Sector
Finmeccanica	 2009 500.000.000 Aviation	R&D
Safran 2009 300.000.000 Aircraft	R&D
EADS	 2011 500.000.000 Aviation	R&D
Airbus	 2015 500.000.000 Aerospace	R&D
Indra 2016 80.000.000 RadarR&D
Leonardo 2018 299.999.991 Cybersecurity	R&D
Ariane 2020 200.000.000 Aerospace	R&D
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These	 financial	 flows	 are	 therefore	 also	 crucial	 political	 economic	 underpinnings	 in	 the	
development	of	EU	border	control.	Examples	abound,	but	to	mention	a	few,	Finmeccanica	in	2010,	
signed	a	revolving	credit	 line	of	€2,4	billion	provided	by	a	conglomerate	of	24	European	credit	
institutions,	headed	by	BNP	Paribas	and	including	Bank	of	Scotland,	Unicredit,	Barclays,	JP	Morgan	
and	Goldman	Sachs.	Following	the	name	change	to	Leonardo,	the	company	replaced	it	in	2014	by	
another	credit	worth	€2,2	billion,	and	involving	many	of	the	same	banks.	Yet	another	credit	deal	
was	signed	in	2018	worth	3,6	billion,	and	involving	26	banks,	including	the	lead	arrangers	Natixis	
S.A,	The	Royal	Bank	of	 Scotland	and	Deutsche	Bank	 (Leonardo,	2014;	 Leonardo	Press	Release,	
2018).	In	a	similar	manner,	Airbus	has	a	€3	billion	revolving	credit	facility	coordinated	by	Tokyo-
Mitsubishi	UFJ,	Credit	Agricole	CIB,	the	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	and	UniCredit	(Airbus	website)	and	
Thales	operates	with	€1.5	billion	 in	a	 revolving	credit,	coordinated	by	BNP,	Credit	Agricole	and	
HSBC.	In	2010,	Safran	signed	a	€1.6	billion	revolving	credit	facility,	overseen	by	Credit	Agricole	and	
HSBC	and	involving	10	more	banks.	
Furthermore,	Atos	operates	with	€1.8	billion	in	revolving	credit	through	banks	including	
Tokyo-Mitsubishi,	Barclays,	BNP	and	Credit	Agricole.	In	2016,	3M	signed	a	$3.75	billion	in	revolving	
credit	administrated	by	Citibank,	which	was	replaced	in	2019	by	one	worth	$3	billion,	against	with	
Citibank	as	lead	arranger.		IBM	holds	a	gigantic	$15	billion	in	revolving	credit,	co-ordinated	by	J.P	
Morgan,	while	HP	 recently	 renewed	 their	 revolving	 credit	of	 $4.75	billion,	 co-ordinated	by	 J.P.	
Morgan	and	Citibank.	
7.2	Controversies	and	criticism			
Examining	 the	 financial	 dimension	 of	 the	 political	 economy	 underpinning	 EU	 border	 control	
provides	important	insights	into	the	multileveled	processes	shaping	the	material	infrastructure	of	
Union	 border	 control.	 This	 is	 an	 under-examined	 and	 –prioritized	 aspect	 of	 research	 into	 the	
militarization	of	European	border	control.	The	stock	ownership,	grants,	loans	and	credit	facilities	
provided	by	national	or	global	actors	on	the	financial	scene	are	without	a	doubt	absolutely	crucial	
for	the	operations	and	strategic	visions	pursued	by	the	main	actors	on	the	market	for	EU	border	
control.			
Examining	the	financial	dimension	of	the	market	for	border	control	also	accentuates	the	
important	point	that	as	border	infrastructures	are	being	expanded	along	the	lines	of	surveillance	
and	defence,	the	notoriously	opaque	relations	between	banks,	investment	firms	and	the	suppliers	
of	 military	 technology,	 are	 increasingly	 also	 being	 transferred	 to	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 EU	
borders.		
Not	only	are	 the	conglomerate	actors	 incredibly	volatile	 through	mergers,	 subsidiaries,	
joint	ventures	and	take-overs,	the	financial	flows	underpinning	them	are	also	difficult	to	follow.	
And	yet,	through	large	and	successive	framework	contracts,	these	actors	are	nonetheless	actively	
reshaping	the	technological	outlook	of	EU	borders,	leading	to	associated	political	lock-in	effects.	
This	has	ramifications	for	both	the	general	European	public,	who	have	little	opportunity	
to	realize	how,	and	by	who,	the	formation	of	EU	border	control	is	being	influenced,	as	well	as	for	
EU	policy-makers	who	are	situated	at	the	locus	of	intersecting	and	extremely	powerful	interests.	
While	these	span	 institutional	and	private,	national	and	global	 financial	and	strategic	 interests,	
they	may	not	be	most	conducive	 for	 long-term	political	outlooks	compatible	with	concerns	 for	
democratic	stability	and	fundamental	human	rights.	
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8. Conclusion	
Through	a	methodology	involving	the	construction	of	several	databases,	and	multi-sourced	desk	
research	into	the	actors,	networks	and	instruments	underpinning	EU	border	control,	this	report	
has	 discussed	 the	 conjunction	 between	 EU	 institutions	 and	 private	 actors	 from	 the	 European	
security	and	defence	sector.	The	cases	of	interoperable	EU	databases,	like	Eurodac,	VIS,	SIS	and	
EES,	 and	 the	 space-based,	 networked	 surveillance	 pursued	 under	 the	 EURUSOUR	 project,	
represent	 the	 intensification	 and	 proliferation	 of	 public-private	 interactions	 concerning	 the	
infrastructures	of	EU	border	control	and	governance.		
Although	the	market	for	EU	border	control	is	multisectoral,	it	is	dominated	by	conglomerates	
from	security,	defence,	aerospace	and	biometrics.	Accordingly,	their	capture	and	co-shaping	of	the	
priorities	 for	 EU’s	 border	 infrastructures	 has	 served	 to	 accelerate	 the	 securitization	 and	
militarization	 of	 the	 associated	 European	 border	 control.	 The	 result	 is	 that	 the	 mobility	
governance	 of	 the	 EU	 is	 increasingly	 evolving	 into	 a	 market	 for	 border	 control	 services	 and	
products	along	premises	co-shaped	by	the	largest	market	actors	themselves.	They	both	position	
themselves,	and	are	being	positioned,	as	unrivalled	experts.	But	this	connects	border	control	to	
industrial	 ambitions	 of	 widening	 and	 standardized	 future	 markets,	 of	 fighting	 market	
fragmentation,	and	of	fusing	civil	and	military	purposes.	
The	processes	through	which	this	continues	to	happen	remain	opaque	to	civil	society	and	
democratic	EU	organs	as	well	as	to	those	migrants	and	refugees	which	experience	the	systems	of	
border	 control	 and	 surveillance	 from	 the	 outside.	 This	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 increasing	
involvement	of	European	universities	and	academic	institutions	in	the	resarch	and	development	
of	border	control	and	surveillance.	
The	framing	of	technological	border	infrastructures	as	a	politically	neutral	growth	area	for	
European	 industrial	 competitiveness	 vis	 a	 vis	 Asia	 and	 America	 appear	 abstracted	 from	 and	
omitting	the	violent	and	politically	contested	character	that	has	surrounded	EU	border	control	in	
the	 last	 decades.	 The	 coinciding	 roll-out	 of	 border	 control	 interventions	 and	 their	 associated	
technological	 infrastructure	with	 the	 tragic,	periluous	and	 life-threatening	migration	 routes	 for	
third	 country	 nationals	 into	 the	 EU	 is	worrying	 and	 rarely	 if	 ever	 addressed	 in	 the	myriads	 of	
reports,	 meeting	 minutes,	 contracts,	 topics,	 consortium	 objectives	 or	 company	 profiles	 and	
webpages	examined	for	this	report.	
	 Various	 lobbying	 strategies	 and	 forums	 are	 deployed	 by	 actors	 on	 the	 market	 for	 EU	
border	 control,	 from	 direct	 meetings	 with	 Commission	 representatives,	 over	 intergroups,	
extraparliamentary	forums	and	interest	organizations.	Yet	others	are	blurred	forums	where	the	
actors	on	the	market	for	border	control	are	invited	into	strategic	or	decision-making	processes.	
The	Group	of	Personalities,	European	Security	Research	Advisory	Board,	the	European	Security	
Research	Innovation	Forum,	the	FP7	and	Horizon	2020	Advisory	Groups		and	European	Technology	
Platforms	 are	 but	 some	 examples.	 Policies	 also	 evolve	 through	 a	 plethora	 of	 lucheons,	 talks,	
meetings,	workshops,	 seminars	 and	 conferences,	 all	 events	where	 norms	 and	 knowledges	 are	
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continuously	recalibrated.	These	are	settings	which,	for	the	most	part,	are	not	accessible	to	the	
general	public.	
Accordingly,	 through	 the	 construction	of	databases,	 the	 report	 identifies	multiple	R&D	
projects	and	framework	contracts	pertaining	to	interoperable	border	databases	and	the	EUROSUR	
project,	which	have	been	consistently	awarded	to	a	select	few	big	security	and	defence	companies	
and	consortiums	in	Europe.	These	actors	are	involved	in	EU	border	infrastructures	on	the	levels	of	
strategy,	planning,	advisory	 input	and	technical	expertise,	but	also	as	product	suppliers	 for	 the	
«	end	users	»,	 that	 is	 the	EU	or	national	 agencies	 and	bodies	 tasked	with	border	 control.	 The	
different	levels	on	which	vested	interests	affect	policy-making	on	EU	borders	is	further	illustrated	
when	considering	the	financial	dynamics	underpinning	the	conglomerate	actors	involved	in	border	
control,	 through	 shareholding,	 grants,	 loans	 and	 credits.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 strategic	 and	
operational	influence	on	border-making	yielded	by	global	finance	is	an	understudied	aspect	of	the	
militarization	of	EU	borders,	and	suggests	paths	to	remedy	this.		
From	within	a	framework	of	forward-looking	and	sustainable	policy	based	on	the	respect	
of	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 democratic	 transparency,	 the	 report	 details	 how	 this	 development	
leads	to	 technological	and	political	 lock-in	effects.	These	make	 it	diffulcult	 for	policy-makers	 to	
question	or	reverse	the	functionality	of	the	EU	borders	as	well	as	the	norms	embedded	within	
infrastructures	 such	 as	 the	 VIS,	 SIS,	 EES	 or	 EUROSUR	 systems.	 These	 dynamics	 pose	 serious	
challenges	not	just	to	the	democratic	legitimacy	and	transparency	of	the	EU’s	multileved	border	
governance,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 balance	 struck	 between	 short-sighted,	 vested	 interests,	 and	 the	
forward-looking,	long-term	ambitions	in	European	Union	migration	politics.	
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